ALAN J. GORDON
CAROL S. GORDON
November 28, 2016
from Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, B.
J. Gordon, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
H. Perlmutter, for the appellee (defendant).
Keller, Mullins and Sullivan, Js.
civil action, the plaintiff, Alan J. Gordon,  appeals from the
trial court's order granting summary judgment for the
defendant, Carol Gordon, on the ground that there was no
genuine issue of material fact that the three tort actions
alleged in the plaintiff's complaint were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes §
52-577. The plaintiff claims that the court
committed plain error in granting the defendant's motion
for summary judgment because the defendant had not properly
pleaded the statute of limitations as a special defense, and,
therefore, had waived her right to raise it as a ground for
summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the court.
following facts and procedural history, as determined by the
trial court in its memorandum of decision, are relevant to
this appeal. ‘‘The plaintiff . . . instituted the
present action through service of process on the defendant .
. . on May 18, 2014. The [amended and] revised complaint
filed on March 12, 2015, alleges three counts of extortion,
fraud, and larceny arising out of the parties' divorce on
April 18, 2011.
the extortion count, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant
obtained a restraining order against him, then convinced him
to break that order by asking him to watch their children
while she vacationed in Mexico. [H]e believed the restraining
order applied to her, rather than the family residence. The
defendant filed a complaint against the plaintiff on March
17, 2011, and an arrest warrant was issued without the
plaintiff's knowledge. In order to coerce the plaintiff
into signing the separation agreement, the defendant and her
attorney . . . who is the defendant in a companion case, told
the plaintiff that if he signed the separation agreement, no
charges would be brought against him. The plaintiff [signed
the separation agreement] on April 18, 2011, completely
against his will. On April 24, 2011, the police arrested the
plaintiff for violation of the protective order.
the fraud count, the plaintiff alleges the defendant abetted
her attorney in leading the plaintiff to believe things which
were not true. He also alleges that she did so in
‘taking the steps necessary to have plaintiff removed
from his home' even though she had never called the
police before in their twenty-two years of marriage . . . .
The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant committed fraud
when she filed her financial [affidavit in the dissolution
action], stating that the family residence was in an
irrevocable trust when it was not,  that two other residences
were worth considerably less than their actual value, and
that her ‘other personal property' had a total
value of $4700 when the plaintiff paid over $5000 for her
wedding ring twenty years prior and the house contained a
substantial quantity of furniture and shoes.
the larceny count, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant
‘refused to return any of the more than forty household
items owned by the plaintiff and purchased many years prior
to their marriage.' '' (Footnotes added.)
defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Practice
Book § 17-44 on March 30, 2015, on the ground that the
statute of limitations for tort actions had expired prior to
the date on which the defendant was served with
process. In support of her motion, the defendant
provided a memorandum of law and her own affidavit, and
requested that the court take judicial notice of the
parties' dissolution file and this court's decision
in the plaintiff's direct appeal from the dissolution
judgment in Gordon v. Gordon, 148 Conn.App.
59, 84 A.3d 923 (2014). The plaintiff filed a memorandum in
opposition, which he styled a ‘‘reply, ''
on May 18, 2015. In his reply, the plaintiff asserted that
there was no statute of limitations applicable to his fraud
claim and that he filed his complaint within the limitations
period, but had to wait until his application for a fee
waiver was approved so that he could serve process on the
defendant. The plaintiff did not file a counter
affidavit or submit any documentation in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment.
court noted that the first count of the revised complaint
clearly alleged a civil action for fraud, but that the
larceny and extortion claims required ‘‘further
explication, '' as larceny and extortion are crimes
set forth in General Statutes § 53a-119, rather than
claims that may be brought in a civil action. The court
stated, ‘‘[p]ursuant to General Statutes §
52-564, [a]ny person who steals any property of another, or
knowingly receives and conceals stolen property, shall pay
the owner treble his damages. Statutory theft under §
52-564 is synonymous with larceny under . . . § 53a-119.
Hospital of Central Connecticut v. Neurosurgical
Associates, P.C., 139 Conn.App. 778, 788-89, 57 A.3d 794
(2012). Section 53a-119 states that larceny includes
extortion. Therefore, the larceny and extortion claims made
by the plaintiff are properly statutory theft claims . . .
.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
court concluded that the plaintiff's claims for fraud and
statutory theft were subject to the three year statute of
limitations contained in § 52-577. Citing Kidder
v.Read, 150 Conn.App. 720, 726-27, 93 A.3d 599
(2014), the court stated that the ‘‘three year
limitation period of § 52-577 begins with the date of
the act or omission complained of, not the date when the
plaintiff first discovers an injury. . . . The relevant date
of the act or omission complained of, as that phrase is used
in § 52-577, is the date when the negligent conduct of
the defendant occurs and not the date when the [plaintiff]
first sustain[s] damage. . . . Ignorance of his rights on the
part of the person against whom the statute has begun to run,
will not suspend its operation. . . . When conducting an
analysis under § 52-577, the only ...