United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER (DOC.
C. Hall, United States District Judge
defendant, Jonathan Bohannon (“Bohannon”), moves
the court to reconsider its prior determination that Bohannon
lacked a privacy interest in the Toyota Camry belonging to
his friend, Shonsai Dickson (“Dickson”), at the
time law enforcement officials searched the Toyota; and that
Bohannon thus could not challenge the legality of the search.
See Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider (Doc. No. 699) at
1; see also United States v. Bohannon, 67 F.Supp.3d
536, 542-43 (D. Conn. 2014). For the reasons that follow,
Bohannon's Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
was arrested inside Dickson's second-floor apartment, on
the morning of December 5, 2013. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bohannon, 824 F.3d 242, 245 (2d
Cir. 2016). Bohannon had slept over Dickson's apartment
the night before. See id. at 248 n.8. At the time of
Bohannon's arrest, law enforcement officials seized
drugs, money, a scale, three firearms, and ammunition from
Dickson's apartment; they also seized a firearm from her
Toyota. See id. at 247.
moved to suppress the evidence seized from Dickson's
home. See Mot. to Suppress (Doc. No. 134) at 1.
Bohannon's Motion to Suppress and initial supporting
papers did not explicitly mention the search of the Toyota
Camry, nor did they argue that Bohannon had a privacy
interest in the Camry. See id.; Mem. in Supp. of
Mot. to Suppress (Doc. No. 134-1); Bohannon Aff. (Doc. No.
134-2); Second Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress (Doc. No.
362); Third Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress (Doc. No. 409).
At the suppression hearing held on November 13, 2014,
however, defense counsel stated that he believed the search
of Dickson's Camry was also improper. See Nov.
13, 2014 Tr. (Doc. 411) at 178. On December 4, 2014, Bohannon
elaborated on this view in his Fourth Memorandum in Support
of his Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 416). See Fourth
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress at 24 (arguing that search
of Toyota was tainted by initial unlawful entry into
Dickson's home and that Dickson's consent to search
Toyota was involuntary due to same circumstances that,
according to defense counsel, made Dickson's consent to
search her home involuntary).
suppression hearing, Dickson testified that, although
Bohannon had been borrowing her Camry on the day before he
was arrested, he gave Dickson back her Camry on the evening
of December 4, 2013, the night before his arrest.
See Tr. at 60 (“That's why he met up so he
can take the rental and I can take my car.”); 62
(“He just brought me my car.”). Dickson testified
that Bohannon thus stopped using her Camry on the evening
before his arrest, and that the car remained parked in front
of Dickson's home from the evening before Bohannon's
arrest until the morning, when the arrest and search
occurred. See id. at 87. Defense counsel argued to
the court at that Dickson's testimony “shows that
Mr. Bohannon did not have control of the [Camry] past 9:30
p.m. or 9:00 p.m. the night before the [ ] search, ”
and stated that the Government had “no evidence that
Mr. Bohannon ever used [the Camry] whatsoever.”
Id. at 162-63.
court suppressed all evidence seized from Dickson's home,
finding that Dickson had not voluntarily consented to the
search of her apartment. See Bohannon, 824 F.3d at
247; see also Bohannon, 67 F.Supp.3d at 543.
However, this court did not suppress the evidence seized from
Dickson's Toyota, because Marshall had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the Toyota. See Bohannon,
824 F.3d at 247; Bohannon, 67 F.Supp.3d at 542-43
(“With respect to the search of Dickson's Toyota
Camry, the court concludes that Bohannon cannot challenge the
legality of that search because he had no privacy interest in
Bohannon admits, the Motion to Reconsider is untimely.
See Second Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to
Reconsider (Doc. No. 702) at 10. Under the District of
Connecticut Local Rules of Criminal Procedure, a party must
file a motion for reconsideration within fourteen days of the
ruling of which the party seeks reconsideration. See
D. Conn. Local R. Crim. P. 1(c) (“The following Local
Civil Rules shall apply in criminal proceedings: . . . 7(c)
(Motions for Reconsideration).”); D. Conn. Local R.
Civ. P. 7(c)(1) (“Motions for reconsideration shall be
filed and served within fourteen (14) days of the filing of
the decision or order from which such relief is
sought.”). The court issued the Ruling of which
Bohannon seeks reconsideration on December 15, 2014.
Bohannon, 67 F.Supp.3d 536. Over two years had
passed since that date, when, on February 3, 2017, Bohannon
moved for reconsideration. See Def.'s Mot. to
counsel initially argued that good cause existed for
permitting a late Motion to Reconsider. See
Id. ¶ 17. A court may extend a time limit if
good cause is shown. See D. Conn. Local R. Crim. P.
1(c) (“The following Local Civil Rules shall apply in
criminal proceedings: . . . 7(b) (Motions for Extension of
Time)”); D. Conn. Local R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2) (allowing
court to extend time upon showing of good cause). But see
Collins v. Blumenthal, 581 F.Supp.2d 289, 291 (D. Conn.
2008) (“Even if [the] motion for reconsideration were
construed to include, sub silentio, a motion for
extension of time, no ‘good cause' for [the] delay
has been offered as required.”); Buster v. City of
Wallingford, No. 3:07 CV 544 (JBA), 2008 WL 2782731, at
*1 (D. Conn. July 7, 2008) (absent good cause, denying
nunc pro tunc extension of time for motion to
good cause does not exist. Bohannon initially believed that
good cause exists because, four days after the Ruling, the
United States (“the Government”) filed an
interlocutory appeal of the Ruling. See Def.'s
Mot. to Reconsider ¶ 17(B). Bohannon believed that,
“[o]nce the Government filed its appeal, ” he
“was without a vehicle whereby he could” move for
reconsideration, “as the jurisdiction was now vested in
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.” Id.
¶ 17 (D).
however, Bohannon concedes “that there is a line of
cases that hold a motion for reconsideration would toll the
filing of the notice of appeal, ” and that this
“motion for reconsideration could have been timely
filed within fourteen (14) days of this Court's decision
on December 15, 2014, as the Court was not ...