United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DOC.
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
before the Court is a motion [Doc. #130] by defendant Sahil,
Inc. (“defendant Sahil”) seeking reconsideration
of this Court's Ruling on Amended Motion for Sanctions
[Doc. #129]. Plaintiff Jane Doe (“plaintiff”) has
filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Reconsideration. [Doc. #132]. For the reasons set
forth herein, the Court DENIES defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration. [Doc. #130].
Court presumes familiarity with the background of this
matter, which is recited in the Court's Ruling on Amended
Motion for Sanctions. See Doc. #129. For purposes of this
Ruling, however, the Court will briefly address the
background leading to the present motion for reconsideration.
several conferences with the Court, on February 12, 2016,
plaintiff filed an Amended Motion for Sanctions against
defendant Sahil. [Doc. #95]. Defendant Sahil filed an
untimely response to the Amended Motion for Sanctions, which
the Court ordered stricken. [Doc. #102]. Nevertheless, the
Court considered defendant Sahil's previously filed
memoranda in opposition to plaintiff's original motion
for sanctions, which are docket entries 76 and 88. See Doc.
#102 at 5. In the Amended Motion for Sanctions, plaintiff
alleged a number of discovery abuses by defendant Sahil, but
sought the imposition of sanctions for only two specific
violations of Rule 26: (1) the failure to identify Mr. Moody
in the initial disclosures as an individual with discoverable
information; and (2) the failure to timely disclose
Hicks' personnel file. See Doc. #95-1 at 14.
considering the parties' arguments, and applying the
relevant standards, the Court found that sanctions under Rule
37 were warranted for: (1) defendant Sahil's failure to
identify its former employee, Mr. Moody, as an individual
with discoverable information in its initial disclosures; and
(2) the untimely disclosure of defendant Hicks' personnel
file. See Doc. #129 at 21, 25. Defendant Sahil now seeks
reconsideration of these findings.
standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached
by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Three grounds can justify
reconsideration: “an intervening change of controlling
law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct
a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation
Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 18 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure §4478 at 90). “A motion for
reconsideration may not be used to plug gaps in an original
argument or to argue in the alternative once a decision has
been made. ... It is also not appropriate to use a motion to
reconsider solely to re-litigate an issue already
decided.” SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408
F.Supp.2d 87, 91-92 (D. Conn. 2006) (citing Lopez v.
Smiley, 375 F.Supp.2d 19, 21-22 (D. Conn. 2005))
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. SPGGC, LLC v.
Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007).
Sahil timely filed the motion for reconsideration now at
issue, and contends that the Court overlooked the following
matters in its original Ruling: (1) that Mr. Moody was timely
“disclosed through discovery compliance upon awareness
of his role and relevance”; (2) “Hicks'
personnel file was disclosed when it came to the attention of
counsel, and when defendant became aware of the documents
that were responsive to the request;” and (3)
plaintiff's counsel's failure to confer with defense
counsel to resolve their discovery concerns prevented the
parties from “having a low cost resolution” and
“unnecessarily caused costs to be incurred for the
motion for sanctions.” Doc. #130 at 1.
defendant Sahil included in its motion the standard for
granting a motion for reconsideration, defendant Sahil would
have been forced to acknowledge that the standard is strict,
see Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257, and that a motion to reconsider
is not appropriate to “re-litigate an issue already
decided.” SPGGC, 408 F.Supp.2d at 91-92. Defendant
Sahil's motion does not raise an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
Rather, the motion simply reiterates, largely verbatim, the
arguments raised in its original opposition. Compare Doc.
#88, with Doc. #130. As Judge Meyer aptly stated:
The fact that counsel feels upset or disappointed with a
judge's ruling is not grounds for a motion to reconsider.
Nor should counsel file a motion for reconsideration on the
assumption that a judge did not bother to read or understand
counsel's prior pleading - or on the assumption that a
masterful cut-and-paste of prior points posited will elicit
an epiphany from a hard-headed jurist who was unwilling or
unable to comprehend “the truth” when presented
by counsel in its first incarnation. Needless to say, clients
are less than well-served by counsel who file groundless
motions in ignorance of controlling standards of law.
Mercedes Zee Corp., LLC v. Seneca Ins. Co., Inc.,
Civ. No. 14CV119(JAM), slip. op. at 2 (D. Conn. Sept. 16,
2016). Here, defendant Sahil attempts to re-litigate the same
issues already decided by reasserting its contentions through
a largely cut and pasted brief. “Beyond this needless
exercise in redundancy, the motion for reconsideration does
not cite or acknowledge the legal standard that governs a
motion for reconsideration. [Defendant Sahil] has ignored
governing law and done nothing to satisfy it.”
Id. Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration
[Doc. #130] is DENIED.