February 17, 2016.
to foreclose a judgment lien on certain real property owned
by the defendant, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where
the defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the court,
Abrams, J., denied the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment; subsequently, the court, Abrams, J., issued an
articulation of its decision; thereafter, the matter was
tried to the court, Hon. Lois Tanzer, judge trial referee;
subsequently, the court, Hon. Lois Tanzer, judge trial
referee, sua sponte, determined that it had subject matter
jurisdiction; judgment of foreclosure by sale and judgment
for the plaintiff on the counterclaim, from which the
defendant appealed to this court, which dismissed the appeal;
thereafter, this court granted the defendant's motion for
reconsideration and reinstated the appeal.
defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of
foreclosure by sale of a judgment lien that had been placed
on his property by the plaintiff to secure an order in the
parties' prior dissolution judgment. In the dissolution
judgment, the court had ordered the defendant to repay the
plaintiff with interest for certain loans that she made to
him during the marriage. Neither child support nor alimony
was awarded to either party. To secure the repayment of the
loans, the plaintiff filed in the land records a certificate
of judgment lien against the defendant's property and,
when the judgment remained unpaid, the plaintiff commenced
the present foreclosure action. The trial court concluded
that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the action, that
the judgment was not a " family support judgment"
as that term is defined by statute (§ 52-350a ), but
rather was a " money judgment," which is defined in
§ 52-350a (13) as an order for the payment of a sum of
money excluding family support judgments. The court further
concluded that the judgment could be enforced pursuant to the
statute (§ 52-350f) providing that a money judgment may
be enforced by the foreclosure of a real property lien on any
nonexempt property of the judgment debtor. The trial court
rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale, and the defendant
claimed on appeal that the order in the dissolution judgment
was a family support judgment that could not be enforced
pursuant to § 52-350f. Held that the trial
court properly determined that it had jurisdiction over the
foreclosure action because the order to repay the loan made
by the plaintiff to the defendant during the parties'
marriage fell squarely within the definition of a money
judgment, which was therefore subject to enforcement by the
foreclosure of the judgment lien under § 52-350f;
contrary to the defendant's claim, the fact that the
order was issued during the course of the parties'
dissolution proceeding did not automatically make such a
ruling a family support judgment.
W. Lombardi, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
H. Perlmutter, with whom, on the brief, was Andrew M. Ullman,
for the appellee (plaintiff).
Alvord and Prescott, Js.[*]
Conn.App. 660] PER CURIAM.
defendant, Curtis W. Lombardi, appeals from the trial
court's judgment of foreclosure by sale of a judgment
lien that had been placed on the defendant's residential
property by the plaintiff, Margaret Profetto. The purpose
of the judgment lien was to secure the order of the court,
Burke, J., contained in the parties' dissolution
judgment, that required the defendant to pay the plaintiff
$72,172.31 plus interest at the rate of 6 percent from the
date of that judgment. On appeal, the defendant claims that
the court should have concluded that the foreclosure of a
judgment lien was " not the appropriate vehicle to
enforce a family support judgment" in a dissolution
action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. The court dissolved the parties' three year
marriage on October 4, 2013. In the judgment of dissolution,
the court concluded that an award of alimony to either party
was not appropriate due to the relatively short duration of
the marriage. There were no children issue of the marriage.
The court entered orders with respect to, inter alia, the
parties' personal property and their responsibility for
existing debts. The court also entered the following order
regarding the defendant's obligation to repay the
plaintiff for certain loans she had made to him during the
marriage, as [164 Conn.App. 661] evidenced by promissory
notes: " [T]he [defendant] shall transfer to the
[plaintiff] the amount of $72,172.31 with postjudgment
interest of six (6%) percent accruing as of the date of this
judgment . . . ."
October 23, 2013, to secure the payment of that judgment, the
plaintiff filed in the land records a certificate of judgment
lien against the defendant's real property located at 106
Treble Road in Bristol. The property is the defendant's
residence. Because the judgment had not been paid in whole or
in part, the plaintiff commenced the present foreclosure
action on December 5, 2013. Although the defendant did not
file a motion to dismiss the action, the court, Hon. Lois
Tanzer, judge trial referee, acknowledged and addressed
his challenge to the court's jurisdiction over the
foreclosure action in a memorandum of decision issued on
February 18, 2015. The defendant had claimed that the
foreclosure of a judgment lien was permitted for " money
judgments" only, and that the court's order in the
dissolution judgment was not a " money judgment."
The court determined that the order at issue was not alimony
or any other type of " family support judgment,"
but, rather, was a judgment for a sum certain with interest
and [164 Conn.App. 662] therefore a " money
judgment." Accordingly, the court concluded that the
judgment could be enforced by the foreclosure of a judgment
lien pursuant to General Statutes §
52-350f, that the court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the parties' controversy, and that the
trial was to continue as scheduled. Following a two day
trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff
on March 5, 2015, and ordered a foreclosure by sale of the
judgment lien. This appeal followed.
sole issue in this appeal is whether the court's order in
the dissolution judgment that required the defendant to pay
the plaintiff $72,172.31 plus interest was a money judgment
subject to enforcement by the foreclosure of a judgment lien,
or a family support judgment that was not subject to
enforcement pursuant to the postjudgment procedures detailed
in chapter 906 of the General Statutes. The trial court
concluded that the order requiring the repayment of
$72,172.31 plus interest, which was a debt that arose from
loans made between the parties during the marriage, was a
money judgment and not a family support judgment. We agree.
defendant's claim on appeal is a question of subject
matter jurisdiction that raises a matter of statutory
interpretation. See LoRicco Towers Condominium Assn. v.
Patani, 90 Conn.App. 43, 48-49, 876 A.2d 1211, cert.
denied, 276 Conn. 925, 888 A.2d 93 (2005). " Issues of
statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we
exercise plenary review. . . . The process [164 Conn.App.
663] of statutory interpretation involves the determination
of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the
facts of the case, including the question of whether the
language does so apply." (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut,
Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838,
847, 937 A.2d 39 (2008).
When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the
legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such
relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Alvord Investment, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
282 Conn. 393, 401-402, 920 A.2d 1000 (2007). " The test
to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when ...