Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Mercado v. Dep't of Corrections

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 23, 2017

RAUDELL MERCADO, Plaintiff,
v.
DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL., Defendants.

          RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS

          VANESSA L. BRYANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         The Plaintiff, Raudell Mercado, is currently incarcerated at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution. He initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint against the State of Connecticut Department of Correction, Commissioner Scott Semple, Deputy Commissioner Monica Rinaldi, Warden Ann Cournoyer, Deputy Wardens William Mulligan and Richard Laffargue, Acting Warden Scott Erfe, Director of Clinical Services Craig Burns, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Director Colleen Gallagher, Psychologist Joslyn Cruz, Drs. Mark Frayne and Gerard Gagne, Health Service Administrator Brian Liebel and Captain Jesse Johnson as Defendants.

         On January 6, 2017, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion for appointment of pro bono counsel. The Clerk has appointed four attorneys to serve as pro bono counsel to the Plaintiff and all have declined. The Clerk continues to attempt to find an attorney willing to represent the Plaintiff on a pro bono basis.

         On January 20, 2017, the Court issued a corrected Initial Review Order dismissing in part the claims in the complaint, including the claims against the Department of Correction. The Court concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to mental health needs and safety and unconstitutional conditions of confinement relating to the Plaintiff's confinement at Northern Correctional Institution, a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim relating to the Plaintiff's transfer to Northern and Cheshire Correctional Institution and his placement in the administrative segregation programs at those facilities, and a First Amendment retaliation claim would proceed.[1] The Plaintiff has filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, [ECF No. 15], a motion for an emergency hearing, [ECF No. 32], a motion to be relieved of all sanctions, [ECF No. 44], a motion to correct, [ECF No. 63], and a motion for order, [ECF No. 64]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to correct will be granted and the motions for injunctive relief, for relief of sanctions, and for a hearing will be denied.

         I. Motion to Correct the Motion to Withdraw Motion for Relief From Sanctions [ECF Nos. 44, 63]

         On February 17, 2017, the Defendants filed a response to the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. See [ECF No. 40]. On February 21, 2017, the Court ordered the Plaintiff to file a reply to Defendants' opposition to the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction within twenty-one days. See [ECF No. 41]. The Court also ordered the Defendants to supplement their opposition to the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction within twenty-one days. See [ECF No. 42].

         On February 22, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a motion to be relieved of all sanctions and a motion to enforce his motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. See [ECF Nos. 43, 44]. That same day, the Court denied the motion to enforce the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as moot in light of its order directing the Defendants to supplement their opposition to the motion for temporary restraining order and construed Plaintiff's motion to be relieved of all sanctions as a reply to the Defendants' memorandum in opposition to the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. See [ECF Nos. 45, 46].

         On March 2, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a second reply to the Defendants' opposition to his motion for injunctive relief. See [ECF No. 52]. On March 15, 2017, the Defendants filed their supplemental response to the Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and Plaintiff's reply to the motion. See [ECF No. 59].

         On March 17, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a motion to correct in which he requests that the Court decline to treat his motion for relief from sanctions, [ECF No. 44], as a reply to the Defendants' opposition to the motion for injunctive relief. He states that he made a mistake in filing the motion for relief from sanctions and prefers that the Court only consider the formal reply that he filed on March 2, 2017. The Court construes the Plaintiff's motion as seeking to withdraw the motion for relief from sanctions, [ECF No. 44]. The motion is granted. The Court will consider the Plaintiff's Reply, [ECF No. 52], in addressing the motion for temporary restraining order and for preliminary injunction and the Defendants' memorandum in opposition to the motion.

         II. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction [ECF No. 15] and Motion for Emergency Hearing [ECF No. 32]

         Preliminary injunctive relief “is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy . . . that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this circuit the standard for injunctive relief is well established.

         To warrant preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must demonstrate (a) that he or she will suffer “irreparable harm” in the absence of an injunction, and (b) either (1) a “likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits [of the case] to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting preliminary injunctive relief.” Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 405-06 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         The standard that is used to review a request for a preliminary injunction is also used to review a motion seeking a temporary restraining order. See Local 1814 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n. AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass'n. Inc., 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1992). A district court has wide discretion in determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief. See Moore, 409 F.3d at 511.

         A hearing is generally required on a properly supported motion for preliminary injunction if material facts are in dispute. See Kern v. Clark, 331 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2003) (“the existence of factual disputes necessitates an evidentiary hearing . . . before a motion for preliminary injunction may be decided.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hen the relevant facts either are not in dispute or have been clearly demonstrated at prior stages of the case . . . or when the disputed facts are amenable to complete resolution on a paper record, ” a hearing is not required to resolve a motion for preliminary injunction. Charette v. Town of Oyster Bay, 159 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted).

         A. Motion for Emergency ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.