United States District Court, D. Connecticut
AMENDED ORDER OF RESTITUTION
R. UNDERHILL, District Judge.
11, 2012, the defendant, Peter Pinto, pleaded guilty to one
count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud, and
money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. Â§ 371, and one
count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1343. (doc.
16) Pinto then made six motions to continue sentencing (docs.
26, 35, 48, 63, 79, 88), all of which I granted. On December
17, 2013, Pinto was sentenced to two terms of imprisonment,
as well as restitution in an amount to be determined by a
subsequent hearing; the judgment of conviction entered on
January 7, 2014. (doc. 102)
to the Mandatory Victim's Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. Â§
3663 et seq. ("the "MVRA"), Pinto is
now ordered to pay $10, 401, 227.00 in restitution, to be
distributed according to the schedule attached to this Order.
Delay in Setting Amount of Restitution
MVRA states that "the court shall set a date for the
final determination of the victim's losses, not to exceed
90 days after sentencing." 18 U.S.C. Â§ 3664(d)(5). That
deadline has not been met in this case; however, in Dolan
v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010), the Supreme Court
unequivocally stated that such a delay is not fatal to a
district court's ability to award restitution:
We hold that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day
deadline nonetheless retains the power to order
restitution-at least where, as here, the sentencing court
made clear prior to the deadline's expiration that it
would order restitution, leaving open (for more than 90 days)
only the amount.
Id. at 608; see also id. at 613-14
("[T]o read the statute as depriving the sentencing
court of the power to order restitution would harm those-the
victims of crime-who likely bear no responsibility for the
deadline's being missed and whom the statute also seeks
present case, at Pinto's sentencing on December 19, 2013,
I ordered that restitution was to be awarded in an amount to
be determined, that the amount was payable immediately and
that the remainder should be paid at the commencement of
Pinto's supervised released at a rate of no less than
$500 per month. See Sentencing Tr. at 30 (doc. 112).
government filed its first motion to adopt a proposed
restitution order on January 20, 2014. (doc. 103) Pinto
subsequently made four motions for extension of time to
respond, (docs. 105, 109, 115, 117), based on the
counsel's difficulty communicating with his client and
on-going discussion between the government and Pinto
regarding issues in the first restitution order, all of which
I granted in order to give the parties time to resolve their
August 21, 2015, the government filed a motion to adopt an
updated restitution order that reflected some of the
negotiations between the parties, including several
reductions based on Pinto's assertions regarding the
losses suffered by specific clients. (doc. 123) Specifically,
Pinto asserted that the investor victims were repaid more
than the government acknowledges. I held a phone conference
on September 18, 2015 to discuss any remaining disputes
between the parties. (doc. 127) During that conference, I
asked Pinto's counsel to confer further with his client
to determine whether he wished to change his position
regarding an argument that was apparently foreclosed by his
Stipulation of Offense Conduct. Id. On September 22,
2015, Pinto's counsel affirmed that Pinto did not wish to
change his position.
the holding in Dolan clearly applies to this case,
where only the amount of restitution was left open at the
time of Pinto's sentencing, Pinto himself was responsible
for considerable delays in determining that amount, and where
an inability to grant restitution would only harm the victims
of Pinto's illegal scheme.
Amount of Restitution
to the MVRA, 18 U.S.C. Â§ 3664(e), I must resolve a dispute
about restitution by the preponderance of the evidence. The
burden for showing loss amount rests with the government.
argues that the government has still not met that burden, and
requests that the government conduct additional
investigations and provide him with additional documentation.
Def.'s Letter to Underhill, J. (Sep. 15, 2015, doc. 126).
The government explained in the phone conference that, given
the nature of the offense, which involved payments that were
collected by Pinto on the false premise that he was acting on
the victims' behalf, further documentation from the
victims was not available. Moreover, the government asserted
that, with respect to the client losses, the only records
that exist were those in the possession of one of Pinto's
co-conspirators. With respect to a contested line of credit,
the government pointed out that Pinto had stipulated in his
plea agreement that he caused one of the victims to
apply to a line of credit, placing the entire line
squarely within the ...