United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER
VANESSA L. BRYANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
plaintiff, Reymundo Lozada, is currently confined at Garner
Correctional Institution in Newtown, Connecticut. He has
filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming
Counselor Palombo and Jane/John Doe Medical Staff as
defendants. Pending is the plaintiff's complaint and
motion to consolidate. For the reasons set forth below, the
complaint will be dismissed and the pending motion will be
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the court must review prisoner
civil complaints against governmental actors and
“dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, ” or that “seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” Id. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A
complaint that includes only “‘labels and
conclusions, ' ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action' or ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement, '” does not meet the facial
plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).
Although courts still have an obligation to interpret
“a pro se complaint liberally, ” the
complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet
the standard of facial plausibility. See Harris v.
Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations
plaintiff's complaint includes no facts. Instead, the
plaintiff refers the court to exhibits attached to the
complaint. The exhibits reflect that on June 29, 2016,
Counselor Palombo ordered the plaintiff to move from the
bottom bunk to the top bunk despite the fact that the
plaintiff claimed that he had been issued a bottom bunk pass.
Counselor Palombo checked with the medical department and
Jane/John Doe Medical Staff informed Counselor Palombo that
the plaintiff did not have a pass.
4, 2016, the plaintiff attempted to get up to the top bunk
using a chair and a ladder, but the ladder and chair slipped
and caused the plaintiff to fall onto the desk and then to
the floor of the cell. The plaintiff suffered a gash to his
back that was several inches long and deep and a bruise to
his foot. Medical staff treated him for his injuries.
20, 2016, the plaintiff submitted an Inmate Request Form to
Counselor Palombo requesting the name of the person who had
authorized him to make the decision not to honor the bottom
bunk pass. The request was forwarded to Captain McDaniel. On
August 2, 2016, Captain McDaniel indicated that he had
further reviewed the matter with N/S Miller and Miller
confirmed that the plaintiff did have a bottom bunk pass on
the date in question. The bottom bunk pass was to expire on
August 10, 2016.
plaintiff claims that he suffered pain as a “direct
result of the negligent and flagrant dis-regard of both
D.O.C. and especially medical policy. Thereby inflicting both
physical and emotional injuries.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at
6. For relief, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
Official Capacity Claims
extent that the plaintiff seeks damages against the
defendants in their official capacities, the claims are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985); Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). All such claims are
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).
Individual Capacity Claims
state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, an
inmate must establish first, that a prison official denied
him “the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Second, the inmate must show that the official acted with
subjective “deliberate indifference to [his] health or
safety” because the official knew that he
“face[d] a substantial risk of serious harm and
disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.” Id. at 834, 847
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
are no facts to suggest that either defendant deliberately or
intentionally disregarded a risk to the plaintiff's
health or safety. In fact, the plaintiff describes the
conduct of Counselor Palombo in failing to believe that he
had been issued a bottom bunk pass as well as the conduct of
the unnamed medical staff member who allegedly confirmed
Counselor Palombo's belief, as negligent.
or negligent conduct which causes injury does not support a
section 1983 action. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835
(“deliberate indifference requires more than mere
negligence”); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986)(“conduct that does not purport to be
punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due
care for the prisoner's interests or safety.”);
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-36 (1986)
(due process protections not triggered by lack of due care by
state officials); Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155,
165 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Negligence does not, however,
satisfy the scienter requirement necessary to support a claim
for cruel and unusual punishment”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Thus, plaintiff's claim that
the defendants' conduct constituted a lack of due care or