United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER
VICTOR A. BOLDEN, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Francis Anderson, currently incarcerated at Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut ("Northern"), filed this action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, Patricia Rehmer, Helene Vartelas, Scott Semple, and Anne Cournoyer, in their official capacities. Mr. Anderson alleges that Defendants and their employees physically and mentally abused him while he was confined at the Whiting Forensic Division of the Connecticut Valley Hospital ("Whiting"), falsified criminal charges against him, and, while he was at Northern, denied him mental health treatment, which allegedly caused him to hurt himself.
On November 2, 2015, the Court entered an Amended Order (ECF No. 68) denying Mr. Anderson's ten motions for preliminary injunctive relief, which were based on allegations that Defendants were abusing him and denying him mental health treatment and he was hurting himself as a result. Am. Order, ECF No. 68. The Court denied Mr. Anderson's requests for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders because (1) Mr. Anderson had not shown that he was at imminent risk of irreparable harm, because he had repeatedly requested mental health treatment and, when offered treatment, refused it; and (2) Mr. Anderson had not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits. See id. at 4-7.
Mr. Anderson filed an interlocutory appeal of the Court's order denying his motions for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. See Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, ECF No. 76. The Second Circuit dismissed that appeal because it lacked an arguable basis in law or fact. See Mandate, ECF No. 105.
At the time of the Court's November order, the sole request for relief in Mr. Anderson's complaint was that the Court issue preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders to provide him mental health treatment, and "stop the cruel and unusual punishment[.]" Compl. at 8, ECF No. 1. Because the sole request for relief was adjudicated, the Court should have dismissed this action then, and hereby dismisses it now. See, e.g., Stevenson v. State & Local Police Agencies, 42 F.Supp.2d 229, 230, 234 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's action after denying request for preliminary injunction, which was plaintiff's "sole request for relief"); see also Lovaas v. Osen, No. C-06-66-BU, 2007 WL 686689, *5 (D. Mont. March 5, 2007) (recommending dismissal of pro se plaintiff's action upon denial of her request for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, which was the only relief sought in the complaint); Herder v. Biesh, Civil No. 1CV-09-2470, 2011 WL 861818, at *1, *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2011) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's action after finding moot his sole request for relief - an injunction to compel medical care); cf. Holt v. Cont'l Grp., Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1983) (where complaint's sole request for relief was preliminary injunction, and district court had ...