United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
A. BOLDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Mark Mansa, brings this action against the United States of
America under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), et.
seq., alleging negligence on the part of several
officials of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) acting
in their official capacities. See Compl., ECF No. 1,
¶ 1. Defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint under
Rule 12(b)(1) on the grounds that this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, as well as Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds
that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. See Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 9. For
the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is DENIED.
December 30, 2011, Mr. Mansa alleges that he pled guilty to
one count of possession with intent to distribute 100
kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of federal drug
laws. Compl. ¶ 3. On June 1, 2012, a federal judge
sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 46 months, which
he began serving on July 6, 2016. Id. Mr. Mansa
allegedly participated in the Residential Drug Abuse Program
(“RDAP”) while incarcerated. Id. at
¶ 4. On or about May 6, 2014, prison officials
transferred Mr. Mansa to a Residential Reentry Center
(“RRC”) in Waterbury, Connecticut (“the
Chase Center”) because Mr. Mansa had completed the
residential phase of the RDAP program. Id. As an
RDAP participant, Mr. Mansa was required to provide the Chase
Center with a urine sample for drug testing approximately two
times per week. Id. at ¶ 5.
about May 20, 2014, Mr. Mansa claims that he began working at
Cameron's Deli in Cross River, New York. Id. at
¶ 6. He alleges that his employer gave him a daily food
allowance to purchase items from Cameron's, which he
often used to purchase sandwiches and rolls, all of which
contained poppy seeds. Id. at ¶ 7. On July 7,
2014, Mr. Mansa allegedly informed the Chase Center that he
had been consuming poppy seeds. Id. at ¶ 8. A
Chase Center employee allegedly noted this in Mr. Mansa's
2014, the Chase Center notified Mr. Mansa that he had
produced a urine sample containing morphine. Compl. ¶ 9.
On July 1, 2014, prison officials allegedly notified Mr.
Mansa that he would be remanded into custody because of the
test results. Id. at ¶ 12. The next day, Mr.
Mansa alleges that he submitted hundreds of hairs for gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry testing, which allegedly
resulted in a negative determination “for all five
major drug classes.” Id. at ¶ 13.
Nevertheless, prison officials transferred Mr. Mansa to
Donald W. Wyatt Detention Center in Central Falls, Rhode
Island (“Wyatt”). Id. at ¶ 14.
During his subsequent stay at Wyatt, which allegedly lasted
several months, Mr. Mansa “suffered physical pain and
discomfort and loss of freedom as a direct and proximate
consequence of his imprisonment by the defendant.”
Id. at ¶ 15.
Mansa alleges that an administrative claim “was served
upon the defendant's duly authorized representatives on
or about December 21, 2015, which was within two years of the
events alleged.” Compl. ¶ 16. He alleges that
Defendants denied the claim by letter dated January 4, 2016.
Id. Several months later, Mr. Mansa filed this
Complaint, alleging negligence under the FTCA.
Standard of Review
seeks to dismiss Mr. Mansa's Complaint under both Rule
12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), making two standards of review
when a court reviews a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), it “must
accept as true all material factual allegations in the
complaint, but [it is] not to draw inferences from the
complaint favorable to plaintiffs.” J.S. ex rel.
N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir.
2004). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence is on the plaintiff.
Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426
F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005). “In resolving a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1), a district court . . . may refer to evidence
outside the pleadings” to resolve the jurisdictional
issue, Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113
(2d Cir. 2000) (citing Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986)), but a court
“may not rely on conclusory or hearsay statements
contained in the affidavits.” Attica Cent.
Sch., 386 F.3d at 110.
to survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible if
“the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at
570. Although “detailed factual allegations” are
not required, a complaint must offer more than “labels
and conclusions, ” or “a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action” or “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual
enhancement.” Id. at 557.
determining whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible
claim for relief, the Court may consider only “the
facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint,
the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any
documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.”
McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d
184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must accept the
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d
89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007).
seeks to dismiss Mr. Mansa's Complaint in its entirety
under two provisions of Rule 12(b). Defendant invokes Rule
12(b)(1), claiming that the Court does not have jurisdiction
over Mr. Mansa's Complaint because it alleges false
imprisonment and seeks to challenge the BOP's
“discretionary decisions, ” neither of which are
actionable under the FTCA. In the alternative, Defendant