September 7, 2016
from Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Blawie,
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, with whom were Michael S.
Taylor, assigned counsel, and, on the brief, James P. Sexton,
assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
E. Mattei, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the
brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and
Cornelius P. Kelly, supervisory assistant state's
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Lavine, Mullins and Mihalakos, Js.
defendant, Mark Hayward, appeals from the judgment of
conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of larceny in the
first degree in violation of General Statutes §§
53a-119 and 53a-122 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims
that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he intended to permanently deprive the
victim of his property. We affirm the judgment of the trial
jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The
victim, Ronald Runk, met the defendant in September, 2008.
After the victim told the defendant that he had written two
books and recorded music, the defendant claimed that he was
in the business of marketing and distributing books like
those of the victim and that he was interested in selling
records. Consequently, the defendant and the victim entered
into a written agreement whereby the defendant agreed to
market one of the victim's books. The defendant also
became involved in selling the victim's record.
December, 2008, the defendant and the victim discussed the
defendant's limited liability company, Mark I Group,
which was in the business of marketing corporate gifts.
Following these discussions, the victim agreed to invest $34,
000 in the Mark I Group.
thereafter, the defendant met with the president of Steiner
Direct, a nationwide sports memorabilia company. In
September, 2009, after developing a prototype of a keychain
filled with dirt from Yankee Stadium, the defendant and
Steiner Direct entered into a formal agreement for the
manufacturing and selling of key-chains. The defendant
informed the victim of the agreement.
in February, 2009, the defendant began to ask the victim for
money beyond the $34, 000 invest-ment. In an e-mail
dated February 12, 2009, the defendant asked the victim for
$2500 to market the victim's book. The victim wired $2500
to the defendant's Mark I Group account. In an e-mail
dated February 19, 2009, the defendant asked the victim for
$6500, which he claimed was needed to pay backdated taxes on
his Barclays Bank account containing over $1.2 million and to
pay for airfare so that the defendant could travel to London
to access the funds. The defendant stated that the $6500 loan
would be a repayable loan against the Barclays Bank funds.
The victim wired $6500 to the Mark I Group account. In an
e-mail dated February 25, 2009, the defendant asked the
victim for $3200, claiming that the bank gave the defendant
the wrong details and that the amount needed to pay the taxes
was $6700. The victim wired $3200 to the Mark I Group
after the February 25, 2009 e-mail, the defendant showed the
victim a letter purporting to be from Carl Hynes, the Premier
Operations Director of
Accounts at Barclays Bank. Dated April 4, 2009, the letter
stated that the Barclays Bank account contained $1, 223, 000
and that an advance of $30, 000 was to be wired to the Mark I
Group account on May 2, 2009.
April 11, 2009, the defendant informed the victim that he
needed $2750 because the defendant had miscalculated the mold
cost of the keychains, and, therefore, he was short $2750.
The defendant stated that he would give the victim a check
for $2750, dated May 3, 2009, when he expected the $30, 000
from his Barclays Bank account to clear. The victim wired
$2750 to the Mark I Group account. On April 16, 2009, the
defendant asked the victim for $3850, stating that the
defendant had not accounted for the gift box for the
keychains. The victim wired $3850 to the Mark I Group
account. On April 23, 2009, the defendant asked the victim
for $6000, stating that he needed the money to start
promoting the key-chains and to eat until ...