United States District Court, D. Connecticut
R. Underhill United States District Judge
15, 2015, the defendant, Triple Point Technology, Inc.
("TPT"), filed a motion for summary judgment in
this case. (doc. 338) After voluminous briefing and numerous
unsuccessful attempts to schedule a hearing on that motion,
see, e.g., (docs. 538, 541, 544, 550), on March 21,
2016, I granted TPT’s motion, (doc. 566); see
also (doc. 573) (corrected order). On March 25, 2016,
Hewett filed a motion for reconsideration of that order.
(doc. 577); see also (doc. 581) (amended
following reasons, Hewett’s motion is denied.
Standard of Review
standard for granting motions for reconsideration is strict;
motions for reconsideration "will generally be denied
unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or
data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached
by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70
F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Motions for reconsideration
will not be granted where the party merely seeks to
relitigate an issue that has already been decided.
Id. The three major grounds for granting a motion
for reconsideration in the Second Circuit are: (1) an
intervening change of controlling law, (2) the availability
of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd.
v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d
Cir. 1992) (citing 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller
& Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 4478).
makes several arguments in support of her motion for
reconsideration, including: (1) Hewett did give her employer
adequate notice of her intention to use FMLA leave; (2) her
termination constitutes a denial of FMLA leave; (3) she has
sufficiently shown disparate treatment; and (4) she has
sufficiently shown that the reasons given for her termination
were pretextual. The bulk of those are clearly attempts to
relitigate issues squarely addressed in my previous Order.
See, e.g., Corr. Order at 10-11 (assuming,
arguendo, that Hewett did give TPT sufficient notice
of her intent to take FMLA leave); id. at 11-13
(rejecting Hewett’s arguments that termination
constitutes a denial of FMLA leave); id. at 18
(observing that Hewett had failed to provide meaningful
evidence of disparate treatment); id. at 16-18
(rejecting Hewett’s arguments that TPT’s
justification for her termination was pretextual);
id. at 6 n.2 (rejecting Hewett’s
interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a)). And to the
extent that Hewett attempts to meet the "new
evidence" standard for a motion for reconsideration,
particularly in her discussion of disparate treatment, she
has failed to present any evidence that is "newly
discovered or . . . could not have been found by due
diligence." United States v. Potamkin Cadillac
Corp., 697 F.2d 491, 493 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted); see also Palmer v. Sena, 474 F.Supp.2d
353, 355 (D. Conn. 2007) ("A motion for reconsideration
cannot be employed as a vehicle for asserting new arguments
or for introducing new evidence that could have been adduced
during the pendency of the underlying motion.")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
remainder of Hewett’s arguments hinge on a typographic
error in the Order. She points out that the Order incorrectly
states the date of an April 24, 2012 email, which I
determined at least arguably put TPT on notice of
Hewett’s potential future need for FMLA leave, as
having been sent on April 24, 2015. Pl.’s Am. Br. at
14. But my regrettable typographical error does not change
the analysis-Hewett’s need for FMLA leave would not
protect her from what appear to be well-documented legitimate
business reasons for her termination over a year after that
email was sent. See Corr. Order at 16-19.
amended motion for reconsideration is denied, (doc. 581), and
her initial motion for reconsideration is denied as moot in
light of the amended brief, (doc. 577).
has also filed several motions that are mooted out by either
this order, or previous orders that have been entered in this
case. Those motions are disposed of as follows:
Hewett’s motion to vacate the judgment (doc. 575) is
denied as moot in light of this ruling; Hewett’s
motions to again reconsider the order imposing sanctions upon
her (docs. 589 and 595) are denied as repetitive and for the
reasons stated in my previous Order (doc. 590); and finally,
Hewett’s motions for a hearing on either of her motions
for reconsideration (docs. 579, 605) are denied as moot
because those motions have been decided on the papers.