United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MICHAEL DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
DANNEL P. MALLOY, et al., Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §
Jeffrey Alker Meyer United States District Judge
Michael Davis is a prisoner in the custody of the Connecticut
Department of Correction at the Osborn Correctional
Institution. He has filed a complaint pro se and
in forma pauperis on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, alleging violation of his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the
reasons set forth below, the complaint is dismissed.
following facts as alleged in two handwritten pages in the
complaint are accepted as true only for purposes of this
initial ruling. Since a young age, plaintiff has suffered
from serious mental illness and has required long-term
psychiatric care and treatment. He alleges that
defendants-Governor Dannel P. Malloy, Commissioner Scott
Semple, Deputy Commissioner Monica Ellison, Director Kathleen
Maurer, and Warden Henry Falcone-have denied him proper
psychiatric care and treatment since 2009. Specifically,
plaintiff alleges that defendants engage in the warehousing
of mentally ill inmates at Garner Correctional Institution,
where the only psychiatric treatment he and others receive is
medication and disruptive group therapy. He has on numerous
occasions written to defendants about this issue, but they
have ignored him. He also alleges that defendant Falcone
transferred him on some unspecified date to Garner.
states that his allegations ring true for many other
similarly situated prisoners and that, together, they seek
$250, 000, 000 in damages and transfer to the care and
custody of the Commissioner Mental Health and Addiction
Services so that they will receive appropriate mental health
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review prisoner
civil complaints against governmental actors and
“dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, ” or that “seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” Id. The allegations of a pro
se plaintiff's complaint must be read liberally to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010)
(discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se
recent years, the Supreme Court has set forth a threshold
“plausibility” pleading standard for courts to
evaluate the adequacy of federal court complaints. A
complaint must allege enough facts-as distinct from legal
conclusions-that give rise to plausible grounds for relief.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). Notwithstanding the rule of liberal
interpretation of a pro se complaint, a pro
se complaint may not survive dismissal if its factual
allegations do not meet the basic plausibility standard.
See, e.g., Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40,
790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015).
purports to file this complaint on behalf of himself and
similarly situated prisoners. A non-attorney “pro
se litigant, however, is not empowered to proceed on
behalf of anyone other than himself.” McCall v.
Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1654). Because plaintiff may not represent
other prisoners, I will dismiss this action to the extent
plaintiff pursues the claim on behalf of any prisoner other
plaintiff's own claim, I understand the complaint
principally to allege that he has not received adequate
medical care for his mental illness. It is well established
that “[a] prison official's ‘deliberate
indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an
inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). A deliberate
indifference claim has two component requirements. The first
requirement is objective: the alleged deprivation must be
serious. The second requirement is subjective: the charged
officials must act with a subjectively reckless state of mind
in their denial of medical care. See Spavone v. New York
State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138
(2d Cir. 2013); Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 127
(2d Cir. 2012).
plaintiff alleges that he has been denied proper mental
health treatment, but omits any allegations regarding his
diagnoses, what treatment (other than medication and group
therapy) he has been denied, and what harm he has encountered
from the omitted treatment options. Nor does he identify any
dates of any alleged failures of medical treatment except for
a broad and continuous range from 2008 to the present.
Without specific allegations relating to the denial of care
for plaintiff and demonstrating the personal involvement of
each of the defendants with this denial of care, see
Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d
Cir. 2013), the Court cannot conclude that any of the
defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to
plaintiff's serious medical needs. See Selah v.
N.Y.S. Docs Com'r, 2006 WL 2051402, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (Chin, J.) (dismissing plaintiff's vague
allegations of deliberate indifference to medical needs).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts that give rise to plausible
grounds for relief.
complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A on the ground that the complaint does not
allege specific facts that give rise to plausible ...