United States District Court, D. Connecticut
JEROME T. DUNBAR, Plaintiff,
JOHN LIONS et al ., Defendants
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
Jeffrey Alker Meyer, United States District Judge
Jerome Dunbar has filed this pro se lawsuit against
defendants John Lions, Stephen Barris, and Craig Appleby.
Based on my review of the complaint, it is clear that
plaintiff has not alleged facts that give rise to plausible
grounds for relief. Accordingly, the Court will sua
sponte dismiss this action without prejudice.
pro se complaint alleges that defendant John Lions
is an Assistant State's Attorney, and it appears that
defendants Barris and Appleby are police officers. For
“Claim I” of the complaint, plaintiff alleges
solely the following sentence fragment: “The officers
knew that there was no factual basis to believe that.”
Doc. #1 at 3. There are no other factual allegations for
“Claim II, ” the complaint alleges as follows:
Malicious Prosecution the vehicle was not owned or operated
by the plaintiff. “Lions” knew that the vehicle
was registered to someone other than the plaintiff and that
the plaintiff was not a passenger nor operating the vehicle
Doc. #1 at 4. There are no other factual allegations for
“Claim III, ” the complaint alleges as follows:
Illegal imprisonment the plaintiff was hand cuffed and
brought to the station on the 5/5/2010 arrest and upon
learning that a warrant was issued for the Insurance
violation turned himself in see both U.A.R.'s attached
Doc. #1 at 4. Attached to the complaint are two Uniform
Arrest Reports. One report reflects defendant's arrest by
defendant Appleby on April 25, 2011, on a charge of operating
a motor vehicle without insurance, in violation of Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 14-213b. Doc. #1 at 7. The second report
reflects defendant's arrest by defendant Barris on May 5,
2010, for interference and resisting arrest, in violation of
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167a. Doc. #1 at 8. Neither of the
attached arrest reports describes any factual circumstances
leading to plaintiff's arrests.
well established that “pro se complaints must be
construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of
America., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013); see also
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010)
(discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se
litigants). Although the Court must accept as true all
factual matters alleged in a complaint, a complaint may not
survive unless its factual recitations state a claim to
relief that is at least plausible on its face. See, e.g.,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Mastafa
v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014)
Court has authority to review and dismiss sua sponte
a legally frivolous complaint or if the complaint fails to
state a claim for which relief may be granted. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Fitzgerald v. First E.
Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir.
2000) (per curiam). “An action is
‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual
contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations
are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”
Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434,
437 (2d Cir. 1998).
complaint does not state a plausible claim for relief and
appears to be frivolous. First, to the extent that plaintiff
states a claim for false or illegal arrest, this claim is
plainly barred by the three-year statute of limitations that
governs constitutional claims filed under Section 1983.
See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 133-34 (2d
Cir. 1994). A claim for false arrest in violation of the
Fourth Amendment accrues as of the date of the alleged false
arrest. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90
(2007); Johnson v. Teague, 2014 WL 2515214, at *2
(D. Conn. 2014). Plaintiff was allegedly arrested in May 2010
and April 2011, but the complaint in ...