Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Antonucci v. Antonucci

Appellate Court of Connecticut

March 29, 2016

MARIANNA ANTONUCCI
v.
VINCENT ANTONUCCI

         Argued September 21, 2015

          Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Shay, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Shay, J., issued an articulation of its decision.

          Reversed in part; further proceedings.

          SYLLABUS

         The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the defendant, and, inter alia, valuing her remainder interest in certain real property that had been transferred to her as a gift under a written agreement with her mother, who retained a life estate in the property. The agreement was conditioned on the defendant's waiver in the agreement of any claim to the property that he may have had or may have in the future. The waiver also stated that the property at no time would be considered marital property, regardless of whether the parties' marriage was dissolved. The agreement did not include any direct promises between the plaintiff and the defendant in exchange for the waiver. The trial court expressed concern as to the legal viability of the agreement, but determined that it did not need to abrogate the agreement. The court thereafter evaluated the agreement under the special scrutiny standard that is applicable to postnuptial agreements. The court determined that the defendant's waiver was void as against public policy and declined to enforce it, treated the plaintiff's remainder interest as part of the marital estate for purposes of distributing the marital property, and awarded alimony to the defendant. In determining the value of the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property, the court adopted the valuation methodology employed by L, the plaintiff's expert witness at trial, but found that L had applied an inappropriate discount rate in valuing the property. The court thereafter opened the evidence so that the parties could present additional evidence as to an appropriate discount rate. M, an expert witness for the defendant, thereafter testified that the discount rate that L had applied was not realistic and that a lower discount rate was more appropriate. The court accepted the lower discount rate proposed by M and adopted M's valuation of the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property. The court in its financial orders thereafter permitted the plaintiff to retain her remainder interest in the property and ordered her to pay certain alimony to the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly failed to enforce her agreement with her mother and had improperly valued her remainder interest in the property.

         Held :

         1. The trial court erred when it declared that it would not decide whether the agreement between the plaintiff and her mother was enforceable, but then issued a decision in which it declined to enforce the defendant's waiver of any claim he may have had to the property at issue after having determined that the waiver was void as against public policy, and the court improperly evaluated the agreement under the special scrutiny standard applicable to postnuptial agreements instead of applying principles of contract interpretation: because the agreement at issue was not a postnuptial agreement, was not an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, did not include any direct promises between them, and the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property was not part of the marital estate prior to the execution of the agreement, the court should have construed the agreement as a third party beneficiary contract and analyzed it under principles of contract interpretation, the defendant's waiver having been the consideration for the promise from the plaintiff's mother to transfer to the plaintiff as a gift a remainder interest in the property; moreover, although the court found that the primary consideration for the mother's execution of the agreement was the language in it that stated that the plaintiff promised to care for her while they mutually occupied the premises, that was an illusionary promise that could be easily avoided by the plaintiff or her mother, and not the bargained for promise in the agreement in light of the mother's clear expressions in it that the conveyance of the property to the plaintiff was intended as a gift; accordingly, the judgment was reversed in part and the case was remanded for consideration of the agreement as a third party beneficiary contract between the defendant and the mother, and for reconsideration of the trial court's financial orders.

         2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in opening the evidence to allow the plaintiff and the defendant to offer additional evidence as to the valuation of the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property: that court had expressed reservations about the manner in which the parties' experts had calculated the value of the remainder interest, and it would have been injudicious for the court to decide on financial orders without having asked for additional evidence; moreover, the parties were permitted ample opportunity to address the court's concern with further evidence, there was no injustice or substantial prejudice to the plaintiff in the manner in which the court conducted the hearing on the additional evidence, and the plaintiff acquiesced in the court's decision to open the evidence by having failed to express any objection to the court.

         3. The trial court erred in adopting M's proposed discount rate and valuation of the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property; M's testimony did not properly apply a certain valuation methodology that the court had adopted, M ascribed a value to the remainder interest that was nearly equivalent to the property's present fair market value, and the court failed to examine and draw necessary conclusions regarding the amount that a willing buyer would pay for the remainder interest.

         Thomas M. Cassone, for the appellant (plaintiff).

         Kevin F. Collins, with whom, on the brief, was Ami Jayne Wilson, for the appellee (defendant).

         Sheldon, Keller and Schaller, Js. KELLER, J. In this opinion the other judges concurred.

          OPINION

          KELLER, J.

          [164 Conn.App. 97] The plaintiff, Marianna Antonucci, appeals from the trial court's award of lump sum alimony to the defendant, Vincent Antonucci, in the context of its judgment dissolving the parties' twenty-five year marriage. The plaintiff claims that the court erred by (1) failing to enforce an agreement between the parties and the plaintiff's mother, whereby the plaintiff's mother transferred her real property (property) to the plaintiff and retained a life estate in it for herself, conditioned on the defendant waiving any claims to the property; (2) reopening the evidence sua sponte in order to allow the parties the opportunity to offer additional evidence regarding the valuation of the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property; (3) adopting the valuation of the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property proposed by one of the defendant's expert witnesses, William F. Murray, who assertedly was not qualified to appraise the value of remainder interests in residential real estate and had not used a relevant discount rate in calculating the value of the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property; and (4) failing to consider adequately the parties' current financial circumstances in awarding the defendant lump sum alimony, payable by the plaintiff in ten annual nonmodifiable installments, each equaling more than 40 percent of her annual gross income, commencing [164 Conn.App. 98] just three months from the date of the judgment of dissolution.

         On the basis of our conclusion that the court erred in its analysis with respect to the enforceability of the agreement between the parties and the plaintiff's mother, and in determining the value of the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, in part, with respect to its financial orders. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the issue of whether the parties' agreement with the plaintiff's mother is enforceable and for reconsideration of all financial orders.[1]

         The plaintiff filed an action for dissolution of the parties' marriage on August 10, 2011. The trial initially took place over a period of four days in August, 2013. After both parties had rested, the trial court, sua sponte, on November 1, 2013, ordered the evidence reopened, indicating that, although it had accepted the methodology of the plaintiff's expert for determining the value of the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property, it believed that one of the variables in the expert's formula, the discount rate utilized by the plaintiff's expert to determine the net present value of the remainder interest, was inappropriate. The court then gave the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence on March 14, 2014, as to an appropriate discount rate. The court rendered a judgment of dissolution on March 21, 2014.

         In rendering its decision, the court found the following facts: " The plaintiff . . . whose birth name was Marianna Sandolo, and the defendant . . . were married in Stamford, Connecticut, on April 10, 1988. They [164 Conn.App. 99] are the parents of two adult children . . . . The parties have been living separate and apart for approximately two years. Neither party graduated from high school, and both are currently employed. The [plaintiff] is a co-owner with her mother of a family restaurant in Stamford, and the [defendant] is a heavy equipment operator for Lee Rizzuto . . . . Both have comparable incomes of approximately $50,000 per annum, and both have, apart from a couple of relatively brief periods of unemployment by the [defendant], been steadily employed throughout the marriage. Except for some minor conditions, each enjoys generally good health. Neither claims alimony from the other.

         " Throughout the marriage, the couple benefited from substantial gifts from their respective families, by far the greater coming from the [plaintiff's] parents. Remarkably, they have managed to save nothing--no safety net; no retirement accounts. While the [plaintiff] generally paid the bills, both are relatively unsophisticated when it comes to finances. Neither was able to live within their means, enabled no doubt by the generosity of the [plaintiff's] parents. They bought, improved, and sold some real properties, yet their investments had marginal returns at best. For the first ten years of marriage, and later, at the end, they lived in her parents' home. Prior to moving back with the [plaintiff's] mother, the couple [was] residing at 501 Roxbury Road, Stamford. They sold this property in June, 2007. . . . They own several automobiles between them, as well as a modest time-share in Florida.

         " The principal bone of contention is the [plaintiff's] interest in the real property at 85 Doolittle Road in Stamford, formerly the residence of the [plaintiff's] parents. On November 9, 2005, following the death of the [plaintiff's] father, her mother, Filomena Sandolo, transferred her interest in the real property to her daughter by way of a quitclaim deed . . . while at the same time [164 Conn.App. 100] retaining a life estate in the property. The conveyance of the real estate was made pursuant to a certain Agreement . . . also dated November 9, 2005, signed by both parties and Filomena Sandolo, which contained the further proviso that the [defendant] waive any claims thereto, particularly in the event of a divorce. . . .

         " After the death of her husband . . . Sandolo wanted to remain in her own home; however, she did not wish to live there alone. Accordingly, she asked the [defendant] and [plaintiff] if they would like to live with her again. She indicated that she would make some substantial improvements to the home if they would do so. . . . [B]oth parties agreed. [Sandolo] called her family attorney, Joseph Pankowski, to draft certain documents and to bring them to her home. He did so on November 9, 2005.

         " Each party called upon an expert to value the real estate at 85 Doolittle Road, Stamford, and the [plaintiff's] remainder interest therein. The [plaintiff's] expert, Armand V. Liguori, testified that the value of the real property and improvements as of May 14, 2013 was $1,280,000, which opinion was supported by a written appraisal . . . . For his part, the [defendant's] expert, James J. Tooher, testified that as of that date, the value of the property was $1,325,000, which was also supported by a written appraisal . . . . While the court found both witnesses credible on this point, it finds that the more reliable number is the lower number. However, in arriving at the value of the [plaintiff's] remainder interest, the experts varied in a range from $513,000 ([plaintiff's] expert) to $634,000 ([defendant's] expert). While the court finds . . . the methodology employed by [Liguori] to be more reliable . . . it finds that he relied upon an article published in 1998 and applied a 10 percent discount [rate], which the court finds is not reflective of the current circumstances.

          [164 Conn.App. 101] " The court heard the matter over the course of five days, including final argument, and the evidence closed on August 28, 2013. However, upon further consideration, citing the case of Mensah v. Mensah [2] [145 Conn.App. 644, 75 A.3d 92 (2013)] . . . the court reopened the evidence on November 1, 2013, in order to allow the parties the opportunity to offer additional evidence regarding the discount rate to be applied in the valuation of the [plaintiff's] remainder interest. . . .[3] A further hearing was held on March 14, 2014, where the court heard the testimony of the [defendant's] expert, William Murray, as well as briefly the [plaintiff's business attorney, Jonathan Hoffman,] and her real estate appraiser . . . Liguori. Mr. Murray testified at length and submitted a written report . . . . The witness testified categorically that a 10 percent discount rate was not realistic. Basing his opinion upon a life expectancy of 11.1 years, an average rental in Stamford for a comparable property, and a combination of historical [Real [164 Conn.App. 102] Estate Investment Trust] performance return data and the applicable federal rate, he testified that the appropriate discount rate should be 3.37 percent. Applying that to the market value of the property, results in a value of the remainder [interest] of $1,103,806." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnotes added.)

         Before it issued its final orders, the court addressed certain questions of law. First, it determined that the plaintiff's remainder interest in the property was part of the marital estate as it was " acquired while the parties were husband and wife" and " [was] the sole significant asset in either party's name at the termination of a twenty-five year marriage." [4] The court noted that, " [i]n family cases . . . it is the function of the court to divide the marital estate, irrespective of who holds title." The court cited General Statutes § 46b-81 (a), which states in relevant part that " [a]t the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation . . . the Superior Court may assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of the other . . . ." Further, the court concluded that the plaintiff " has a vested interest in the real property at 85 Doolittle Road . . . [and] this interest is capable of valuation at this time."

          [164 Conn.App. 103] Next, the court discussed the enforceability of the agreement dated November 9, 2005, between the parties and Sandolo. Although it expressed concerns as to the agreement's legal viability, the court determined that it did not need to abrogate the agreement, deciding instead to use " alternate means to achieve an equitable resolution of this family dispute." The court concluded that, regardless of the terms of the agreement, " [s]aying that [the plaintiff's remainder interest is not part of the marital estate] does not make it so."

         In issuing its final orders, however, the court found that " the portion of the agreement entered into on November 9, 2005 . . . in particular paragraph 3 thereof, relating to the [defendant's] waiver of marital and other legal rights is void as against public policy and is unenforceable against the [defendant], and is, moreover, not binding upon a court in exercising its statutory duty to subsequently dissolve the parties' marriage, award alimony, and provide for an equitable distribution of assets and other relief; and that as to the remainder of the agreement, there was sufficient mutual consideration to enforce same as between . . . Sandolo and [the plaintiff]."

         The court determined that its equitable powers gave it authority to consider all the circumstances that may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute and that, although neither party sought periodic alimony, an award of lump sum alimony to the defendant was appropriate under all the circumstances.[5] In making this finding, the court took into account the statutory factors in § 46b-81, and further found that the plaintiff's vested interest in the property [164 Conn.App. 104] " will inure to the benefit of her long-term financial security . . . and that [an] award of lump sum alimony [to the defendant would] give [him a] present opportunity to provide for his long-term financial security." The court gave weight to the length of the marriage, the source of the [plaintiff's] principal asset, her remainder interest in the property, the limited education of both parties, their occupations and vocational skills, their present assets and the likelihood that neither of them would acquire significant assets in the future, and the fact that neither party made any other provision for retirement. The court also found that " throughout the marriage, until their separation, both parties . . . made significant contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, and preservation of the family assets, including . . . improvements to . . . 85 Doolittle Road . . . ."

         The court permitted the plaintiff to retain her interest in the property, subject to the existing indebtedness and the life estate of Sandolo. It ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant, " as and for lump sum alimony, the sum of $225,000, payable as follows: On or before July 1, 2014, the [plaintiff] shall pay to the [defendant] the sum [of] $22,500, and a like sum annually on each subsequent anniversary of the first payment, until paid in full. The foregoing notwithstanding, nothing shall prevent the payment in full or in part at any earlier time, and in the event of the death of . . . Sandolo, the sale, refinance, or other transfer of the property, or any interest therein, whichever shall sooner occur, the then outstanding balance shall be due and payable in full." The court also stated, " It is the intention of this court that this obligation shall be nonmodifiable, survive the death of either party and the remarriage or cohabitation of the [ defendant ], and that it be nontaxable to [ defendant ] and nondeductible by the [ plaintiff ]." [6] (Emphasis in original.)

          [164 Conn.App. 105] The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue on April 9, 2014, which was denied by the court on May 1, 2014.[7] On June 20, 2014, the court filed a correction to its decision, clarifying that it was the intention of the court that the lump sum alimony obligation be nonmodifiable, that it survive both the death of either party and the remarriage or cohabitation of the defendant, and that it be nontaxable to the defendant and nondeductible by the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed the present appeal, and also filed a motion to articulate the court's decision as to four issues. The court addressed each request for articulation in turn. It first found that during their occupancy of the property, the defendant and the plaintiff " made actual, tangible contributions to the property, including full or partial payment of the mortgage for at least two years, installation of bathroom tile and fixtures, installation of garage doors, construction of a cinder block retaining wall . . . use of a machine to break up stone in [the] backyard, and raising of the level of the same."

         The court further articulated that it did not intend that its decision abrogate the agreement of November 9, 2005, because rather than awarding the defendant a share of the property, which would likely trigger further acrimonious litigation, it awarded the entire interest in the property to the plaintiff.[8] That being the case, when [164 Conn.App. 106] it came time to consider an award of alimony, the court took into account the statutory factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82, including the award, if any, the court may make pursuant to § 46b-81.[9] Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

         We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant standard of review and legal principles. " An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Thus, unless the trial court applied the wrong standard of law, its decision is accorded great deference because the trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases.

          " Appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . [164 Conn.App. 107] A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Our deferential standard of review, however, does not extend to the court's interpretation of and application of the law to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fulton v. Fulton, 156 Conn.App. 739, 745, 116 A.3d 311 (2015).

          " [T]rial courts are empowered to deal broadly with property and its equitable division incident to dissolution proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jewett v. Jewett, 265 Conn. 669, 682, 830 A.2d 193 (2003). " [T]he court is required by § 46b-81 to consider the estate of each of the parties. Implicit in this requirement is the need to consider the economic value of the parties' estates. . . . In assessing the value of the assets that comprise the marital estate, the trial court functions as the trier of fact. . . . The trial court has the right to accept so much of the testimony . . . as [it] finds applicable . . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McRae v. McRae, 129 Conn.App. 171, 183-84, 20 A.3d 1255 (2011). " [It] arrives at [its] own conclusions by weighing the opinions of the appraisers, the claims of the parties, and [its] own general knowledge of the elements going to establish value, and then employs the most appropriate method of determining valuation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 274, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983). In selecting and applying an appropriate valuation method, the trial court has considerable discretion. Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 799-800, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). Generally, an appellate court will not overturn a trial court's division of marital property unless it " misapplies, overlooks, or gives a wrong or [164 Conn.App. 108] improper effect to any test or consideration which it was [its] duty to regard. . . . As with other questions of fact, unless the determination by the trial court is clearly erroneous, it must stand." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 532, 752 A.2d 978 (1998).

         I

         We first address the plaintiff's claim that the court erred in failing to enforce an agreement between the parties and the plaintiff's mother, Sandolo, in which Sandolo transferred her property to the plaintiff and retained a life estate in it for herself, conditioned on the defendant waiving any claims to the property.

         The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. On November 9, 2005, the parties and Sandolo entered into an agreement to effectuate the transfer of a remainder interest in the property from Sandolo to the plaintiff. In this agreement, Sandolo is referred to as the " [g]rantor," and the plaintiff and the defendant are referred to as the " [g]rantee" and " the [g]rantee's [h]usband," respectively. Paragraph 1 of the agreement states, " In consideration of, and reliance upon, the [g]rantee's Husband's statement set forth in paragraph 3 hereof, the [g]rantor hereby agrees to gift and convey, and the [g]rantee hereby agrees to accept, [the property] . . . subject to the reservation by the [g]rantor of a life estate in the [p]remises."

         Paragraph 3 of the agreement constitutes the defendant's claimed waiver. It reads: " In consideration of the [g]rantor's decision to gift and convey the [p]remises, the [g]rantee 's [h]usband hereby relinquishes all right, title and interest which he may have in and to the [p]remises at the time of the conveyance or at any time in the future. The [g]rantee's [h]usband further declares that the [p]remises shall at no time be considered property of he and his wife's marriage, whether or not he [164 Conn.App. 109] and his wife's marriage is at any time dissolved, and that, if the [g]rantee predeceases him, he hereby waives his right to elect the statutory share provided in Connecticut General Statute[s] [§ ] 45a-436 to obtain an interest in the [p]remises." (Emphasis added.)

         Paragraph 4 states, " The [g]rantee agrees to provide nutritional, health and other care-giving services to the [g]rantor during the [g]rantor and [g]rantee's mutual occupancy of the premises." The agreement does not require that Sandolo permit the plaintiff to reside in the home during the tenure of her life estate, nor does it require the plaintiff to reside in the home in exchange for the gift of the remainder interest.

         In addressing the issue of whether the agreement was not enforceable on the ground that it violates public policy, the court devoted considerable discussion to why enforcement of the defendant's waiver in the agreement served " no good societal interest . . . ." The court opined that any attempt to limit the marital estate by a third party while the marriage is intact should be void, that if the agreement was intended to be a postnuptial agreement, it might not survive the special scrutiny to be applied to such agreements, and that, with respect to the circumstances surrounding its execution, the agreement failed " the test of even the most basic right to counsel, if not a want of consideration."

         The court treated the agreement as a postnuptial agreement. In so doing, it utilized the type of special scrutiny that applies to determine the enforceability of postnuptial agreements. With respect to the judicial scrutiny to which postnuptial agreements are subject, our Supreme Court has stated: " Because of the nature of the marital relationship, the spouses to a postnuptial agreement may not be as cautious in contracting with one another as they would be with prospective spouses, [164 Conn.App. 110] and they are certainly less cautious than they would be with an ordinary contracting party. With lessened caution comes greater potential for one spouse to take advantage of the other. This leads us to conclude that postnuptial agreements require stricter scrutiny than prenuptial agreements. In applying special scrutiny, a court may enforce a postnuptial agreement only if it complies with applicable contract principles, and the terms of the agreement are both fair and equitable at the time of execution and not unconscionable at the time of dissolution.

          " We further hold that the terms of a postnuptial agreement are fair and equitable at the time of execution if the agreement is made voluntarily, and without any undue influence, fraud, coercion, duress or similar defect. Moreover, each spouse must be given full, fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character and value of property . . . and all of the financial obligations and income of the other spouse. This mandatory disclosure requirement is a result of the deeply personal marital relationship." (Footnote omitted.) Bedrick v. Bedrick, 300 Conn. 691, 703-704, 17 A.3d 17 (2011). Whether each spouse had a reasonable opportunity to confer with independent counsel is also a relevant circumstance to consider. Id., 704-705 n.6.

         In an examination of the parties' intentions with respect to the agreement, the court went beyond the four corners of the agreement and considered extrinsic evidence as to the circumstances of its execution, as required by Bedrick.

         The court found that, after the death of her husband, Sandolo wanted to remain in her own home, however, she did not wish to live there alone. Accordingly, she asked the plaintiff and the defendant if they would like to live with her again. Sandolo indicated that she would make some substantial improvements to the home if [164 Conn.App. 111] they would move back in with her. Both parties agreed to do so. Sandolo called her family attorney to draft certain documents. On November 9, 2005, the attorney brought the agreement to Sandolo's home. The court found that Sandolo's primary goal was to be able to live in her home for the rest of her life, where her daughter would provide lifetime care, and that the plaintiff's primary interest was to obtain ultimate, unencumbered title to the property, in return for providing long-term care to Sandolo. The court found: " [B]oth [Sandolo] and [the plaintiff] have had the benefit of the bargain. A question for another time is whether or not [Sandolo] could undo the transfer, should the court void the [defendant's] waiver, or, in the alternative, grant him an interest in the property. The waiver by the [defendant] of his legal rights was secondary to that primary bargain, and while it may have been part of [Sandolo's] estate plan, it was, nevertheless, mean-spirited, or shortsighted at best, and a likely source of friction between the spouses at some point. In viewing the agreement and the circumstances surrounding its execution, it fails the test of even the most basic right to counsel, if not a want of consideration. The parties were already living under the roof at 85 Doolittle Road, and there is no evidence that they would be evicted in the absence of the [defendant's] signature, only that [Sandolo] would not make the transfer to the [plaintiff]. Moreover, although this agreement does not fall within the strict definition of a postnuptial agreement, nevertheless, it was executed during the marriage of the parties. As such, public policy would seem to dictate that it should be viewed with special scrutiny. . . . Under all the circumstances, no good societal interest is served by the enforcement of this provision.

         " The foregoing notwithstanding, this court believes that the protracted, contentious, and acrimonious litigation that would very likely follow the judicial abrogation [164 Conn.App. 112] of the agreement in question, would do more harm to all the parties than good. Accordingly, the court has taken an alternate means to achieve an equitable ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.