United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Raschinna Craig, has brought this lawsuit against her former
employer, University of Connecticut Health Center
(“UCH”), arising out of her treatment by UCH
during her pregnancy. The Court dismissed all but one of her
claims in its ruling on UCH's Motion to Dismiss. Ruling
on Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16. Ms. Craig's sole
remaining claim is that UCH violated the Federal Family and
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601
et seq., by terminating her before she could take
maternity leave. Compl. at Count One, ECF No. 1. She seeks
damages, costs, attorney's fees, and restoration to her
previous position or an equivalent. Id. at Count One
and Prayer for Relief.
moves for summary judgment on this claim. Mot. for Summ. J.,
ECF No. 46. For the reasons that follow, the motion is
Statement of Facts
did not file a Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement as required by
this Court's Local Rule 56(a)2. In absence of a Local
Rule 56(a)2 Statement, “all material facts” set
forth in the Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement that are supported
by evidence in the record are admitted. See D. Conn.
L. Civ. R. 56(a)1 (“all material facts set forth in
[the movant's Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement] will be deemed
admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be
filed and served by the opposing party in accordance with
Local Rule 56(a)2.”); see also e.g.,
Cashman v. Ricigliano, No. Civ. 3:02CV1423(MRK),
2004 WL 1920798, at *1 n.2 (D. Conn. Aug. 25, 2004) (deeming
facts in a Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement admitted because the
opposing party did not file a Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement);
August v. Dep't of Corrections, 424 F.Supp.2d
363, 365 n.2 (D. Conn. 2006) (same); see also Vt. Teddy
Bear Co. v. 1-800 BEARGRAM Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d
Cir. 2004) (in adjudicating motions for summary judgment,
courts “must be satisfied that the citation to evidence
in the record supports the assertion”). Accordingly,
the following facts are taken from UCH's Local Rule
56(a)1 Statement, as supported by the evidence submitted by
Craig began working for UCH in November 2001 and was promoted
to various positions during her tenure there. Def.'s
Local Rule 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶¶1-2, ECF No. 50. Ms.
Craig also gave birth to one child in September 2009 and
another in December 2010. Id. ¶¶ 15, 87.
January 7, 2009, Ms. Craig's supervisor e-mailed her
information about FMLA leave. Id. ¶10. Ms.
Craig responded that she had doctor's appointments coming
up to address her “chronic back pain” and
“chronic headaches” and that she wished she had
known she was eligible for FMLA leave “awhile
ago.” Id. ¶11.
months leading up to the birth of her child in September
2009, Ms. Craig worked fewer hours than she had in the past
and took ten sick days and twenty-four unpaid sick days.
Id. ¶¶ 17-18. On August 18, 2009, she
began a maternity leave under the Federal FMLA, because she
was experiencing breathing complications, chest pain, and
extreme fatigue related to the pregnancy. Id.
¶¶ 14, 16, 20. In support of this maternity leave,
she submitted all of the forms UCH required, including a
medical certificate from her doctor. Id.
¶¶ 27-28, 33.
Craig returned to work from this maternity leave on January
8, 2010, having exhausted her Federal FMLA leave for the
year. Id. ¶ 21. Shortly after returning to work,
Ms. Craig became pregnant again and gave birth to another
child in December 2010. Id. ¶ 82.
testified that, in April 2010, she discussed the pregnancy
and her interest in FMLA leave in the future with Joann
LaMere, who was responsible for approving FMLA leaves at UCH.
Def.'s Ex. A, Craig Dep. 42:2-43:-2, ECF No. 51-2. LaMere
has not confirmed this conversation took place anywhere in
the record. Ms. Craig also testified that she did not tell
anyone else at UCH about her pregnancy and possible need for
leave in the future. Id. at 102:2-5. There is no
other evidence in the record indicating that she told anyone
she was pregnant until October 2010.
her return from her initial maternity leave, Ms. Craig was
scheduled to work 30 hours a week, six hours per workday.
Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶ 39, ECF No. 50. Ms.
Craig testified that she arranged a reduced work schedule
with UCH so that she could parent her children. Pl.'s Ex.
4, Craig Decl. ¶¶ 1-4, ECF No. 56.
Craig's time records reveal, that after returning from
maternity leave, except for one week in February 2010, she
worked less than the 30 hours per week that UCH expected
until August 2010. Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶
40, ECF No. 50. In April 2010, Ms. Craig's supervisor
held a meeting with her and “several others” to
address concerns about her time and attendance at work.
Id. ¶ 43. She was told that her attendance
needed to improve immediately and that she could contact
LaMere to determine whether she qualified for additional FMLA
leave. Id. ¶¶ 44-45.
12, 2010, Ms. Craig's supervisor followed up with Ms.
Craig in a memorandum, indicating that her attendance had not
improved and reminding her that she needed to provide a
medical certificate for any absence related to illness.
Id. ¶¶46-47. The memorandum also indicated
that “[u]nauthorized days without pay are grounds for
dismissal from employment.” Id. ¶47.
October 20, 2010, Ms. Craig e-mailed Joann LaMere to ask
about her eligibility for leave under the Federal FMLA.
Id. ¶ 48. LaMere responded that she was
ineligible for Federal FMLA leave at the time, because she
had not worked more than 1, 250 hours during the year
preceding the request. Id. ¶ 49. LaMere also
explained that, under Connecticut's FMLA, Ms. Craig was
entitled to four more weeks of leave until August 18, 2011.
Id. Ms. Craig asked LaMere for the required forms to
apply for FMLA leave, which she provided to her. Id.
¶¶ 50-51. These forms were similar to the ones Ms.
Craig had filled out for her maternity leave the previous
year. Id. ¶ 51. LaMere also reiterated that Ms.
Craig was only entitled to four weeks of leave under the