United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER
R. Underhill United States District Judge
plaintiff, Leo Remillard, is incarcerated at the
MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in Suffield,
Connecticut (“MacDougall-Walker”). He has filed a
Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Warden and
a Counselor Supervisor at Osborn Correctional Institution
(“Osborn”) as well as the medical department at
Osborn. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint is
to section 1915A(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code,
the Court must review prisoner civil complaints against
governmental actors and “dismiss . . . any portion of
[a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, ” or
that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A
complaint that includes only “‘labels and
conclusions, ’ ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action’ or ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement, ’” does not meet the facial
plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).
Although courts still have an obligation to interpret
“a pro se complaint liberally, ” the
complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet
the standard of facial plausibility. See Harris v.
Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations
21, 2015, Remillard was involved in an altercation in the
cafeteria at Osborn. He received a disciplinary report for
fighting. He pleaded guilty to the infraction and the
disciplinary hearing officer imposed sanctions of seven days
in punitive segregation.
claims that he should have been released from segregation on
June 29, 2015. On that date, prison officials initially
informed Remillard that his risk level had been raised to
level four and that he would be transferred to another prison
facility. Later that day, prison officials took Remillard off
the transfer list because medical staff wanted to keep him at
Osborn until he had completed his Hepatitis C protocol.
Medical staff informed Remillard that he would remain at
Osborn for at least a week.
alleges that Unit Manager Long improperly chose to keep him
confined in the punitive segregation unit for an additional
seven days instead of transferring him to the medical unit to
complete his Hepatitis C protocol and that Warden Maldonado
approved Remillard’s continued confinement. On July 6,
2015, prison officials transferred Remillard to another
Claims against the Medical Department
names the medical/infectious diseases department at Osborn as
a defendant. To state a claim under section 1983, the
plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant, a
person acting under color of state, law deprived him of a
federally protected right. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982).
agency is not a person within the meaning of section 1983.
See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). The State of Connecticut
Department of Correction is a state agency. See Vaden v.
Connecticut, 557 F.Supp.2d 279, 288 (D. Conn. 2008);
Garris v. Dep’t of Corr., 170 F.Supp.2d 182,
186 (D. Conn. 2001). As part of the Department of Correction,
a correctional facility medical department is not a person
subject to liability under section 1983. See Santos v.
Conn. Dep’t of Corr., 2005 WL 2123543, at *3 (D.
Conn. Aug. 29, 2005) (observing that “[n]either a
Department of Correction nor a correctional institution is a
person” subject to liability under section 1983);
Torrence v. Pelkey, 164 F.Supp.2d 264, 271 (D. Conn.
2001) (same). Thus, the claims against defendant Osborn
Medical Department are dismissed as lacking an arguable legal
basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Official Capacity Claims
asks for monetary damages to compensate him for emotional
distress and pain and suffering. To the extent that he seeks
monetary damages from defendants Long and Maldonado in their
official capacities, those claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159
(1985); Quern v. Jordan, 440 ...