United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Josie Marie Malave (“plaintiff”), brings this
appeal under §205(g) of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §405(g),
seeking review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner” or “defendant”)
denying her application for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under the Act. Plaintiff has moved to
reverse the decision of the Commissioner, or in the
alternative, for remand to the Social Security Administration
for a new hearing. [Doc. #17].
reasons set forth below, plaintiff's Motion for Order
Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner and/or Remanding
the Matter for Hearing [Doc. #17] is DENIED, and
defendant's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of
the Commissioner [Doc. #19] is GRANTED.
filed an application for SSI on April 9, 2013, alleging
disability beginning January 1, 2006. See Certified
Transcript of the Administrative Record, compiled on July 22,
2016, (hereinafter “Tr.”) 201-10. Plaintiff's
application was denied initially on July 10, 2013, see Tr.
128-31, and upon reconsideration on November 4, 2013. See Tr.
October 29, 2014, plaintiff, represented by Attorney Richard
Grabow, appeared and testified at a hearing before
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Alexander Peter
Borré. See Tr. 36-76. Vocational Expert
(“VE”) Courtney Olds also testified at the
hearing. See Tr. 68-74; see also Tr. 171-73. On December 19,
2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. See Tr. 16-35.
On March 18, 2016, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's
request for review, thereby making the ALJ's December 19,
2014, decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See
Tr. 1-6. The case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C.
timely filed this action for review and now moves to reverse
the Commissioner's decision, or in the alternative, to
remand for a new hearing. [Doc. #17]. On appeal, plaintiff
1. The ALJ failed to address the significance of Dr.
Harvey's signature on the Medical Report for Incapacity
authored by plaintiff's treating clinician;
2. The ALJ failed to evaluate the Medical Report for
Incapacity as authored by an “acceptable medical
3. The ALJ failed to provide good reasons for discounting the
Medical Report for Incapacity authored by plaintiff's
See Doc. #17-1 at 3-8; Doc. #20 at 1-4. As set forth below,
the Court finds that ALJ Borré did not err as
STANDARD OF REVIEW
review of a social security disability determination involves
two levels of inquiry. First, the Court must decide whether
the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles in
making the determination. Second, the Court must decide
whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d
Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion; it is more than a “mere
scintilla.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The reviewing
court's responsibility is to ensure that a claim has been
fairly evaluated by the ALJ. See Grey v. Heckler,
721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
Court does not reach the second stage of review - evaluating
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
conclusion - if the Court determines that the ALJ failed to
apply the law correctly. See Norman v. Astrue, 912
F.Supp.2d 33, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The Court first
reviews the Commissioner's decision for compliance with
the correct legal standards; only then does it determine
whether the Commissioner's conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence.” (citing Tejada v.
Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999))).
“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether
the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the
substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no
disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will
be deprived of the right to have her disability determination
made according to the correct legal principles.”
Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987).
crucial factors in any determination must be set forth with
sufficient specificity to enable [a reviewing court] to
decide whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence.” Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582,
587 (2d Cir. 1984) (alterations added) (citing Treadwell
v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1983)). The ALJ
is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, but
a “finding that the witness is not credible must
nevertheless be set forth with sufficient specificity to
permit intelligible plenary review of the record.”
Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255,
260-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Carroll v. Sec. Health and
Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1983)).
“Moreover, when a finding is potentially dispositive on
the issue of disability, there must be enough discussion to
enable a reviewing court to determine whether substantial
evidence exists to support that finding.” Johnston
v. Colvin, No. 3:13CV00073(JCH), 2014 WL 1304715, at *6
(D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Peoples v. Shalala,
No. 92CV4113, 1994 WL 621922, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 4,
important to note that in reviewing the ALJ's decision,
this Court's role is not to start from scratch. “In
reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited
to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence in the record and were
based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v.
Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Lamay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507
(2d Cir. 2009)). “[W]hether there is substantial
evidence supporting the appellant's view is not the
question here; rather, we must decide whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's decision.” Bonet ex
rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App'x 58, 59 (2d Cir.
SSA LEGAL STANDARD
the Social Security Act, every individual who is under a
disability is entitled to disability insurance benefits. 42
considered disabled under the Act and therefore entitled to
benefits, plaintiff must demonstrate that she is unable to
work after a date specified “by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Such impairment
or impairments must be “of such severity that [s]he is
not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot,
considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy.” 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(2)(A)(alterations added); 20 C.F.R.
§416.920(c) (requiring that the impairment
“significantly limit ... physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities” to be considered
“severe” (alterations added)).
is a familiar five-step analysis used to determine if a
person is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §416.920. In the
Second Circuit, the test is described as follows:
First, the Secretary considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is
not, the Secretary next considers whether the claimant has a
“severe impairment” which significantly limits
his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry
is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant
has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the
Secretary will consider him disabled without considering
vocational factors such as age, education, and work
experience; the Secretary presumes that a claimant who is
afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to
perform substantial gainful activity.
Berry v. Schweiker,
675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). If and only if the claimant does not have a
listed impairment, the Commissioner engages in the ...