United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
W. EGINTON SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
an employment discrimination action by plaintiff Ana Reyes
against defendant St. Joseph's Living Center. Plaintiff
alleges unlawful termination based on race, color, and
national origin in violation of Connecticut General Statutes
Section 46a-60(a)(1) (Count I); and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act (Count II). Defendant has moved for summary
judgment on both counts. For the following reasons,
defendant's motion will be granted.
following background was gleaned from the parties'
statements of fact, affidavits, deposition transcripts, and
other exhibit documentation.
operates a long-term nursing facility in Windham,
Connecticut. Defendant hired plaintiff, a Hispanic Puerto
Rican of brown complexion, in March 2012 to work as a
certified nurses' assistant (“CNA”) on the
third shift. Charge Nurse Diane Jeske served as
October 18, 2014, plaintiff worked her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m. shift. During the course of the shift, Kristina Rivera,
another CNA, reported to Jeske that plaintiff had been in a
resident's room for over an hour. Plaintiff asserts that
she was in the room to prevent the resident from falling out
of bed, but Rivera provided a written statement indicating
that plaintiff slept in a recliner for nearly 1 hour and
end the shift Jeske spoke to plaintiff about the report of
her sleeping. Subsequently, plaintiff met with Pat Duffy,
Director of Nursing. Duffy informed plaintiff that she had
received a complaint and that sleeping on the job was
unacceptable. Plaintiff again denied that she had been
asserts that Jeske walked into the dark room where plaintiff
was sitting and found plaintiff to be awake, so Jeske knew
that plaintiff was not sleeping. Moreover, plaintiff
highlights that Rivera's written statement does not state
that Rivera actually saw plaintiff sleeping. Nevertheless,
defendant terminated plaintiff's employment on October
25, 2014, based on the reports that plaintiff was sleeping
during her shift.
contends that she was the only person of color working her
shift. Defendant asserts that Rivera, who reported plaintiff,
is also Hispanic.
motion for summary judgment will be granted where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
"Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the
import of the evidence is summary judgment proper."
Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 (1991).
burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of
any material factual issue genuinely in dispute. American
International Group, Inc. v. London American International
Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981). In determining
whether a genuine factual issue exists, the court must
resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences
against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of his case with respect to which he has
the burden of proof, then summary judgment is appropriate.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the nonmoving
party submits evidence which is "merely colorable,
" legally sufficient opposition to the motion for
summary judgment is not met. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
VII and ...