September 12, 2016
Alexandra R. Harrington, deputy assistant public defender,
with whom was Adele V. Patterson, senior assistant public
defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's
attorney, John P. Doyle, Jr., senior assistant state's
attorney, and Melissa Patterson, assistant state's
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,
Espinosa and Robinson, Js.
defendant, Ray Boyd, appeals from the trial court's
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence for
lack of jurisdiction. The defendant, who was sentenced to
fifty years imprisonment without parole in 1992 for a crime
that he committed when he was seventeen years old, contends
that he is entitled to resentencing on the basis of recent
changes to juvenile sentencing law. We discussed this precise
issue in State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, A.3d
(2016), and our resolution of the defendant's appeal is
controlled by our decision in that case. We affirm the trial
court's dismissal of the defendant's motion to
following facts and procedural history are relevant to the
present appeal. The defendant was convicted of murder in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a and sentenced by
the trial court, W. Hadden, J., to a term
of fifty years imprisonment with no opportunity for parole.
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of
conviction. State v. Boyd, 36 Conn.App. 516, 525,
651 A.2d 1313, cert. denied, 232 Conn. 912, 654 A.2d 356,
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 828, 116 S.Ct. 98, 133 L.Ed.2d 53
(1995). The facts underlying the defendant's conviction
are set forth in that decision.
2013, the defendant filed a motion to correct his sentence
pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22,  contending that a
prison term that is equivalent to life imprisonment without
parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution and
article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut
constitution. The defendant further argued that his
sentence was illegal because he had not been given
ameaningful opportunity for release from prison, and that the
sentence had been imposed in an illegal manner because he was
not afforded an individualized sentencing hearing at which
the court considered specific mitigating factors associated
with his young age at the time of the crime of which he was
convicted. See Miller v. Alabama, U.S., 132 S.Ct.
2455, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (requiring sentencing
court to consider youth related mitigating factors when
imposing sentence of life imprisonment without parole);
State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 658-59, 110
A.3d 1205 (2015) (sentencing court must consider age related
evidence in mitigation when deciding whether to irrevocably
sentence juvenile offender to term of life imprisonment, or
equivalent, without parole), cert. denied, U.S., 136 S.Ct.
1361, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016); see also Casiano v.
Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 62, 115
A.3d 1031 (2015) (sentencing considerations that were
identified in Miller apply retroactively in
collateral proceedings), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v.
Casiano, U.S., 136 S.Ct. 1364, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016).
The trial court, Clifford, J., did not
reach the merits of the motion to correct but dismissed the
motion for lack of jurisdiction, from which dismissal the
present case, as in Delgado, we affirm the trial
court's dismissal of the defendant's motion to
correct for lack of jurisdiction. As we explained in
Delgado, an allegation that a sentence is illegal or
was imposed in an illegal manner is a necessary predicate to
a trial court's jurisdiction to correct a sentence. See
State v. Delgado, supra, 323 Conn. 812.
When the defendant in the present case filed his motion to
correct, he was serving a sentence that was equivalent to
life imprisonment and he was not eligible for parole. As a
result, he could raise a colorable claim that his sentence
was illegal or imposed in an illegal manner on the ground
that the trial court had failed to consider youth related
factors as required by Miller. Following the
enactment of No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84),
however, the defendant is now eligible for parole and can no
longer claim that he is serving a sentence of life
imprisonment, or its equivalent, without parole. In
considering this issue in Delgado, we explained that
‘‘[t]he eighth amendment, as interpreted by
Miller, does not prohibit a court from imposing a
sentence of life imprisonment with the opportunity
for parole for a juvenile homicide offender, nor does it
require the court to consider the mitigating factors of youth
before imposing such a sentence. . . . Rather, under
Miller, a sentencing court's obligation to
consider youth related mitigating factors is limited to cases
in which the court imposes a sentence of life, or its
equivalent, without parole. . . . As a result, the
defendant's sentence no longer falls within the purview
of Miller, Riley and Casiano, which require
consideration of youth related mitigating factors only if the
sentencing court imposes a sentence of life without
parole.'' (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.)
because Miller, Riley and Casiano do not
require a trial court to consider any particular mitigating
factors associated with a juvenile's young age before
imposing a sentence that includes an opportunity for parole,
the defendant can no longer allege, after the enactment of
P.A. 15-84, that his sentence was imposed in an illegal
manner on the ground that the trial court failed to take
these factors into account. We therefore conclude that the
defendant has not raised a colorable claim of invalidity
that, if decided in his favor, would require resentencing.
See id., 812-13. In the absence of such an
allegation, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over
the motion to correct.
trial court's dismissal of the defendant's motion to
correct an illegal sentence is affirmed.
opinion the other justices concurred.