Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford
M SHERIDAN, Judge
327.00 MOTION TO REARGUE/RECONSIDER
foregoing, having been considered by the Court, is hereby:
the court are separate motions filed by the Hartford Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corporation and St. Adalbert Church seeking
reconsideration of the court's December 15, 2016 ruling
on the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation requests that
the court " reconsider the facts relative to the
Diocesan Corporation as distinguished from the separate
Parish Corporation and then to reconsider its
conclusions" on the basis that " the Diocesan
Corporation is a corporation separate and distinct from the
Parish Corporation that did not operate the CCD program at
St. Adalbert's, did not supervise Fr. Ramsay, and did not
'affirmatively create a situation' where adults were
allowed to be alone with minors." (January 3, 3017
Motion to Reargue [#327], pp. 3 - 4).
are not arguments that were raised previously in the motion
for summary judgment. Nowhere in the motion for summary
judgment is it argued as a matter of undisputed fact that the
Diocesan Corporation cannot be held liable because it "
did not operate" the CCD program at St. Adalberts. That
question of fact was not addressed in the briefing. As such,
considering it at this point would represent a classic "
second bite at the apple, " which is not the function of
a motion to reargue. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.
Eldon, 144 Conn.App. 260, 278, 73 A.3d 757, 768 (2013);
see also Lynch v. Lynch, 153 Conn.App. 208, 245, 100
A.3d 968, 992 (2014) (motion to reargue improperly asked
court to court to reevaluate the facts that had been before
it during the hearing in order to arrive at a different
calculation). Reargument on that basis is therefore denied.
defendants' motions suggest that reconsideration is
warranted because the court may have misapprehended certain
facts. The defendants point to the court's summary in its
written decision of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the alleged abuse of the plaintiff which, in the view of the
court, were sufficient to create a genuine dispute of
material fact. The court stated: " In the present case,
the evidence of negligent affirmative acts and negligent
omissions by HRCDC and St. Adalbert, although scant, is
sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether
the plaintiff can satisfy the requirements of § 302B.
The testimony of the plaintiff was to the effect that Father
Ramsay was permitted to come to her classroom, remove her
from the classroom with no more than a request to the
instructor to 'see Mary outside', and take her to a
locked ladies room 'down the hall' for which he had
been given a key. He would return her to the classroom ten to
fifteen minutes later without explanation, and without any
questioning from the instructor."
defendants argue that the plaintiff's deposition
testimony reflects only one occasion when she was taken out
of her classroom by Father Ramsay. The court disagrees. At
the outset, it is clear that the deposition testimony
reflects multiple " acts" of improper sexual
contact - approximately 12 - which occurred on the premises
of St. Adalbert's from December 1977 through April 1979.
In the absence ofcontrary evidence, it is reasonable to infer
that the sequence of events leading to Ramsay being alone
with the plaintiff was similar for all of those occasions.
confirmed by the plaintiff's interrogatory responses,
which were appended to her opposition. In her responses the
plaintiff stated that there were multiple incidents of
improper sexual contact. On each of those occasions "
the incidents always took place while I was attending CYO
[sic.] class when he [Ramsay] would come and pull me out of
class." (See September 5, 2012 Responses to
Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 41).
it is correct that the plaintiff was taken " behind
locked doors" on only one of the occasions when she was
removed from the classroom. On the other occasions the
improper sexual contact occurred at the secluded end of a
hallway. In the court's view, this does not change the
analysis. Whether the defendants' affirmative acts
exposed the plaintiff to a recognized high degree of risk of
harm through the intentional misconduct of another is, under
these facts, a jury question.
court's decision might have more accurately stated that
" under these circumstances, a jury could reasonably
conclude that the defendants had affirmatively created a
situation where adults were permitted to remove a minor CCD
student from the classroom and take that student to another
part of the building where they would be alone or unobserved
for up to fifteen minutes. Or, in the alternative, the
defendants had failed to take precautions against adults
under their supervision removing a minor CCD student from a
classroom and taking that student to another part of the
building where they would be alone or unobserved for up to
acts or omissions are of a sort that would lead to the
'peculiar conditions' which create a high degree of
risk of intentional misconduct. Compar ...