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United States v. Cardillo

April 24, 1963

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE,
v.
JOHN CARDILLO, LAWRENCE HARRIS, RALPH KAMINSKY, JOHN KNAPP, LOUIS MARGOLIS, AND LOUIS PISELLI, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.



Author: Moore

Before CLARK, WATERMAN and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

LEONARD P. MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Appellants were all in some way involved in the interstate transportation and sale of furs stolen from the Zwerdling fur shop in Paterson, New Jersey. The indictment was in four counts: Piselli and Knapp were convicted on Count One of transporting stolen goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and on Count Two of conspiring to transport stolen goods in violation of § 2314. All appellants were convicted on Count Three of receiving goods which were moving in interstate commerce knowing the same to have been stolen, 18 U.S.C. § 2315, and on Count Four of conspiring to receive goods in violation of § 2315. Knapp was sentenced to concurrent ten-year terms on Counts One and Three and concurrent two-year terms on Counts Two and Four; the sentences on Counts Two and Four are to be served consecutively to the sentences on Counts One and Three. Piselli was sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years on Counts One and Three and two years on Counts Two and Four. Harris and Margolis were sentenced to concurrent four-year sentences on Counts Three and Four. Cardillo received concurrent five-year sentences on Counts Three and Four. Ralph Kaminsky was sentenced to six years on Count Three and five years on Count Four, both sentences to be served concurrently.

The major part of the government's case was supplied by the testimony of Thaddeus Ohrynowicz and Max Friedman, both of whom testified to having a part in the criminal plan.

Ohrynowicz testified that Knapp approached him about taking part in a burglary in New Jersey and that, after examining several possibilities, they decided on the Zwerdling fur shop in Paterson, New Jersey. After surveying the store area on September 17, 1960, they concluded that they would need the assistance of a lock man. When they returned to New York that night, they communicated with Piselli, a lock expert, and he agreed to work with them. The following day, Sunday, September 18th, Knapp, Ohrynowicz and Piselli drove from New York City to Paterson and, after picking up tools at a garage that they had rented, they proceeded to Zwerdling's. They secured entrance to the fur shop by breaking into a dentist's office above the shop and drilling a hole through the floor into the store below. As Piselli and Ohrynowicz were leaving with the furs, on their way to join Knapp at the car, they were accosted by residents of the building who demanded to know what was in the bags that they were carrying. Piselli and Ohrynowicz fled in different directions and, in his flight, Ohrynowicz dropped the bags of furs that he was carrying. Piselli managed to meet Knapp and put the furs, which he was carrying, in the car. Knapp drove the car back to New York, Piselli and Ohrynowicz each returned to New York separately. That night, after his return from New Jersey, Ohrynowicz met Cardillo in a bar in New York and told him of the Zwerdling robbery. After a short time Knapp joined them and told them that he had left the furs in a locker at the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York City. Knapp, Ohrynowicz and Cardillo then drove in the latter's car to the terminal and got the furs which Cardillo and Ohrynowicz took to Ohrynowicz's hotel room.

On Tuesday, September 20, 1960, Knapp told Ohrynowicz that Nicholas Sten*fn1 had found a man named Lou (later identified as Margolis) who was willing to purchase the furs for $7,500. On the following day, Sten called Margolis and arranged for him to meet Ohrynowicz that day. At this meeting Margolis asked for some time to think over the purchase. They met again the following day. Margolis then agreed to take the furs but told Ohrynowicz that he could not pay for them until he sold them. On Saturday, September 24th, Ohrynowicz delivered the furs to Margolis at his place of business. On the following Tuesday Sten delivered $4,000 to Ohrynowicz who divided it, giving two-thirds to Knapp (presumably one-third was for Piselli) and keeping one-third for himself. On Friday, September 30th, Sten delivered $3,500 to Ohrynowicz who, after deducting $300 to cover the payment of $150 each to Sten and Cardillo, made the same division of the remainder.

Friedman testified that on September 20, 1960, Harris told him that he had an opportunity to buy some stolen furs, which he later stated came from the Zwerdling store in Paterson, New Jersey, and asked if Friedman could lend him some money for the purchase. About a week later, Harris told Friedman that Margolis offered him the furs for $7,500 and that he was going to meet Margolis and pick up the furs. When they met later the same day at Harris's house, Harris had the furs and asked Friedman for a loan of $5,000. Friedman then went out to obtain the $5,000. Upon his return, he gave it to Harris. Harris then said that he had to go to meet Margolis but he told Friedman to return later that evening. Friedman returned and met Harris at about ten P.M. and at about one A.M. Ralph Kaminsky arrived. Kaminsky agreed to pay $250 each for 28 of the fur pieces and the three men took the furs and put them in Kaminsky's car.

The first question to be considered is whether the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by Ohrynowicz and Friedman during cross-examination so limited appellants' right to cross-examine the witnesses against them that the convictions should be reversed. After having been instructed by the judge that he could refuse to answer questions if the answers would tend to incriminate him under state or federal law, Ohrynowicz refused to answer several questions by defense counsel relating to prior criminal activity unrelated to the crime at issue. Friedman was also instructed that he had a right to refuse to answer questions if the answers would incriminate him, and he refused to answer questions concerning the source (other than a "friend") of the $5,000 that he allegedly lent to Harris to finance the purchase of the furs from Margolis.

The right of a defendant in a federal court to confront witnesses against him, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, includes the right to test the truth of those witnesses' testimony by cross-examination. Greene v. Mc-Elroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959); see In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1941); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S. Ct. 218, 75 L. Ed. 624 (1931); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 19 S. Ct. 574, 43 L. Ed. 890 (1898). The importance of cross-examination in our jurisprudence has been well stated by Professor Wigmore:

"It is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. However difficult it may be for the layman, the scientist, or the foreign jurist to appreciate this, its wonderful power, there has probably never been a moment's doubt upon this in the mind of a lawyer of experience." (5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (3d ed. 1940))

Since the right to cross-examine is guaranteed by the Constitution, a federal conviction will be reversed if the cross-examination of government witnesses has been unreasonably limited. E.g., Alford v. United States, supra; United States v. Masino, 2 Cir. 1960, 275 F.2d 129; United States v. Lester, 2 Cir. 1957, 248 F.2d 239. However, reversal need not result from every limitation of permissible cross-examination and a witness' testimony may, in some cases, be used against a defendant, even though the witness invokes his privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination. In determining whether the testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination may be used against the defendant, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear only on the credibility of the witness and those cases in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry into matters about which the witness testified on direct examination. Where the privilege has been invoked as to purely collateral matters, there is little danger of prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, the witness's testimony may be used against him. United States v. Kravitz, 3 Cir. 1960, 281 F.2d 581; Hamer v. United States, 9 Cir. 1958, 259 F.2d 274; United States v. Toner, 3 Cir. 1949, 173 F.2d 140. On the other hand, if the witness by invoking the privilege precludes inquiry into the details of his direct testimony, there may be a substantial danger of prejudice because the defense is deprived of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony and, therefore, that witness's testimony should be stricken in whole or in part, Montgomery v. United States, 5 Cir. 1953, 203 F.2d 887; cf. United States v. Andolschek, 2 Cir. 1944, 142 F.2d 503; Stephan v. United States, 6 Cir. 1943, 133 F.2d 87; United States v. Keown, W.D.Ky.1937, 19 F.Supp. 639.

The district court was not in error in refusing to strike Ohrynowicz' testimony. After admitting to a substantial criminal record, Ohrynowicz invoked the privilege against self-incrimination when asked whether he committed other crimes in the past and whether he was guilty of certain crimes with which he was then charged in the state courts. These questions were purely collateral for they related solely to his credibility as a witness and had no relation to the subject matter of his direct examination. Since the trial court was aware of his substantial criminal record and the pendency of other criminal actions against him, the defendants were not prejudiced by Ohrynowicz' assertion of the privilege and, therefore, there was no need to strike his testimony. United States v. Kravitz, supra; Hamer v. United States, supra; United States v. Toner, supra.*fn2

HARRIS and KAMINSKY

Defense counsels' motion to strike the testimony of Max Friedman because of his refusal on Fifth Amendment grounds to answer questions concerning the source of the $5,000 that he allegedly gave Harris to use for the purchase of the stolen furs presents a much more troublesome problem. Friedman's testimony comprised practically the entire case against Harris and Kaminsky. He testified that Harris had told him "that he (Harris) had a chance to buy a lot of clipped [stolen] furs", that the asking price was $9,000 which he thought was too much, that "he was going to wait to see if he can get them cheaper" and asked was he [Friedman] in a position to help him by loaning him some money if he consummated the deal. Friedman testified further that he had been at Harris's house a week later on which occasion Harris told him that he had bought the furs for $7,500 and that he had asked Friedman if he had the money. Friedman said that he left and returned with $5,000 which he gave to Harris. After some cross-examination concerning his financial resources (which tended to show that he was not a ...


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