United States District Court, D. Connecticut
JEAN K. CONQUISTADOR, Plaintiff,
HARTFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
February 1, 2016, Plaintiff Jean Conquistador brought this
lawsuit against the City of Hartford, Hartford Police
Department, Hartford Police Officer Jones, and Hartford
Police Officer Welson, alleging a violation of his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants
have moved to dismiss the complaint because the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For
the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
plaintiff alleges the following facts. On January 25, 2016,
the plaintiff was “robbed at gun point by two young
men.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8.) On January
26, 2016, the plaintiff went to the suspects' residence
“in a peaceful attempt to recover his mobile
phone.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) He did not report
the initial robbery. (Id.) The plaintiff was chased
by one of the suspects and as he fled, the plaintiff noticed
that “the suspect held a handgun in his hand.”
(Id. at ¶ 10.) That same day, the plaintiff
stopped a Hartford Police car operated by Defendant Jones.
(Id. at ¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff informed Jones that
he was robbed on January 25 and the men had taken his wallet,
student I.D., house keys, phone, social security card, and
other items, and that one of the suspects with a gun had
chased him while “attempting to shoot, possible murder
the plaintiff.” (Id. at ¶ 13.) The
plaintiff gave Jones and Welson a good description of the
suspect. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Jones and Welson then
asked the plaintiff “multiple irrelevant and
impertinent questions.” (Id. at ¶ 15-17.)
The plaintiff was “transported to his mother's
residence.” (Id. at ¶ 18.) Welson asked
the plaintiff if his mother would come out to speak with
them, and the plaintiff replied that “he was not going
to wake his mother to speak with him, as it was an
unnecessary thing to do such.” (Id. at ¶
19.) Welson then asked to speak with the “young lady
that opened the door, ” and the plaintiff informed them
that the woman was his brother's “spouse” or
“girlfriend.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) Welson
asked the plaintiff to get her because he wanted to speak
with her “one on one.” (Id.) The
plaintiff replied that this was “insulting.”
plaintiff volunteered to go with Welson and Jones to recover
his property, but was told that he could not go.
(Id. at ¶ 21-22.) They asked where he was
initially robbed and he gave them an “accurate
description.” (Id. at ¶ 23-24.) Welson
then called the plaintiff's mother's phone and told
the plaintiff that they “could not find the building
where the incident transpired.” (Id. at ¶
25.) None of the suspects were arrested. (Id. at
filed his complaint and a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis on February 1, 2016. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) The Court
denied the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and
dismissed the complaint without prejudice on February 10,
2016. (ECF No. 6.) The Court granted a motion to reopen the
case and the plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma
pauperis on June 15, 2016. The Defendants filed a Motion
to Dismiss on August 18, 2016.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the
Plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570. Under
Twombly, the Court accepts as true all of the
complaint's factual allegations when evaluating a motion
to dismiss. Id. at 572. The Court must “draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.” Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent
Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir.
2008). “When a complaint is based solely on wholly
conclusory allegations and provides no factual support for
such claims, it is appropriate to grant defendants[']
motion to dismiss.” Scott v. Town of Monroe,
306 F.Supp.2d 191, 198 (D. Conn. 2004). For a complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss, “[a]fter the court strips
away conclusory allegations, there must remain sufficient
well-pleaded factual allegations to nudge plaintiff's
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
In re Fosamax Products Liab. Litig., 2010 WL
1654156, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2010). In other words
“a plaintiff must plead factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Vega v.
Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations
of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. To state a
claim under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege that a
person acting under color of state law deprived him of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendant Hartford ...