United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER
R. UNDERHILL United States District Judge.
April 24, 2015, the plaintiff, Paul Izzo, filed a complaint
against the defendant, Freedom Graphic Systems, Inc.
(“FGS”), alleging that FGS had breached its
employment contract with Izzo by failing to allow him to
contact certain sales accounts and by failing to pay rent on
his office space. See Compl. (doc. 1); Am. Compl.
(doc. 20). On December 15, 2015, having converted FGS'
motion to dismiss the complaint into a motion for summary
judgment, I held a hearing on that motion and granted summary
judgment for FGS. (doc. 35) On January 12, 2016, Izzo filed a
motion for reconsideration. (doc. 39)
standard for granting motions for reconsideration is strict;
motions for reconsideration “will generally be denied
unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or
data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached
by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Motions for reconsideration
will not be granted where the party merely seeks to
relitigate an issue that has already been decided.
Id. The three major grounds for granting a motion
for reconsideration in the Second Circuit are: (1) an
intervening change of controlling law, (2) the availability
of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd.
v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.
1992) (citing 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 4478). Izzo has not met any of those grounds.
offer letter dated March 16, 2010 and executed the following
day, FGS hired Izzo to act as “Director of National
Strategic Accounts.” Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Br.,
Ex. A; Am. Compl., Ex. 1 [hereinafter
“Agreement”]. The agreement did not expressly state
whether Izzo was an at-will employee or had been hired for a
particular term. It did, however, make provisions for various
termination scenarios: for instance, it stated that if Izzo
was terminated for any reason other than “Willful
Misconduct” in the first six months, he would be
entitled to six months of severance payments, and if he was
so terminated in the second six-month period, he would be
entitled to three months of severance payments. Id.
at ¶ 1. If Izzo was terminated after twelve months, he
would not be entitled to receive any severance payments.
according to the terms of the agreement, Izzo was an at-will
employee of FGS-he was hired for an indefinite term and
“'[a]s a general rule, contracts of permanent
employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at
will' in Connecticut.'” Grunberg v. Quest
Diagnostics, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:05-CV-1201V, 2008 WL
323940, at *10 (D. Conn. Feb. 5, 2008) (quoting
D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame
High School, 520 A.2d 217 (Conn. 1987)). And, as I
observed in the December 15 hearing, when “the entire
contract is terminable at will, [the employer can] surely
change its terms in accordance with the needs of the company
without breaching the agreement.” Bessemer Trust
Co. v. Branin, 498 F.Supp.2d 632, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2007),
aff'd, 618 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2010). Certainly,
the employer can change an at-will employee's
responsibilities without breaching the agreement, even if it
might not be able to change its obligations to the employee.
now apparently concedes that his employment contract was
at-will, but argues that the “Account Assignment
Responsibilities” list, Agreement at ¶ 5 (the
“Appendix”),  effectively constitutes an
additional agreement ensuring that he could call on
specified clients during the entire term of his at-will
employment. He further asserts that whether the Appendix
constitutes an additional contract is a question of fact that
must be decided by a jury. But, as Izzo also concedes in his
brief, “where . . . there is clear and definitive
contract language, the scope and meaning of that language is
not a question of fact but a question of law.”
Antonino v. Johnson, 113 Conn.App. 72, 75 (2009)
(alterations in original, citation omitted). In the present
case, neither the Agreement nor the Appendix contain
ambiguous terms suggesting that the Appendix was intended to
provide additional protections to Izzo during the duration of
his at-will employment.
Appendix does include an “approximate yearly
spend” column that Izzo suggests served as an
inducement to take the position on the basis of a certain
level of commissions. By referring to the Appendix as a list
of “Responsibilities” in both the Agreement and
on the Appendix itself, however, the Agreement makes clear
that the Appendix listed obligations Izzo was required to
perform for the benefit of the FGS, rather than conferring a
right or benefit on Izzo. Moreover, the Appendix is
conspicuously dated March 23, 2010, indicating that it was
subject to change.
Izzo has failed to provide any binding authority or new
evidence that would require me to call into question my
ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, his
motion for reconsideration is denied. The defendant's
request for costs (doc. 40) is also denied.
 There are different notations on those
two versions of the contract. The notations do not appear to
be at issue here, so I will generally cite to the
 Exhibit 1 to the Amended Complaint
includes that Appendix (doc. 20-1).
 To the extent that Izzo is in fact
asserting a wage claim for failure to pay contractually
obligated commissions or a fraudulent inducement claim, as
FGS pointed out in its memorandum in support of its motion to
dismiss, both of those claims would be barred by the
respective statute of limitations. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 52-596 (two-year statute of limitations for wage
claims); Conn. Gen. Stat. § ...