United States District Court, D. Connecticut
December 16, 2016
BECKER ALTAYEB, Plaintiff,
CAROL CHAPDELAINE, CTO PERRY, C/O JOHN DOE 1, C/O JOHN DOE 2, C/O JOHN DOE 3, C/O JOHN DOE 4, C/O JANE DOE 1, C/O JANE DOE 2, C/O JANE DOE 3, C/O JANE DOE 4, NURSE JOHN DOE 1, NURSE JOHN DOE 2, NURSE JOHN DOE 3, NURSE JOHN DOE 4, NURSE JOHN DOE 5, NURSE JANE DOE 1, NURSE JANE DOE 2, NURSE JANE DOE 3, NURSE JANE DOE 4, NURSE JANE DOE 5, Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Becker Altayeb (“Altayeb”), incarcerated and
pro se, has filed a Complaint [Doc. 1] asserting 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims and certain state-law claims. The
Defendants are Warden Carol Chapdelaine, Correctional
Treatment Officer Perry, Correctional Officers John Doe 1-4,
Correctional Officers Jane Doe 1-4, and Nurses John/Jane Doe
1-5. All Defendants are named in their individual capacities
STANDARD OF REVIEW
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review prisoner civil
complaints against governmental actors and dismiss any
portion of the complaint that “is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted” or that “seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune to such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Second Circuit
precedent, a pro se complaint is adequately pled,
and thus passes a § 1915A review, if its allegations,
liberally construed, could “conceivably give rise to a
viable claim.” Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d
124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005). The Court must accept as true all
factual matters alleged in a complaint, although a complaint
may not survive dismissal unless its factual recitations
"'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.'" See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Mastafa v.
Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014) (same).
Nevertheless, it is well-established that “[p]ro
se complaints ‘must be construed liberally and
interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.'” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d
399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see
also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir.
2010) (discussing rules of solicitude for pro se
Second Circuit reviews a district court's dismissal of a
prisoner's complaint under § 1915A de novo
and will "reverse a district court's dismissal
pursuant to § 1915A whenever a liberal reading of the
complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be
stated." Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139
(2d Cir. 2003) (citing Wynn v. Southward, 257 F.3d
588, 591-92 (7th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, reiterating this
point, in the § 1915A context, the Second Circuit in
Larkin cited and quoted approvingly from
Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1999) that it
"will not affirm the dismissal of a complaint unless it
appears beyond doubt, even when the complaint is liberally
construed, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that
would entitle him to relief." Larkin, 318 F.3d
was transferred to the MacDougall Correctional Institution on
April 3, 2014. During the intake interview, Altayeb told
correctional staff he was concerned for his personal safety
because he was a Muslim/Arab. He repeated these concerns to
Warden Chapdelaine when she toured his housing unit. Warden
Chapdelaine told Altayeb that he was over-reacting.
July and August 2014, Altayeb told Correctional Officers John
Doe 1-4 and Jane Doe 1-4 that several inmates had threatened
him. They called him a terrorist and said that they were
going to “get him for what Arabs are doing to our
country.” Doc. 1 at 5, ¶ 15. Defendants
Correctional Officers Doe told Altayeb that he would get what
was coming to him. Altayeb relayed these comments and his
concerns to Defendant Perry, who told him not to pay
attention to the comments and characterized the comments as
August 14, 2014, over Altayeb's objection, Defendant
Perry moved inmate Williams into Altayeb's cell. Inmate
Williams made a derogatory remark toward Altayeb based on his
faith, which Defendant Perry heard. Altayeb asked to be
removed and Defendant Perry laughed it off. Inmate Williams
was a former soldier who had served in Afghanistan, which
Defendant Perry also knew. That afternoon, while Altayeb was
sleeping, inmate Williams attacked Altayeb and called him a
terrorist. Inmate Williams stabbed Altayeb in the chest,
broke a fan over his head and hit him in the chest and ribs.
Altayeb tried to bang on the cell door for help but
Correctional Officers Doe did nothing. After another inmate
called Correctional Officers Doe, they eventually came to the
cell and deployed a chemical agent. Both inmates were
was taken to the medical unit to have his eyes washed and
brought to the segregation unit. At the medical unit,
Defendants Nurses John/Jane Doe 1-5 refused to treat
Altayeb's stab wounds and other injuries. He received no
medical care from August 14, 2014, through August 21, 2014,
on which day Altayeb was transferred to Corrigan-Radgowski
Correctional Facility. Medical staff there ordered him taken
to the hospital for treatment of several broken ribs, a
concussion, and infected stab wounds.
August 14 and 21, 2014, Altayeb repeatedly requested that
Defendants Correctional Officers Doe call the state police so
he could file a complaint for a hate crime and assault
against inmate Williams. They denied his requests.
Correctional Officers Doe also denied Altayeb a legal call to
contact his attorney. Warden Chapdelaine also denied him
permission to call his lawyer, the state police and "the
councilor at the embassy in New York." Doc. 1 at 9,
asserts several § 1983 claims based on the following
violations: (1) Defendants Chapdelaine, Perry and
Correctional Officers Doe were deliberately indifferent to
his safety and failed to protect him from harm in violation
of the Eighth Amendment; (2) Defendants Nurses Doe were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (3) Defendants
Chapdelaine and Correctional Officers Doe violated
Altayeb's right to due process and equal protection as
well as his First Amendment rights by failing to call the
state police and failing to permit him to make legal calls.
Alatayeb also asserts state-law claims against Defendants
Chapdelaine, Perry and Correctional Officers Doe for
negligence in failing to protect him from harm. Altayeb seeks
declaratory relief, monetary damages, punitive damages and
injunctive relief, but asserts claims against all Defendants
only in their individual capacities.
seeks injunctive relief only in the form of an order that the
Department of Correction place him on single cell status,
remove all disciplinary reports from his file and reinstate
his social contact visits. This relief must be denied. First,
Altayeb asks the Court to order the Department of Correction
to afford him the requested relief. The Department of
Correction, a state agency, is not a defendant in this case
and, indeed, cannot be sued under section 1983 for injunctive
relief. See Bhatia v. Conn. Dep't of Children &
Families (DCF), 317 F.App'x 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2009)
("[A] state agency . . . is not susceptible to liability
under section 1983 . . . both because such an agency is not a
'person' within the meaning of that statute . . . and
because state agencies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity." (citations omitted)) (summary order); see
also Will v. Mich. Dep't of Police, 491 U.S. 58,
70-71 (1989) (holding that states and its officials are not a
person within the meaning of the statute); Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984) (recognizing that state agencies are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity). Thus, Altayeb cannot save this
claim by simply adding the Department of Corrections as a
Defendants sued by Altayeb are named in their individual
capacities only. “[Injunctive relief against a state
official may be recovered only in an official capacity suit,
. . . because [a] victory in a personal-capacity action is a
victory against the individual defendant rather than against
the entity that employs him.” Marsh v.
Kirschner, 31 F.Supp.2d 79, 80 (D. Conn. 1998)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
Altayeb cannot seek injunctive relief against the state
officials in their individual capacities. Section 1983 does,
however, permit individuals to seek injunctive relief against
state actors in their official capacities. Id.
However, even if Defendants had been named in their official
capacities, Defendants all work at MacDougall Correctional
Institution and have no control over Altayeb's
confinement at Garner Correctional Institution, his place of
confinement when he filed this action. See Prins v.
Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) ("It is
settled in this Circuit that a transfer from a prison
facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the
transferring facility." (citing Young v.
Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989) and
Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.
summary, all requests for injunctive relief are dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
State-law Negligence Claim
asserts a state-law negligence claim against Defendants
Chapdelaine, Perry and Corrections Officers Doe. Altayeb
challenges actions (and inaction) taken by Defendants as a
breach of a duty of reasonable cared owed to him, resulting
in physical and emotional injury to Altayeb. However, Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 4-165(a) provides that "[n]o state
officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or
injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the
discharge of his duties or within the scope of his or her
employment." Therefore, state employees are not
"personally liable for their negligent actions performed
within the scope of their employment." Miller v.
Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 319 (2003). As such, Defendants
have statutory immunity from Altayeb's negligence claim.
See Ziemba v. Lynch, No. 11-974, 2013 WL 5232543, at
*8 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2013). Altayeb's state-law
negligence claim is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
Altayeb's § 1983 Claims
alleges a number of § 1983 claims related to the alleged
assault, his injuries and the subsequent treatment he
received by Defendants. The Court will address each claim in
Eighth Amendment Claims
alleges that Defendants Chapdelaine, Perry and Correctional
Officers Doe were deliberately indifferent to his safety and
failed to protect him from harm in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. To state such a claim, Altayeb must "allege
facts showing that he was incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that risk
and [his] safety." See Medina v. Black, No.
15-1371, 2016 WL 386030, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2016)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836
(1994)). Defendants must have known of and disregarded
"an excessive risk of harm to the plaintiff's health
and safety, " been aware of the facts from which the
inference can be drawn that such a substantial risk of harm
existed, and actually drawn that inference. Id.
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
assessing whether Altayeb faced an excessive risk of serious
harm, this Court must "look at the 'facts and
circumstances of which the official was aware at the time he
acted or failed to act.'" Hartry v. City of
Suffolk, 755 F.Supp.2d 422, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting
Heisler v. Kralik, 981 F.Supp. 830, 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1997)). The focus is "on the existence of a substantial
risk of serious harm, rather than the actual injuries
suffered in an attack." Medina, 2016 WL 386030,
at *5 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). In fact, an
inmate need not await injury to seek to remedy the unsafe
conditions. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at
845). "[W]hen a prisoner is subjected to specific
threats from another inmate, and there are indication[s] that
the threat will be carried out, the failure of prison
officials to act may give rise to a deliberate indifference
claim." Hartry, 755 F.Supp.2d at 436 (quoting
Walker v. Shaw, No. 08-10043, 2010 WL 2541711, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Altayeb alleges that he informed Defendants, including the
supervisory Defendants, several times that he was worried
about his safety as a Muslim/Arab person, that inmates were
calling him a terrorist and stated an intention to attack
him, and that he should not be housed with a soldier that had
fought in Afghanistan. Defendants brushed aside and minimized
Altayeb's concerns and certain Defendants are alleged to
have predicted that Altayeb would get was coming to him,
thereby seeming to approve the inmates' threats. He was
then brutally attacked by his cellmate and certain Defendants
ignored Altayeb's pleas allowing the attack to continue
longer. These allegations are enough to plead that Defendants
were aware of, and disregarded, an excessive risk of serious
harm to Altayeb's health and safety. Thus, he has stated
cognizable claims for failure to protect and deliberate
indifference to his safety by these Defendants.
also alleges that Defendants Nurses Doe were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Deliberate indifference by prison officials
or medical staff to a prisoner's serious medical needs
also constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976); Jarecke v. Hensley, 552 F.Supp.2d
261, 264 (D. Conn. 2008); see also Salahuddin v.
Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment
imposes a duty upon prison officials to ensure that inmates
receive adequate medical care." (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 832, 844)). To prevail on such a claim, Altayeb
must demonstrate that the alleged deprivation of adequate
medical care was "sufficiently serious" and that
the Nurse Defendants acted with a "sufficiently culpable
state of mind" by acting with "deliberate
indifference to inmate health." Salahuddin, 467
F.3d at 279-80.
determine whether the alleged deprivation is
"sufficiently serious, " courts must consider (1)
whether the prisoner was actually deprived of adequate
medical care when providing reasonable care is all that is
required, and (2) how the medical care was inadequate, which
requires also examining what harm will likely be caused or
has been caused. Id. at 280. Only deprivations that
deny "the minimal civilized measure of life
necessities" are "sufficiently serious."
Id. at 279 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Regarding the Nurse Defendants' state of mind,
"[d]eliberate indifference is a mental state equivalent
to subjective recklessness, as the term is used in criminal
law, " requiring officials to "act or fail to act
while actually aware of a substantial risk that serious
inmate harm will result." Id. at 280 (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37, 839-40).
Altayeb alleges that the Nurse Defendants, aware of the
brutal attack on Altayeb, ignored his substantial injuries
from the attack, failing altogether to treat him for any
injury other than that to his eyes from the deploying of the
chemical agent. The Nurse Defendants, as alleged, were aware
of a serious medical need, and consciously and intentionally
disregarded that need. As a result, Altayeb was not treated
for his injuries until he was transferred to another
correctional institution at which point he was sent directly
to a hospital. At the hospital, he was finally treated for
his injuries related to the brutal attack, which included
wounds that had become infected due to his lack of prior
treatment. Thus, Altayeb has stated cognizable claims for
deliberate indifference to his medical needs by these Nurse
Claims Related to Altayeb's Inability to Call Certain
alleges that certain Defendants, including Defendant
Chapdelaine, refused to allow him access to a telephone to
call his lawyer, the Connecticut State Police, and the
councilor at the embassy in New York, which denied him due
process and equal protection. Regarding his claim that he was
not allowed to contact his lawyer, "[p]risoners . . .
'have a constitutional right of access to the
courts.'" Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88,
92 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 821 (1977)). Such a right has been grounded, at least as
relevant to prisoners, in the constitutional guarantees of
equal protection and due process. Id.; see also
Pino v. Dalsheim, 558 F.Supp. 673, 674-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) ("The Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that as a corollary to the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process of law, prisoners must be afforded
reasonable access to the courts in order to . . . seek
redress for violations of their constitutional rights."
(citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419
(1974), overruled in part on other grounds by Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989))).
regulations or practices by a state that "unjustifiably
obstruct" this "right of access to the courts are
invalid." Pino, 558 F.Supp. at 674-75 (quoting
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 419) (internal quoatation
marks omitted). However, "[t]o establish a
constitutional violation based on denial of access to the
courts, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's
conduct was deliberate and malicious, and that the
defendant's actions resulted in an actual injury to the
plaintiff." Banks v. Cnty. of Westchester, 168
F.Supp.3d 682, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Bellezza v.
Holland, 730 F.Supp.2d 311, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Such an injury requires
that "the defendant's conduct did, in fact,
hinder the efforts of the plaintiff to pursue a legal
claim." Id. (citing Bellezza, 730
F.Supp.2d at 314-15) (emphasis in original).
Altayeb alleges that for, at most, a period of one week
certain Defendants prevented him from contacting his lawyer.
He does not allege how that hindered him from ultimately
filing the instant action or how it resulted in injury to
him. Moreover, courts have consistently found that
"[m]ere delay in being able to work on one's legal
action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation." Banks,
168 F.Supp.3d at 693 (quoting Davis v. Goord, 320
F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, absent any allegation that the conduct of
certain Defendants in this seven-day period caused harm,
Altayeb's Complaint cannot sustain an action under §
1983 on that ground.
Altayeb's inability to contact the state police, "a
victim of allegedly criminal conduct is not entitled to a
criminal investigation or the prosecution of the alleged
perpetrator of the crime." Johnson v. Ruiz, No.
11-542, 2012 WL 90159, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2012)
(collecting cases). The ability to have a criminal complaint
filed and have a prosecution result as a victim of the
alleged crime is not a constitutionally protected activity.
Moreover, a victim has "no constitutionally protected
right to a proper investigation" of any claims filed.
Id. (citing Lewis v. Gallivan, 315
F.Supp.3d 313, 316-17 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) and Santossio v.
City of Bridgeport, No. 01-1460, 2004 WL 2381559, at *4
(D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2004)).
allegation that certain Defendants did not allow him to
contact the state police to press charges against inmate
Williams does not state a constitutional claim. See
Id. at *5. Altayeb had no constitutional right to an
investigation or to have inmate Williams prosecuted, thus,
his allegations regarding the failure to permit him to press
charges fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
regarding Altayeb's claim that he was prevented from
contacting the "councilor at the embassy in New York,
" it is unclear from his Complaint what embassy Altayeb
was trying to contact, why Altayeb would need to contact an
embassy or what purpose Altayeb had in contacting the
embassy. Although this district has recognized that
communications with foreign embassies directly concern a
prisoner's incarceration and that a foreign national
"surely has a right to communicate with his government
in order to persuade it to take some official action on his
behalf, " Stover v. Carlson, 413 F.Supp. 719,
723 (D. Conn. 1976), Altayeb does not allege that he is a
foreign national entitled to so communicate with his
government or even which embassy he was seeking to speak with
about the assault. In addition, Altayeb does not allege any
harm or injury resulting from the seven day period in which
he could not so communicate with the embassy. Given the lack
of details and allegations concerning this cursory claim,
Altayeb has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted on this basis.
extent Altayeb is asserting any First Amendment claims on the
denial of his requests to call his lawyer, the Connecticut
State Police or the embassy, he also fails to state any
claims upon which relief can be granted. Prisoners have no
constitutional right to unlimited telephone use. See
Pitsley v. Ricks, No. 96-0372, 2000 WL 362023, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. March 31, 2000) ("Courts considering prison
telephone restrictions have agreed that an inmate has no
right to unlimited telephone use." (collecting cases)).
Restrictions on such use are generally upheld if the affected
inmate has an alternate means of communicating with the
outside world. Id. at *5.
does not allege (and it does not appear from his Complaint)
that he was without any other means of contacting his lawyer,
the Connecticut State Police, or the embassy such as by
letter. Thus, although Altayeb may have been limited in his
ability to use the telephone, he has not alleged facts from
which this Court can infer that he was entirely
deprived of his right to communicate with the outside world
in violation of the First Amendment. In addition, to state a
violation of his First Amendment speech rights, Altayeb is
required to show that he suffered prejudice or actual injury.
Clay v. Schwebler, No. 13-1314, 2015 WL 6438919, at
*4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015) (citing Pitsley, 2000
WL 362023, at *3). As explained above, Altayeb has failed to
do so with the allegations in his Complaint.
claims related to the denial of his requests to contact his
lawyer, the Connecticut State Police, and an unspecified
embassy are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
Leave to Amend
pro se complaint fails to state a cause of action,
the court generally "should not dismiss without granting
leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the
complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be
stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112
(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav.
Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, where "[t]he problem
with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive;
better pleading will not cure it." Id. The
Court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend such claims as
"[r]epleading would thus be futile" and
"[s]uch a futile request to replead should be
denied" as instructed by the Second Circuit.
Id. (citing Hunt v. Alliance N. Am. Gov't
Income Trust, 159 F.3d 723, 728 (2d Cir. 1998)).
the problems with Altayeb's claims for injunctive relief,
Altayeb's state-law claims and his § 1983 claims
based on violations of his constitutional rights related to
his inability to call the Connecticut State Police are
substantive. As such, repleading them would be futile. These
claims are dismissed and Altayeb may not replead them.
the Court will grant Altayeb leave to amend his § 1983
claims based on violations of his constitutional rights
related to his inability to call his lawyer and the embassy
in an amended complaint based on the guidance provided in
this Initial Review. Altayeb could reasonably assert such
claims if he can cure the deficiencies noted in this Ruling.
is advised that, if filed, the amended complaint is intended
to completely replace the complaint in this action, and thus
it "renders [any prior complaint] of no legal
effect." See Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco,
556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977). Therefore, Altayeb's
amended complaint must include all of the allegations against
each of the Defendants against whom the case is going forward
so that the amended complaint may stand alone as the sole
complaint that defendants must answer.
requests for injunctive relief, Altayeb's state-law
claims, and Altayeb's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
related to his ability to make phone calls to his lawyer, the
Connecticut State Police, and an embassy are DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Altayeb will have
thirty (30) days to file an Amended Complaint asserting 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims related to his ability to make
phone calls to his lawyer and an embassy in accordance with
this Initial Review. Otherwise, the case will proceed on the
remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based upon Eighth
Amendment violations against Defendants in their individual
Clerk shall verify the current work address of Defendants
Chapdelaine and Perry with the Department of Correction
Office of Legal Affairs, mail a waiver of service of process
request packet to each Defendant at the confirmed address
within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, and report to the
Court on the status of the waiver request on the thirty-fifth
(35) day after mailing. If any Defendant fails to return the
waiver request, the Clerk shall make arrangements for
in-person service by the U.S. Marshals Service on him in his
or her individual capacity and the defendant shall be
required to pay the costs of such service in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).
Clerk shall send written notice to Plaintiff of the status of
this action, along with a copy of this Order.
Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the Complaint and this
Ruling and Order to the Connecticut Attorney General and the
Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs.
Defendants shall file their response to the Complaint, either
an answer or motion to dismiss, within sixty (60)
days from the date the waiver form is sent. If they
choose to file an answer, they shall admit or deny the
allegations and respond to the cognizable claim recited
above. They also may include any and all additional defenses
permitted by the Federal Rules.
Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26
through 37, shall be completed within seven months (210 days)
from the date of this order. Discovery requests need not be
filed with the court.
motions for summary judgment shall be filed within eight
months (240 days) from the date of this order.
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a nonmoving party must
respond to a dispositive motion within twenty-one (21) days
of the date the motion was filed. If no response is filed, or
the response is not timely, the dispositive motion can be
granted absent objection.
Plaintiff changes his address at any time during the
litigation of this case, Local Court Rule 83.1(c)(2) provides
that the plaintiff MUST notify the court. Failure to do so
can result in the dismissal of the case. Plaintiff must give
notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated. Plaintiff
should write PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is
not enough to just put the new address on a letter without
indicating that it is a new address. If Plaintiff has more
than one pending case, he should indicate all of the case
numbers in the notification of change of address. Plaintiff
should also notify Defendant or the attorney for Defendant of
his new address.
Plaintiff is hereby notified that the U.S. Marshal cannot
serve the Complaint on John Doe 1-4, Jane Doe 1-4, and Nurse
John/Jane Doe 1-5 until he identifies these Defendants by
name. Plaintiff will have ninety (90) days from the date of
this order to conduct discovery and file a notice identifying
these Defendants by name. If Plaintiff fails to file a notice
within the time specified, the claims against all Doe
Defendants will be dismissed without further notice from the
Court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) and the action will
proceed only on the claims against Defendants Chapdelaine and
 Although Altayeb mentions at the
beginning of his Complaint state-law assault and battery
claims against Defendants, throughout the rest of the
Complaint he fails to assert any facts supporting such claims
against these Defendants and does not attempt to state such a
claim. The only assault or battery referenced in the
complaint is that committed by inmate Williams, who is not
named as a Defendant. To the extent he is asserting such
claims, they are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §