United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS.
A. Bolden United States District Judge.
Theresa Billie, brings this action against Defendant, named
as Credit Collection Services, Inc. (“Credit
Collection”), under 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et
seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”). ECF No. 1. Defendant Credit Collection
has filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 9.
reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED without
prejudice. Plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint
by March 3, 2017.
Billie is a resident of the State of Connecticut. Compl.
¶ 4, ECF No. 1. She alleges that Defendant, Credit
Collection, is a debt collector under the FDCPA. Id.
date allegedly “better known to Defendant, ”
Credit Collection allegedly began collection activities
regarding an alleged consumer debt from Ms. Billie (the
“alleged debt”). Compl. ¶ 7. Ms. Billie
alleges that the debt at issue “was incurred as a
financial obligation that was primarily for personal, family
or household purposes and is therefore a
‘debt'” as defined by the FDCPA. Id.
Billie alleges that when a debt collector reports a debt to a
credit reporting agency, it is a “communication covered
by the FDCPA.” Compl. ¶ 9. She alleges that Credit
Collection reported the alleged debt, so that it allegedly
appears on her credit report. Id. ¶ 10. On
November 27, 2015, Ms. Billie alleges that she disputed the
alleged debt directly with Credit Collection, by letter (the
“Dispute Letter”). Id. ¶ 11, 13. On
January 12, 2016, Ms. Billie alleges that she examined her
credit report again to find that Credit Collection had
allegedly “re-reported the credit account to the
bureau(s) in December 2015.” Id. ¶ 12.
Ms. Billie alleges that when Credit Collection re-reported
the alleged debt, Credit Collection allegedly “failed
to list the account as ‘disputed by customer'
despite being required to do so by the FDCPA.”
Id. ¶ 13. Ms. Billie further alleges that she
has been damaged by this allegedly “deceptive,
misleading, and unfair debt collection practice.”
Id. ¶ 14.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) is designed “merely to assess the legal
feasibility of a complaint, not to assay the weight of
evidence which might be offered in support thereof.”
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc.
v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 158 (2d
Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). When deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the material
facts alleged in the complaint as true, draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and decide whether it
is plausible that the plaintiff has a valid claim for relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007); In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d
89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007). While courts “tak[e] as true the
factual allegations of the complaint, ” they
“giv[e] no effect to legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations.” Port Dock & Stone Corp.
v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2007)
plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,
” and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show
entitlement to relief and “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A claim is facially
plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although “detailed
factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must
offer more than “labels and conclusions, ” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action, ” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of
“further factual enhancement.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, 557 (2007). Plausibility at the pleading
stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and “a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of [the claims] is improbable, and .
. . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id.
at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Billie brings her claim under the FDCPA. ECF No. 1. Credit
Collection now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. ECF No. 9. Specifically, Credit
Collection contends that Ms. Billie's Complaint fails to
allege sufficient facts to show that the alleged debt is a
debt covered by and subject to suit under the FDCPA.
See Def.'s Br. at 3-6, ECF No. 10.
initial matter, Defendant also argues that Ms. Billie has
failed to “name the . . . parties” as required by
Rule 4 because it is not a proper party to this case. Fed R.
Civ. P. 4(a)(1)(A); see Def.'s Br. at 6. Credit
Collection alleges that Plaintiff named “Credit
Collection Services, Inc.”, a “business entity .
. . unrelated to the Defendant” that “was
voluntarily dissolved on December 7, 2000.” Def.'s
Br. at 6. The Defendant that has appeared in this case is
Credit Control Services, Inc. (“Credit Control”),
d/b/a/ Credit Collection Services. See Def.'s
Mot. at 1 n. 1, ECF No. 9. Ms. Billie argues that Defendant
is, in fact, operating as “Credit Control Services,
Inc.” in the State of Connecticut, as a foreign entity
incorporated in the State of Delaware. See Pl.'s
Br. at 6, ECF No. 11; see also Pl.'s Br. Ex. A,
ECF No. 11-1 (attaching Connecticut business registration for
a “Credit Collection ...