September 12, 2016
from Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Oliver, J.
T. Fetterman, for the appellant (petitioner).
A. Riggione, senior assistant state's attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney,
and Jo Anne Sulik, supervisory assistant state's
attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Pellegrino, Js.
DiPENTIMA, C. J.
petitioner, Rolando Robles, appeals from the judgment of the
habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the habeas
court improperly denied his petition because his guilty
pleas, made pursuant to the Alford doctrine,
were not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily as a
result of the new interpretation of our kidnapping statutes
as detailed in State v. Salamon, 287 Conn.
509, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008), and its progeny. We conclude that
the petitioner's specific claim regarding the knowing and
intelligent nature of his pleas was not raised to or decided
by the habeas court. Accordingly, we decline to review his
appellate claim and affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
following facts and procedural history underlie our
discussion. The state charged the petitioner with kidnapping
in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §
53a-92 (a) (2) (A), attempt to commit kidnapping in the first
degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49
and 53a-92 (a) (2) (A) (kidnapping offenses) and sexual
assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-73a (a) (2). See State v.
Robles, 169 Conn.App. 127, 128-29, A.3d (2016). On
August 29, 2007, the petitioner appeared before the trial
court, Miano, J., to enter guilty pleas to these
charges. Id., 129. After some discussion, the court
accepted the petitioner's guilty pleas pursuant to the
Alford doctrine. Id., 129-30.
the plea proceeding, the prosecutor set forth the following
factual bases underlying the charges against the petitioner.
‘‘[T]hat's an incident that happened on
December 15, 2005, and it was in the area of Sigourney Street
and Russ Street. The complainant, the victim, was a seventeen
year old female. She was on her way to school at Hartford
Public High School when [the petitioner] came up from behind
her. He grabbed her and had sexual contact placing his hand
on her buttocks area and genital area and that was over her
clothing. She was able to push him away.
followed her. A short distance later he pulled her by the
jacket. He attempted to pull her back behind the apartment
building, and these were her words, she was able to break
free. Her jacket did rip. And she was able to gain freedom. A
later identification was made after she filed this complaint
and told family members. One family member had seen him. And
she ultimately positively identified the [petitioner] as the
person who had done this to her.
next incident . . . that happened five days later on December
20, 2005, in the morning hours, 8:40 in the a.m., near the
intersection of Capitol Avenue and Laurel Street. This
[incident] involved a sixteen year old female. She was
walking to school. She observed the [petitioner] following
her. He did catch up with her in that area of Capitol Avenue
and Laurel Street. He grabbed her from behind and attempted
to pull her or drag her into a fenced area. She also fought
back and freed herself after a short scuffle with
him.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 129 n.2. Following his conviction, the court
sentenced the petitioner to fifteen years incarceration,
execution suspended after time served, and twenty years of
probation. Id., 130.
the petitioner's conviction, our Supreme Court
reinterpreted the intent element of our kidnapping statutes.
In State v. Salamon, supra, 287
Conn. 542, it stated: ‘‘Our legislature, in
replacing a single, broadly worded kidnapping provision with
a gradated scheme that distinguishes kidnappings from
unlawful restraints by the presence of an intent to prevent a
victim's liberation, intended to exclude from the scope
of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying
severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim
that are merely incidental to and necessary for the
commission of another crime against that victim. Stated
otherwise, to commit a kidnapping in conjunction with another
crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim's
liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree
than that which is necessary to commit the other
Supreme Court further noted that ‘‘[w]hen that
confinement or movement is merely incidental to the
commission of another crime, however, the confinement or
movement must have exceeded that which was necessary to
commit the other crime. [T]he guiding principle is whether
the [confinement or movement] was so much the part of another
substantive crime that the substantive crime could not have
been committed without such acts . . . . In other words, the
test . . . to determine whether [the] confinements or
movements involved [were] such that kidnapping may also be
charged and prosecuted when an offense separate from
kidnapping has occurred asks whether the confinement,
movement, or detention was merely incidental to the
accompanying felony or whether it was significant enough, in
and of itself, to warrant independent prosecution. . . .
Conversely, a defendant may be convicted of both kidnapping
and another substantive crime if, at any time prior to,
during or after the commission of that other crime, the
victim is moved or confined in a way that has independent
criminal significance, that is, the victim was restrained to
an extent exceeding that which was necessary to accomplish or
complete the other crime.'' (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 546-47.
January, 2012, the petitioner commenced the present action.
On February 21, 2014, the petitioner filed an amended
petition for a writ of habeas corpus (operative petition). In
count one, he alleged illegal confinement because his
conviction for the kidnapping offenses was unconstitutional.
Specifically, he argued that § 53a-92 was
unconstitutional under both the federal and state
constitutions and that our Supreme Court's decisions in
Salamon and its progeny were subject to retroactive
application as set forth in Luurtsema v.Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740, 12 A.3d
817 (2011). The petitioner then iterated the general
claim that his conviction for the kidnapping offenses was
based on a violation of the federal and state constitutions.
In count two of the ...