Argued Oct. 5, 1988.
Carl D. Eisenman, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Dennis A. Santore, State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before DUPONT, C.J., and SPALLONE and FOTI, JJ.
The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of the crimes of robbery in the first degree, General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(3), and attempt to commit larceny in the first degree by extortion, General Statutes §§ 53a-122(a)(1) and 53a-49. The defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in denying his request to compel a codefendant to answer "non-self-incriminating" questions, in violation of his right under the Connecticut constitution and General Statutes § 54-153 to compulsory process, and (2) in excluding as hearsay the testimony of a witness concerning what was told to her by an unavailable defense witness. We find no error.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On February 3, 1987, the victim went to the premises at 42 Taylor Terrace in New Milford, a house he owned that was being rented by his daughter and her husband. Lisa Percoco, the defendant's girlfriend, who was a friend of the victim's daughter, was at the residence. The victim and Percoco were in a bedroom, partially dressed, engaging in sexual activity when the defendant entered the room and represented by his actions that he was photographing them. While the victim was attempting to dress, he was attacked by the defendant, who struck him, threw him down the stairs, put a knife to his throat, and took his wallet, which contained approximately $120. The defendant then informed the victim that, unless the victim procured $5000 and placed it in a mailbox at a designated address by 8 p.m. that night, the defendant would show the purported photographs to the victim's wife. The victim proceeded to make telephone arrangements for the procurement and placement of the money according to the defendant's instructions. The defendant and Percoco left the premises together.
Thereafter, the victim reported the incident to the police, who subsequently arrested the defendant and Percoco. Percoco was charged with attempt to commit larceny [17 Conn.App. 360] in the first degree by extortion. The defendant and Percoco were originally scheduled to be tried [17 Conn.App. 361] in the same proceeding, but the court granted Percoco's motion to sever. Her trial was scheduled to follow the defendant's.
During the course of his trial, the defendant called Percoco as a witness. Percoco was questioned in an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury. Initially, in response to defense counsel's questions, she gave her name and testified that she knew the defendant. She refused to say how long she had known the defendant, asserting her rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. She went on to answer questions as to her age and birthdate. She refused to answer a question inquiring where she had been living on February 3, 1987, the date of the incident in question, again citing her fifth amendment privilege. She answered in the affirmative a question about whether she had been receiving public assistance during February, 1987. Thereafter, in obedience to the court's order directing her to answer yes or no, Percoco affirmed that she had prepared a letter or written statement addressed to the defendant sometime after February 3, 1987. Relying on the fifth amendment privilege, she refused to answer all other questions. 
[17 Conn.App. 362] Upon completing his unsuccessful line of questioning, defense counsel requested the court's permission to call Percoco to the stand in front of the jury to ask her those questions that she had willingly answered without asserting a fifth amendment privilege. The state's attorney objected. After a discussion between counsel and the court regarding the relevance of the testimony Percoco would willingly offer (i.e., her name, age, the fact that she knew the defendant, the fact that she was receiving public assistance, and the fact that she had sent a written document to the defendant), the state moved that the court not permit Percoco to take the stand as a witness Before the jury. Percoco's counsel argued that Percoco had an "absolute right not to testify to anything incriminating" and that she had indicated[17 Conn.App. 363] to him that she was "not willing to answer any questions at all." The court then questioned Percoco, who reiterated her decision not to answer certain questions.  Thereafter, the court ruled that questioning of Percoco in the presence of the jury would not be permitted.
The question in this appeal is whether the court erred in permitting Percoco to exercise a "blanket privilege" by refusing to answer any and all questions in front of the jury. The defendant argues that the court's decision in this regard resulted in the denial of his right to compulsory process under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution and his statutory right under General Statutes § 54-153 to have witnesses summoned on his behalf. These claims are without merit.
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in refusing to compel the witness to testify Before the jury. At the time she was called to testify at the defendant's trial, Percoco was awaiting trial on charges based on the same alleged facts and circumstances that gave rise to the charges brought against the defendant. Consequently, while being questioned by defendant's counsel outside
the jury's presence, she repeatedly asserted her fifth amendment right not to incriminate herself and declined to answer all material questions. The trial court correctly sustained her claim of privilege. In order for the trial court properly to refuse to recognize the privilege when a witness invokes [17 Conn.App. 364] it, it must be "perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have ... a tendency to incriminate." (Emphasis in original.) Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488, 71 S.Ct. 814, 819, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); see also State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310, 319, 511 A.2d 1000 (1986); State v. Simms, 170 Conn. 206, 209, 365 A.2d 821, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1732, 48 L.Ed.2d 199 (1976). To sustain the privilege against self-incrimination, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the context in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. State v. Simms, supra, citing Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. at 486-87, 71 S.Ct. at 818-19. In view of the fact that Percoco was awaiting trial on a criminal charge arising out of the same factual circumstances as the charges against the defendant, it is clear that any testimony she might give could compromise her ability to defend herself against that pending charge. SeeState v. Williams, supra, 200 Conn. at 319-20, 511 A.2d 1000 (codefendant whose trial had been servered from that of defendant and who had pleaded guilty, but was awaiting sentencing, was properly permitted by the court to invoke the fifth amendment privilege and refuse to testify at defendant's trial); United States v. Thornton, 733 F.2d 121, 125-26 (D.C.Cir.1984) (trial court properly concluded that any testimony by co-defendant could tend to incriminate him). The trial court therefore acted properly in sustaining Percoco's claimed fifth amendment privilege not to testify.
The defendant contends, however, that the court at least should have required Percoco to take the witness stand in front of the jury and answer those questions she had willingly answered outside the jury's presence. The defendant says this would have assisted the jury [17 Conn.App. 365] in evaluating the credibility of the victim's testimony. The defendant essentially argues that in this way the court could have accommodated his state constitutional right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his behalf. He refers to the decision in State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 523 A.2d 451 (1987), in support of these claims.
It is true that the defendant has a right under article first, § 8, of the state constitution to have compulsory process to produce witnesses in his behalf. Percoco, however, had a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In a conflict between the rights of the accused and the privilege of a witness, "the accused's right to compel testimony must give way to the witness' privilege against self-incrimination, just as the power of the state to compel testimony must give way to the privilege." State v. Simms, supra. The decision in State v. Bryant, supra, does not alter that conclusion. In Bryant, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in refusing to compel a witness to answer Before the jury only those questions he had willingly answered on the voir dire. The trial court had refused to compel the witness to testify on the basis that the testimony the witness had willingly given was irrelevant. The Supreme Court held that the testimony was clearly relevant because the identity of the culprit was in issue and the witness had willingly testified, without asserting his fifth amendment privilege, to his age, height, weight, familial relationship to the defendant, and other discrete facts ...