Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#119)
B. SHAPIRO, JUDGE.
court heard argument at short calendar on November 21, 2016
concerning the defendant Daniel Soucier, Diversified Group
Brokerage Corp. (DGB), and BCD Holdings LLC (BCD)'s
motion for summary judgment, dated October 2, 2015.
considering the parties' arguments, the court issues this
ruling. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied
as to the First, Second, Third, Tenth and Twelfth Counts,
and, treated as a motion to strike, is granted as to the
Eleventh and Thirteenth Counts.
In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the
burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The
courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for
summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any
genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under
applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a
judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a
strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a
showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that
excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine
issue of material fact.... As the burden of proof is on the
movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the opponent.... When documents submitted in
support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents
establishing the existence of such an issue.... Once the
moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party
must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some
disputed factual issue...." (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, 310 Conn. 304, 319-20, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).
A material fact... [is] a fact which will make a difference
in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 312-13.
Second, and Third Counts General Statutes § 45a-541i (a)
provides, " A trustee may delegate investment and
management functions that a prudent trustee of comparable
skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. The
trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill and caution in:
(1) Selecting an agent; (2) establishing the scope and terms
of the delegation, consistent with the purposes and terms of
the trust; and (3) periodically reviewing the agent's
actions in order to monitor the agent's performance and
compliance with the scope and terms of the delegation."
subsection (3), in their memorandum, page 9, the movants
argue that, here, monitoring was unnecessary since Soucier
delegated his powers to the co-trustee defendants, who had a
fiduciary duty to manage the Trust's assets and had the
power to act as a majority without him. No legal authority is
cited for this proposition. In essence, the argument concedes
that no monitoring by Soucier occurred.
absence of citation to any legal authority, the court is not
required to address this summary judgment argument, which is
briefed inadequately. See Glazer v.
Dress Barn, Inc., 21A Conn. 33, 86 n.37,
873 A.2d 929 (2005). In addition, the plaintiffs'
presentation raises genuine issues of material fact as to
breach of fiduciary duty, as to whether the other trustees
acted as trustees.
and Twelfth Counts
pleaded, and as acknowledged by the movants in their
memorandum, page 12, these counts seek relief against DGB and
BCD for aiding and abetting Soucier in the breach of his
fiduciary duty, and are derivative in nature. See
Ethimiou v. Smith,268 Conn. 499, 504-05, 846 A.2d 222
(2004). Since there are material issues of fact in ...