United States District Court, D. Connecticut
Louis R. Pepe, Special Master: Louis R. Pepe, LEAD ATTORNEY,
McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP, Hartford, CT.
Sikiotis, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff: Anthony J. Pantuso, III,
LEAD ATTORNEY, Richard Eugene Hayber, Hayber Law Firm LLC,
Vitesse Worldwide Chaufeeured Services, Inc., Shahin
Abaspour, Defendants: Michele F. Martin, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO
HAC VICE, Pastore & Dailey LLC - FL, Gainsville, FL;
Christopher E. Geotes, Joseph M. Pastore, III, Pastore &
Dailey, LLC, Stamford, CT.
Bond Arterton, United States District Judge.
Tom Sikiotis brings this action alleging willful and
nonwillful violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (" FLSA" ) 29 U.S.C. § 201, et
seq., by Defendants Vitesse Worldwide Chauffeured
Services, Inc., (" Vitesse" ) and Shahin Abaspour
arising out of Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff
overtime compensation at a rate of one-and-one-half times
Plaintiff's regular pay for all hours worked over forty
hours per week. (Am. Compl. [Doc. # 22] ¶ 12.)
Defendants now move [Doc. # 26] to dismiss Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. For the following reasons,
Defendants' motion is denied.
factual contentions in Mr. Sikiotis' Amended Complaint
allege the following: Mr. Sikiotis was employed by Defendant
Vitesse, a Connecticut corporation with a principal place of
business in Stamford, Connecticut. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.)
Vitesse provides limousine services through its offices
located across the country. ( Id. ¶ 7.)
Defendant Abaspour is the owner and President of Vitesse. (
Id. ¶ 6.) Mr. Abaspour " had the authority
to set the hours of employment, hire and fire, maintain
employment records, [and] to direct the work and . . .
determine the rate and method of payment of wages of
Sikiotis." ( Id. ) " Abaspour's
exercise of that authority was the direct cause of
Vitesse's failure to pay wages."
was responsible for picking up and driving Defendants'
customers to various locations in Connecticut, New York, and
New Jersey. ( Id. ¶ 8.) During job assignments,
Plaintiff was required to wait and be on call, was not free
to engage in personal activities, had to perform various
non-driving tasks including ensuring the vehicle was cleaned
and serviced, and was required to be in contact with
Defendants at all times. ( Id. ¶ ¶ 9, 11,
15.) As well, Plaintiff was required to be at pickup
locations at least fifteen minutes before scheduled pickup
times for each job assignment. ( Id. ¶ 10.)
states that he customarily and regularly worked more than
forty-hours per week but was not paid overtime compensation.
( Id. ¶ 12.) To illustrate typical work weeks
during the period of the claim, the Amended Complaint states
that in the week ending February 24, 2013, Plaintiff had a
total of 21 jobs and worked at least 52 hours; in the week
ending March 3, 2013, Plaintiff had a total of 17 jobs and
worked at least 42 hours; and in the week ending on March 10,
2013, Plaintiff had a total of 18 jobs and worked at least 45
hours. ( Id. ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff received all of his job assignments through
Defendants' dispatchers, Defendants " knew or should
have known" that Plaintiff worked over forty hours per
week, and a reasonable investigation by Defendants would have
revealed that limousine drivers were entitled to overtime pay
because the SAFETEA-LY Technical Corrections Act of 2008
(" Corrections Act" ), enacted June 6, 2008,
removed limousine drivers like Plaintiff who crossed state
lines from coverage of the Motor Carrier Exemption to FLSA.
(Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 16, 17). Nonetheless, Defendants
took no steps to ensure their compliance with the
widely-publicized Act and the FLSA.
Pleading Overtime Violations Under the FLSA
the FLSA, an employee bringing an action for unpaid overtime
wages has the burden of proving that she performed work for
which she was not properly compensated. See
Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., Ypsilon Constr.
Corp., 318 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680,
687, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946)). To succeed on a
FLSA overtime claim, an employee must show that: (1) she was
eligible for overtime (i.e., not exempt from the Act's
overtime pay requirements); and (2) she actually worked
overtime hours for which she was not compensated.
See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a); Hosking v. New
World Mortgage, Inc., 602 F.Supp.2d 441, 447 (E.D.N.Y.
2009). Defendants do not challenge Mr. Sikiotis'
eligibility for overtime compensation. Rather, they maintain
that he has failed to state a plausible overtime violation
under the FLSA because he has not adequately alleged that he
worked compensable overtime hours for which he was not
parties rely on Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long
Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013) and
Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys.,
Inc., 723 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2013), in which the Second
Circuit addressed the degree of pleading specificity required
for FLSA overtime claims. The Lundy plaintiffs, a
respiratory therapist and two nurses, brought a class action
alleging that the Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc.,
" failed to compensate them adequately for time worked
during meal breaks, before and after scheduled shifts, and
during required training sessions" in violation of
various statutes including the FLSA. 711 F.3d at 109.
Recognizing divergency within the Circuit and in sister
circuits as to the level of factual detail necessary to state
a plausible claim for overtime compensation under the FLSA,
Lundy established a baseline: " We conclude
that in order to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a
plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours of work in a
given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess
of the 40 hours." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §
207(a)(1)). While Lundy did not require the
plaintiffs to plead an ...