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Doe v. Mastoloni

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

February 12, 2016

JANE DOE, a Connecticut resident; JOHN DOE, a Connecticut resident; and J.D., a Connecticut resident, Plaintiffs,
TANYA MASTOLONI aka Tanya Romero, a Connecticut resident; REBECCA KESSLER nee Wills, a Connecticut resident; CHRISTOPHER ESPOSITO, a California resident; LAURA SULLIVAN, a Connecticut resident; AVON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, a Connecticut public school district, Defendants.



Plaintiffs Jane and John Doe ("Jane" and "John"), Connecticut residents whose names have been changed to protect the identity of their minor children, claim that three Spanish teachers and a guidance counselor at Avon High School indoctrinated their three daughters into a religious cult. Plaintiffs allege that with their help, J.D., Jane's and John's youngest daughter, broke free from the indoctrination. It is further alleged that J.D.'s older sisters, E.D. and L.D., are fully indoctrinated into the cult and are estranged from the family. They are not parties to this lawsuit.

Plaintiffs Jane and John Doe, each individually and on behalf of J.D., bring this action against Avon Public Schools ("the Board"), and against the Spanish teachers, Tanya Mastoloni, Rebecca Kessler (nee Wills), Christopher Esposito, and the guidance counselor, Laura Sullivan (collectively, the "Faculty Defendants"). The complaint asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as claims under the Connecticut Constitution, Connecticut General Statutes and the common law.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to amend their complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) and a proposed amended complaint. The Board has filed a preemptive motion to dismiss the proposed amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This Ruling decides Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint and the Board's preemptive motion to dismiss it.


The following facts are derived from the proposed amended complaint [Doc. 67-2]. They do not represent findings by the Court. Well-pleaded allegations of fact are accepted as true for the purposes of this Ruling and recited so that the Court may discern the viability of the proposed claims under the governing law.

Tanya Mastoloni taught E.D., L.D., and J.D. (collectively "the Doe Daughters") Spanish at Avon High School. Although not part of the course curriculum, Mastoloni instructed students in "religion and pseudoscience, " and "to believe in superstition, magic, and a non-scientific, anti-intellectual worldview." Doc. 67-2 at ¶ 61.[1] Concepts like "spirituality, numerology, astrology, dreams, mysticism, looking for 'signs, ' angels, symbols, 'synchronicity, ' 'negativity, ' 'seeking the truth, ' and death" were regular topics of discussion in Mastoloni's Spanish class. Id. In one class, Mastoloni directed her students to write an essay in Spanish "about what they thought happened to them when they died." Id. at ¶ 62. Mastoloni's colleague in the Spanish Department, Kessler, also talked about death in the classroom, using "class time to tell her students about the deaths of children." Id. at ¶ 63.

Mastoloni and Kessler, along with the third Spanish teacher, Esposito, were known collectively about school as "Tri-State, " a reference to the fact that one was born in New York, one in New Jersey, and the other in Connecticut. Id. at ¶ 39. The three teachers spent much of their time with Sullivan, the school's guidance counselor. Id. at ¶ 40. All four were "adherents of a religious cult that promotes martyrdom and celebrates death." Id. at ¶ 65.

Mastoloni began recruiting E.D., the eldest Doe Daughter, into this "religious cult, " id., or "coven, " id. at ¶ 268, when Kessler, E.D.'s freshman year Spanish teacher, introduced E.D. to Mastoloni in the faculty lounge, id. at ¶ 76. Their relationship intensified when Mastoloni became E.D.'s Spanish teacher in her sophomore year. Id. at ¶ 101. Mastoloni "consistently proselytized her religious views in the classroom" and taught "E.D. and the other students to believe in superstition and magic." Id. at ¶ 102. Mastoloni found a particularly "impressionable" student in E.D., id. at ¶ 89, who while "extremely intelligent and gifted, " ""lack[ed] . . . friends, " was "bullied in elementary and middle school, " and "related more to adults than to peers her own age, " id. at ¶¶ 66-68.

E.D. spent a significant amount of time with Mastoloni. They ate lunch together during school hours, and communicated via email, phone and text outside of school. Id. at ¶¶ 107, 110. E.D. also agreed to be a teaching assistant for Mastoloni, as well as Esposito and Kessler, often staying after school to help grade papers. Id. at ¶¶ 83, 115. Sometimes E.D. would leave school grounds to have lunch with the three Spanish teachers. Id. at ¶ 92. She was even invited by Kessler to attend her children's birthday parties. Id. at ¶ 91. Esposito, for his part, was "inappropriately intrusive" with E.D., asking her on one occasion "about the sexual orientation of her siblings." Id. at ¶ 136.

Back at home, Jane and John were troubled by what they viewed as the Spanish teachers' "lack of boundaries" and "Mastoloni's inappropriate engagement" with their daughter. Id. at ¶ 104. Though concerned about the nature of E.D.'s relationships with her teachers, Jane and John "were unaware that . . . Mastoloni was teaching religion in the classroom." Id.

Over time, E.D.'s relationship with Mastoloni turned "highly manipulative." Id. at ¶ 117. Mastoloni was given to "extreme mood swings, " id. at ¶55, and "would frequently switch between two extremes, " at times "showering E.D. with love and affection" and at other times, "giving her the cold shoulder." Id. at ¶ 118. By E.D.'s senior year, "Mastoloni's attention to E.D. became even more intense." Id. at ¶ 129. She professed to E.D. that E.D. was her "sole hermana." Id. at ¶ 109. When E.D. turned eighteen, Mastoloni promised that the two would "be friends outside of school." Id. at ¶ 130 (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, "[t]he summer before E.D. began college, her relationship with . . . Mastoloni intensified" yet further. Id. at ¶ 138. Later, when E.D. left home to attend Wellesley College, the two continued to communicate throughout the year and met socially during school breaks. Id. at ¶ 163. E.D. also visited with Esposito and Kessler during college recesses. Id. at ¶ 164.

While away at college, E.D. began increasingly interested in religion and the occult. She "and other girls would frequently go to" a "desolate" building on Wellesley's campus called "Alumni Hall, " where they would "dance, sing and perform 'whirling dervishes' - religious dances - until the wee hours of the morning." Id. at ¶ 173. During her junior year of college, E.D. changed her major from political science to philosophy, and "announced that she wanted to seek a masters in Divinity following graduation." Id. at ¶¶ 184-85. She also "told Jane and John that she wanted to attend . . . Mastoloni's graduation from some type of school where . . . Mastoloni was receiving a degree in 'spirituality.'" Id. at ¶ 181. E.D.'s "sudden interest in religion" corresponded with significant changes to her personality. Id. at ¶¶ 186-214 She was "often irritable and emotional, " id. at ¶ 189, had "trouble 'thinking, '" id. at ¶ 188, was "nervous" around her parents, id. at ¶ 187, and lost her sense of humor, id. at ¶ 197. She also started to speak, and even smell differently. E.D. was "constantly talking about 'seeking the truth' and pursuing a 'greater purpose, '" id. at ¶ 192, and "no longer engaged in ordinary verbal banter or back-and-forth discussion, " id. at ¶ 194. Her mother began "to notice a very odd and pungent odor coming from [her] room, " id. at ¶ 198, that was also "enmeshed in . . . her clothes, " id. at ¶ 199. As E.D. underwent all of these changes, she grew apart from her family, all the while maintaining her friendship with Mastoloni, Kessler, Esposito and Sullivan. Id. at ¶¶ 210-14.

With E.D. away at college, Mastoloni began focusing her attention on L.D., who was a student in Mastoloni's advanced Spanish class during her senior year of high school. Id. at ¶ 215. In keeping with past practice, Mastoloni continued to "proselytize[] her religious views" and to teach students to "believe in superstition and magic." Id. at ¶ 216. She also began indoctrinating L.D. into her religion. Id. at ¶ 225. At the same time, Sullivan urged L.D. to attend Wellesley College after graduation so that the Faculty Defendants would have an easier time keeping the sisters indoctrinated. Id. at ¶ 228. L.D. decided to attend Wellesley, where she grew closer to E.D. and more isolated from the rest of the family. Id. at ¶¶ 229-30. She "developed a fascination with dreams, astrology, and 'symbols, '" id. at ¶ 233, and continued to stay in touch with Mastoloni who would visit the sisters at college, id. at ¶ 237. L.D. ultimately became "fully indoctrinated" into the religion of the Faculty Defendants and "began to engage in fantasies of martydom and suicidal ideation." Id. at ¶ 262.

In the spring semester of 2013, Mastoloni tried to recruit J.D. into her "coven." Id. at ¶ 268. Mastoloni continued to "preach her religious ideas" in the classroom and directed a great deal of "negative attention towards J.D. in an effort to break her down psychologically." Id. at ¶ 269. She was "relentless in her chiding of J.D., " id. at ¶ 271, once "admonish[ing] her for getting a "C" on a test" in front of the class, id. at ¶ 270, and on another occasion, forcing her to sing in front of the class, id. at ¶ 279. Mastoloni also frequently "discussed J.D.'s academic performance with E.D." Id. at ¶ 281. For instance, she told E.D. that J.D. received a "C" on an assignment and also showed E.D. an essay J.D. wrote about her "New Year's Resolutions." Id. at ¶¶ 282-84.

As part of J.D.'s indoctrination, Mastoloni urged E.D. and L.D. to invite J.D. to Wellesley during J.D.'s April recess. Id. at ¶ 288. When J.D. returned from that visit, her parents noticed that her personality had changed. "[S]he was cold, lacked affect, and was behaving just like E.D. and L.D." Id. at ¶ 305. She was no longer "gregarious" or "joking, " id. at ¶ 308, and avoided talking to her parents. Her "bizarre behavior" continued for months. Id. at ¶ 323.

Finally, "[a]fter much time crying and pleading and talking, Jane was finally able to break through to J.D." Id. at ¶ 332. "Jane saw J.D. experience a sudden psychological release, " id. at ¶ 333, and at that moment "knew that J.D. had snapped out of the indoctrination, " id. at ¶ 334. Jane and John later learned that throughout J.D.'s visit to Wellesley, J.D. "was under the total and constant control of . . . E.D., who was acting at the direction of . . . Mastoloni." Id. at ¶ 338. Mastoloni had "orchestrated" the "ordeal" in order to further J.D.'s indoctrination. Id. at ¶ 349.

The Faculty Defendants retaliated against J.D. when she broke free from the indoctrination. Id. at ¶ 403. Sullivan, for example, refused to write a recommendation letter to colleges on J.D.'s behalf, even though a recommendation letter from a guidance counselor is a college application requirement. Id. at ¶ 412. Sullivan also "failed in her duties by not apprising J.D. of benchmark obligations throughout the college application process." Id. at ¶ 411. "When J.D. asked . . . Sullivan to let her drop Spanish from her schedule . . . Sullivan responded by trying to persuade J.D. to take Spanish with . . . Kessler" notwithstanding the role Kessler played in the indoctrination of J.D.'s older sisters. Id. at ¶ 407. When J.D. asked to drop another course, Sullivan "insisted that J.D. stop by her office to discuss the matter, even though such course changes are generally made electronically and do not need to be done in person." Id. at ¶ 408.

J.D.'s "sudden deconversion, " prompted the Faculty Defendants to redouble their efforts to alienate E.D. and L.D. from the Doe family. Id. at ¶ 422. In July 2013, the Faculty Defendants "hatched a plan for E.D. and L.D. to move out of the Doe house for good." Id. at ¶ 376. In order to make them eligible for summer housing at Wellesley, the Faculty Defendants "sent a written communication to Wellesley defaming Jane and John, falsely accusing them of being abusive towards E.D. and L.D., and falsely claiming that E.D. and L.D. were homeless." Id. at ¶ 392. On July 12, 2013, Mastoloni picked up E.D. and L.D. from the Doe home. The sisters stayed at Mastoloni's residence for the next two and a half days until their living quarters at Wellesley were ready. Id. at ¶¶ 378, 380, 384.

During this time period, the Faculty Defendants were either at Mastoloni's residence with E.D. or L.D., or knew that E.D. and L.D. were staying with Mastoloni and concealed their whereabouts from Jane and John. Id. at ¶ 381-82. As of the filing of the proposed amended complaint, the Faculty Defendants were either supporting E.D. and L.D. financially or knew who was providing them with financial support. Id. at ¶ 399.

Since their removal from the Doe home by the Faculty Defendants, E.D. and L.D. have cut of all communication with Jane, John, J.D., and other friends and relatives, and have had almost no contact with their family since July 12, 2013. Id. at ¶ 400-01. "On August 4, 2013, E.D. sent Jane an email asking her parents to 'let her and L.D. go.'" Id. at ¶ 402 (internal quotation marks added).

Jane and John, each individually and on J.D.'s behalf, commenced this action against the Faculty Defendants and the Avon School Board the following spring. The initial complaint was filed on May 19, 2014 [Doc. 1]. Among other theories of liability, Plaintiffs allege that the Board violated their federal and state constitutional rights by indoctrinating the Doe Daughters and breaking up the Doe family.


The Board directs its motion to dismiss at Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint (hereinafter "PAC"). Rule 15(a)(2) provides that Plaintiffs must obtain leave of Court to file this amended pleading. If a proposed amended complaint could not survive a motion to dismiss, the Court will deny leave to file the pleading, since to do otherwise would be futile. The Board's present motion invokes that principle.

The Supreme Court has laid down in two cases guidelines to determine whether the factual allegations of a complaint are sufficient in content and form to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Those cases are Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ("Twombly") and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ("Iqbal").

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This pleading standard creates a "two-pronged approach, " based on "[t]wo working principles." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

First, although a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it must provide "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679.

Second, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This"facial plausibility" prong requires the plaintiff to plead facts "allow[ing] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. Importantly, the complaint must demonstrate "more that a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "[W[here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.[2]


A. Standing to Sue on J.D.'s Behalf

A preliminary question arises as to whether Jane and John Doe have standing to sue on J.D.'s behalf. As stated supra, Jane and John Doe filed this action both individually and on behalf of their daughter, J.D., a minor at the time the PAC was filed. Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for representation of a minor by representatives such as a general guardian or parent. Although a minor at the time the proposed amended complaint was filed, J.D. has now reached the age of majority. Doc. [107]; see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-1d (stating that "the terms 'minor', 'infant' and 'infancy' shall . . . refer to a person under the age of eighteen years . . ."). Consequently her parents no longer have standing to sue on her behalf. See Mulready v. Mulready, No. CIV 306 cv 00934 (AWT), 2007 WL 1791120, at *1 (D. Conn. June 16, 2007) (parents did not have standing to bring suit on behalf of adult child); accord Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F.Supp. 603, 606 (D. Vt. 1997). In the interest of judicial economy, and because there is a possibility that J.D. would join the lawsuit if given the opportunity, the Court will analyze the PAC as if J.D. filed it on her own behalf.

If the Court concludes that J.D. could state a cognizable cause of action, the Court would consider a motion by J.D. for leave to file an amended complaint allowing her to appear as a party plaintiff in this case. It should be noted that such a motion would be made only if J.D., in the exercise of that majority of age she has now attained, decides that she wishes to become a plaintiff.

B. Statute of Limitations

The Board challenges many of the counts in the PAC on statute of limitations grounds. A defendant may raise the statute of limitations in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "[w]here the dates in a complaint show that action is barred by a statute of limitations." Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hops., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1989).[3] "In the absence of a limitations period prescribed by statute, federal courts typically borrow the local state statute of limitations." Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., 774 F.3d 791, 798 (2d Cir. 2014). Furthermore, "[t]he borrowing of a state-law statute of limitations carries with it the borrowing of the state's coordinating tolling rules." Zimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 888 F.Supp.2d 317, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1987)). However, this applies only where the rules "are not inconsistent with the letter and purpose of the relevant provisions of federal law." Twersky v. Yeshiva University, 993 F.Supp.2d 429, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Finally, even where the limitations period and the applicable tolling rules are taken from state law, "federal common law determines the date on which that federal claim accrues." Id. at 438.

The "standard rule" for accrual of federal claims is that a "claim accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action." Singleton v. Clash, 951 F.Supp.2d 578, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1220 (2013)). The standard rule promotes "the basic policies of all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff's opportunity for recovery and a defendant's potential liabilities." Gabelli, 133 S.Ct. at 1221. 1216, 1220 (2013) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000)). Plaintiffs in this case seek to apply an exception to the standard rule, known as the discovery rule. See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferber Corp. Of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)) (the discovery rule is "an exception to the general limitations rule that a cause of action accrues once a plaintiff has a 'complete and present cause of action'"). Under the discovery rule, "accrual is delayed until the plaintiff has discovered his cause of action." Gabelli, 133 S.Ct. at 1220. Under this rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury. Singleton, 951 F.Supp.2d at 587.

The Second Circuit has applied the discovery rule in § 1983 cases. See, e.g. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1156 (2d Cir. 1980); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980). In Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, the Second Circuit, in considering a delayed accrual theory for a statute of limitations regarding a § 1983 claim, noted that "[w]here no single act is sufficiently decisive to enable a person to realize that he has suffered a compensable injury, the cause of action may not accrue until the wrong becomes apparent." 52 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980)). Pinaud also involved liability for a municipal government under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Id. The Second Circuit in Pinaud also said that where the injury is known, but the policy or custom of the municipality that caused the harm is not known, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until it is "clear, or should be clear, that the harmful act is the consequence of a county 'policy or custom.'" Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1157.

The Board argues that, to the extent Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims relating to E.D.'s indoctrination and alienation from her family members under § 1983 and § 1986, such claims are untimely because they accrued when E.D. graduated from high school, which was about four years before the complaint was filed. In addition, the Board argues that the § 1986 claims arising from L.D.'s indoctrination and familial alienation are also untimely because those claims also accrued when L.D. graduated from high school, which was about two years before the complaint was filed. The Board states that any claims against it accrued in relation to the two older daughters at their graduation.

One of Plaintiffs' principal claims is that "as a direct and proximate result of the actions" of Mastolani, Kessler, Esposito and Sullivan, " the "intimate relationship" between Jane and John (as parents) and E.D. and L.D. (their daughters) "was terminated." PAC ¶¶ 595-598. The cause of those terminations of family relationships, on Plaintiffs' theory of the case, was the Faculty Defendants' wrongful indoctrination of the two older Doe daughters into the cult. Plaintiffs argue that these claims did not accrue until for the purposes of their federal claims until "their third daughter, J.D., broke free from indoctrination in June, 2013" because Plaintiffs did not know of the indoctrination before then. PAC ¶ 358 alleges: "It was not until J.D. broke free that Jane and John understood that their three daughters had been subjected to religious indoctrination at Avon High School." Further, the Plaintiffs argued in oral argument that the deprivation of the intimate relationships with E.D. and L.D. only arose in July 2013 when the two eldest daughters left the house and cut off contact with their family. Doc. 123, p. 37. The original complaint was filed on May 19, 2014, less than one year after Plaintiffs allege that they discovered the injury.

From what the Court can discern from the PAC, Plaintiffs allege that they were aware of one of the policies or customs before the occurrence of the alleged injury of relationship deprivation, and one thereafter. The PAC alleges that the Board adopted a policy or custom of deliberate indifference towards the constitutional rights of students and parents that directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries. The PAC further alleges elaborates that this Board policy or custom of deliberate indifference was apparent in two principal areas: the Board's response to complaints from parents, and its failure to fund policies and training programs that would have prevented the Faculty Defendants' unlawful conduct. It appears from the PAC that the Plaintiffs were aware of the policy or custom of deliberate indifference to the complaints of parents before the injury accrued, but it does not state when Plaintiffs became aware of the failure to fund policies and training programs.[4] Doc 67-2, ¶¶ 441-444. Either way, whether the Plaintiffs became aware of the failure to fund policies and training programs before or after they became aware of the injury, the earliest that the claim could have accrued was the date of the injury these parents allege: the wrongful termination of their intimate relationships with their two older daughters. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that this partiular injury occurred within one year of the filing of the original complaint. Even though E.D. and L.D. graduated four and two years prior to the filing of the original complaint, thus ending any relationship between the Board and the two daughters, the date of the injury is the relevant metric in this case. Thus, the Plaintiffs' claims are sufficiently pled to survive the motion to dismiss on the statute of limitations grounds.

This inquiry into the statute of limitations is necessarily a mixed question of law and fact. While the allegations in the PAC are sufficient to survive the Defendants' second motion to dismiss, the issues of when the Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injuries they claim to have suffered, and when they became aware of the Board policies or customs said to have caused those injuries, pose on the present record present factual questions for a jury. Should this case go to trial, a special verdict form asking the jury to name the date on which ...

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