United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER
VANESSA L. BRYANT DISTRICT JUDGE.
plaintiff, Alvin Slaughter, was confined at
Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Institution
(“Corrigan-Radgowski”) when he filed this action.
His most recent address on file with the Court is Carl
Robinson Correctional Institution in Enfield, Connecticut.
Department of Correction records reflect that he is no longer
incarcerated in a prison facility. Pending before the Court is
a Complaint naming the University of Connecticut Health
Center and the Department of Corrections as Defendants. For
the reasons set forth below, the Complaint is dismissed with
leave to amend.
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review prisoner
civil complaints against governmental actors and
“dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, ” or that “seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” Id. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A
complaint that includes only “‘labels and
conclusions, ' ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action' or ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement, '” does not meet the facial
plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).
Although courts still have an obligation to interpret
“a pro se complaint liberally, ” the
complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet
the standard of facial plausibility. See Harris v.
Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations
Plaintiff alleges that in November 2013, he wrote to the
medical unit at Corrigan-Radgowski and requested that he be
tested for diabetes, high blood pressure and a urinary tract
infection. The medical staff subsequently tested the
Plaintiff for a kidney infection and a urinary tract
infection. In January and February 2014, the Plaintiff
requested the results of the tests.
April 2014, the Plaintiff complained to a physician at the
University of Connecticut Health Center about a urinary
infection, blood in his urine and pain. In June 2014, the
Plaintiff complained about blood in his urine and requested
to be transferred to a medical facility. At the end of June,
he complained about blood in his urine, pain in his shoulder
and arm and requested that his medication be re-filled.
14, 2014, prison officials at Corrigan-Radgowski transferred
him to Enfield Correctional Institution. In late August 2014,
he complained to the Enfield medical staff about blood in his
urine and pain in the area of his lower waist on the left
side. He requested results of x-rays.
October 15, 2014, a physician at the University of
Connecticut Health Center examined the Plaintiff. On October
21, 2014, a physician diagnosed the Plaintiff as suffering
from a urethral stricture. In December 2014, the Plaintiff
wrote to the medical department regarding his diagnosis and
sought pain medication. Prison officials at Enfield
transferred the Plaintiff to Corrigan-Radgowski on January 7,
January 2015, the Plaintiff wrote to the medical department
seeking a re-fill of medication and his diagnosis. In
February 2015, he requested to see a physician. On July 1,
2015, a report reflected that the Plaintiff suffered from
hematuria - blood in his urine, a nodule in his lung and a
kidney stone in his right kidney.
Plaintiff claims that the defendants were aware of his
urethral stricture in November 2013, but have intentionally
delayed surgery for the condition. He states that he is
requesting the state court order surgery for his condition.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, monetary damages and an
order directing the Defendants to perform surgery before
August 11, 2019. For the reasons set forth below, the
Complaint is dismissed.
state a claim under Section 1983, the Plaintiff must allege
facts showing that the Defendant, a person acting under color
of state, law deprived him of a federally protected right.
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930
(1982). Neither the Department of Corrections nor the
University of Connecticut Health Center is a person subject
to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
agency is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983.
See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, (1989) (state and state agencies not persons within
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Department of
Correction is a state agency. See Vaden v.
Connecticut, 557 F.Supp.2d 279, 288 (D. Conn. 2008);
Garris v. Department of Correction, 170 F.Supp.2d
182, 186 (D. Conn. 2001). Like other state agencies, the
Department of Correction is not a person within the meaning
of Section 1983. See Santos v. Dep't of Corr.,
3:04CV1562(JCH)(HBF), 2005 WL 2123543, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug.
29, 2005) (observing that “[n]either a Department of
Correction nor a correctional institution is a person”
subject to liability under Section 1983); Torrence v.
Pelkey, 164 F.Supp.2d 264, 271 (D. Conn. 2001) (same).
Thus, the claims against Defendant State of Connecticut
Department of Corrections are dismissed as lacking an
arguable legal basis. See 28 U.S.C. §
Managed Health Care provides medical treatment to inmates and
“is a division of a state agency, the University of
Connecticut Health Center.” Jolly v. Correctional
Managed Health Care, Case No. 3:04cv1582(RNC), 2009 WL
233667, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2009), aff'd,
375 F. App'x 67 (2d Cir. 2010). Because Correctional
Managed Health Care is a division of a state agency, it is
not considered to be a person subject to suit under Section
1983. See Gaby v. Board of Trustees of Community
Technical Colleges, 348 F.3d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 2003) (per
curiam) (noting decisions holding that state universities and
their boards of trustees are not persons within the meaning
of Section 1983); Walker v. State of Connecticut, No.
06cv165(SRU), 2006 WL 1981783, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 15,
2006) (dismissing action against CMHC under Section 1983
because CMHC is not a “person” within the meaning
of the statute); Stewart v. John Dempsey Hospital,
No. 3:03cv1703(WWE), 2004 WL 78145, ...