United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §
Jeffrey Alker Meyer United States District Judge.
Chauncey Moore brings this civil rights action pro
se and in forma pauperis to seek money damages
against his federal probation officer and against two unnamed
officers of the police department of Manchester, Connecticut.
I conclude that plaintiff has not alleged plausible grounds
for relief against his federal probation officer but that his
claims against the police officers shall proceed, subject to
plaintiff's filing of an amended complaint within 60 days
that identifies the police officer defendants by name.
following allegations from plaintiff's complaint are
accepted as true solely for purposes of the Court's
initial review. On October 28, 2012, after plaintiff had been
released from a term of federal imprisonment, he contacted
his United States Probation Officer, defendant Robert
Bouffard, about a place he might live while he completed his
term of supervised release. He provided Bouffard with the
name of a woman-ChiChi Hernandez-who resided in Manchester,
Connecticut. Doc. #1 at 4-5 (¶ I). Bouffard approved
Hernandez's home as plaintiff's place of residence.
Id. at 5 (¶ II).
April 2, 2013, plaintiff contacted Bouffard and asked for
permission to move to a new residence immediately. He stated
that Hernandez had been verbally and physically abusive
towards him, and that he had recently learned that Hernandez
suffered from a mental health disorder and was on probation
for fighting. He told Bouffard that he had found a new place
to live and that he could move in as soon as he received his
paycheck in a couple of days. He also stated that he wanted
to stay with a friend until he could move to the new
warned plaintiff that he could not leave Hernandez's
residence until the new residence had been approved by the
probation office. Bouffard asked plaintiff to stay at
Hernandez's home for a few more days until he could
review and approve the new residence. Id. at 5-6
meantime, on the morning of April 6, 2013, a neighbor called
the police in response to a disturbance at Hernandez's
residence. Hernandez had thrown a jar of spaghetti sauce,
which broke when it hit the floor. Two Manchester police
officers-defendants “John Doe #1” and “John
Doe #2”-arrived at the residence. Doe #1 spoke to
plaintiff about what had occurred, while Doe #2 spoke to
Hernandez in a different room. Plaintiff told Doe #1 that
Hernandez had not taken her medication and had been out all
night smoking angel dust and drinking. Plaintiff, however,
refused to tell Doe #1 that Hernandez had thrown the jar of
spaghetti sauce. Doe #1 arrested plaintiff and transported
him to the Manchester police department. Plaintiff was
charged with assault in the third degree, and was detained.
Id. at 6-7 (¶ VII).
plaintiff's arraignment in state court, a judge set bond
at $10, 000. Federal officials subsequently lodged a detainer
against him for violating his term of supervised release from
his federal sentence. According to plaintiff, the federal
detainer prevented him from being able to post bond to secure
his release on the pending state charge. Id. at 7
September 4, 2013, the Connecticut State's Attorney
entered a nolle prosequi as to the assault charge.
Plaintiff's public defender informed him that Hernandez
had submitted a letter to the court stating that plaintiff
had not assaulted her, and that the court had learned that
Hernandez had a history of giving false statements.
Id. at 7-8 (¶¶ IX-X).
September 6, 2013, marshals transported plaintiff to federal
court for a hearing on the violation of his federal
supervised release. Plaintiff alleges that the federal
magistrate judge found no grounds to support a violation,
because the Connecticut State's Attorney had chosen not
to pursue the assault charge against him. Plaintiff alleges
that the magistrate then lifted the detainer and ordered his
release. Id. at 8 (¶ XI).
his release, plaintiff contacted Hernandez and asked why she
had lied to the police. She responded that Doe #1 and Doe #2
had pressured her into stating that plaintiff had assaulted
her. She explained that she accused plaintiff in order to
avoid being charged with any criminal offenses or sent to
jail. Id. at 8-9 (¶ XII).
two years later, in the summer of 2015, plaintiff was
convicted in state court for resisting arrest, and this in
turn brought him back to federal court for a charge of
violating the conditions of his federal supervised release.
Bouffard submitted a report in connection with the federal
hearing, and plaintiff claims that the report included a
number of false statements about plaintiff. Judge Chatigny
found plaintiff in violation of his supervised release and
sentenced him to one year of imprisonment followed by two
more years of supervised release. See United States v.
Moore, Case No. 3:03cr178(RNC), Doc. #187.
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court must review prisoner
civil complaints and dismiss any portion of the complaint
that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. The
Court must accept as true all factual matters alleged in a
complaint, although a complaint may not survive unless its
factual recitations state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp.,
770 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, it is
well-established that “pro se complaints must be
construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest
arguments that they ...