Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Waterbury, Waterbury
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
W. Roraback, J.
plaintiff, Mario Mendes, has brought a two-count complaint.
Count one is against the defendants Jada Battle and Michael
Spence. In this count, the plaintiff alleges that Spence was
negligent in operating a vehicle owned by Battle. This
negligence is claimed to have caused an automobile collision
in which the plaintiff, the operator of the other vehicle,
was injured. That collision is alleged to have occurred at
approximately 3:35 p.m. on November 26, 2013. The second
count concerns allegations of a separate and distinct
collision the plaintiff was involved in later that same day
at approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 26, 2013. With respect
to that collision, the plaintiff alleges that the driver of
the other car, Siddharth Awasthi, was negligent in the
operation of the vehicle he was driving in that he struck a
parked vehicle in which the plaintiff was sitting. In this
count, the plaintiff has also named as a defendant the owner
of the vehicle that allegedly struck the parked car the
plaintiff was sitting in, Purushottan Awasthi.
January 21, 2016, the Awasthi defendants moved to strike the
second count of the complaint for misjoinder pursuant to
Practice Book § 10-21 and General Statutes § 52-97.
Both of these provisions provide that separate causes of
action may be joined in a single complaint if they arise
" out of the same transaction." The moving
defendants maintain that the separate claims in the two
counts arise from two discrete accidents and thus do not
arise " out of the same transaction." The plaintiff
opposes the motion " on the grounds of judicial
economy." He also asserts that " [u]nder the
circumstances, the granting of the Motion to Strike would
accomplish nothing at this point, but, leave it at the exact
same position at a later date." This is because, if the
plaintiff is obligated to commence a second action against
the moving defendants, the plaintiff predicts that action
will likely be consolidated with this action for trial given
the unusual nature of the specific allegations contained in
the two counts.
[T]he exclusive remedy for misjoinder of parties . . . is by
motion to strike." Bender v. Bender, 292 Conn.
696, 722 n.23, 975 A.2d 636 (2009); see also Practice Book
§ 11-3. " Naming an improper person as a party in a
legal action constitutes misjoinder." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Bloom v. Miklovich, 111
Conn.App. 323, 329, 958 A.2d 1283 (2008). Practice Book
§ 10-21 provides, in relevant part: " In any civil
action the plaintiff may include in the complaint both legal
and equitable rights and causes of action, and demand both
legal and equitable remedies; but, if several causes of
action are united in the same complaint, they shall all be
brought to recover, either (1) upon contract, express or
implied, or (2) for injuries, with or without force, to
person and property, or either, including a conversion of
property to the defendant's use, or (3) for injuries to
character, or (4) upon claims to recover real property, with
or without damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents
and profits of the same, or (5) upon claims to recover
personal property specifically, with or without damages for
the withholding thereof, or (6) claims arising by virtue of a
contract or by operation of law in favor of or against a
party in some representative or fiduciary capacity, or (7)
upon claims, whether in contract or tort or both, arising out
of the same transaction or transactions connected with the
same subject of action . . ." 
Book § 11-3 is unambiguous in its command that "
[T]he exclusive remedy for misjoinder of parties is by motion
to strike." Here, although the plaintiff has put forth a
convincing argument that little may be different in the end
if this motion is granted, he has not provided a sound basis
for the court to conclude that the separate allegations in
the two counts " arise out of the same transaction"
so as to permit them to lawfully be joined in a single
no doubt true that consolidation of individual lawsuits
brought with respect to the two distinct accidents at issue
is likely. This eventuality is even more probable if it is
determined that a jury may be unable to apportion damages
between the two accidents. See Card v. State, 57
Conn.App. 134, 144, 747 A.2d 32 (2000). Nevertheless,
notwithstanding what may likely occur in the future, there is
no basis upon which the court may excuse compliance with the
clear and common mandate of § 52-97 and Practice Book
§ 10-21 that claims brought in a complaint " arise
out of the same transaction."
Superior Court judges confronted with analogous situations in
which a plaintiff claims injuries from two distinct accidents
resulting from the negligence of different parties occurring
close in time have concluded that such claims may not
properly be joined in a single complaint. The court finds the
consistent reasoning articulated in those decisions
persuasive. See e.g., Cianciolo v. Musumano,
Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No.
CV-08-5008286-S, (August 12, 2008, Alvord, J.); Green v.
Blanchard, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland,
Docket No. CV-07-5001528-S, (August 21, 2007, Vachelli, J.)
[44 Conn.L.Rptr. 54]; Bailey v. Thomas, judicial
district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-98-0577916-S, (June 18,
1999, Wagner, J.) (24 Conn.L.Rptr. 687); Mancini v.
Mitchley, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No.
CV-95-0129378-S, (July 2, 1996, McLachlan, J.) (17
reasons set forth above, the defendants' motion to strike
count two of the ...