November 30, 2016
from Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Oliver, J.
Michael W. Brown, assigned counsel, for the appellant
Robert Satti, Jr., supervisory assistant state's
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga,
state's attorney, and Craig P. Nowak, senior assistant
state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Alvord, Sheldon and Gruendel, Js.
a grant of certification to appeal, the petitioner, Somen
Shipman, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal,
the petitioner claims that the habeas court erred by finding
that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was not
violated. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the court
improperly found that his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel was not violated by his trial
counsel's failure (1) to adequately raise a
Bat-son challenge, and (2) to present the
testimony of two alibi witnesses. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
following facts and procedural history, as set forth by this
court on direct appeal, are relevant to this appeal.
‘‘In October, 1996, Torrance McClain, Norman
Gaines and the [petitioner] were entrenched in
Bridgeport's drug trade. Sometime in mid-October, Ronald
Marcellus, another drug dealer and an associate of McClain,
Gaines and the [petitioner], engaged with Gary Louis-Jeune in
an angry verbal exchange over their respective drug dealing
enterprises. Following this exchange, Marcellus requested
that the [petitioner] take care of [the situation] for him
because Louis-Jeune was attempting to move in on the block.
The [petitioner] and Gaines, on the evening of October 29,
1996, thereafter shot Louis-Jeune and his girlfriend, Marsha
Larose, multiple times, killing both of them.
December, 1996, McClain was arrested and pleaded guilty to
drug charges. Before he was sentenced pursuant to his guilty
plea, McClain provided the Bridgeport police with a written
statement indicating that Gaines and the [petitioner] were
responsible for the shooting of Louis-Jeune and Larose. The
[petitioner] subsequently was arrested and charged with one
count of capital felony, two counts of murder and one count
of conspiracy to commit murder. After a trial, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all charges, and the court,
on April 28, 2000, rendered judgment in accordance with the
verdict. Merging the two counts of murder with the capital
felony charge, the court sentenced the [petitioner] to life
imprisonment without the possibility of release, to run
concurrently with twenty years imprisonment on the charge of
conspiracy to commit murder, for a total effective sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
June, 2000, the [petitioner] appealed his conviction directly
to the Supreme Court, following which he moved for
rectification of the trial court record to establish the
races of the jury venirepersons. The trial court denied his
motion and, thereafter, the [petitioner] moved for review by
the Supreme Court. On March 16, 2004, the Supreme Court
granted the motion and the relief requested therein. On
November 17, 2011, the state moved for reconsideration of the
Supreme Court's granting of the [petitioner's] motion
for rectification of the record. The Supreme Court granted
both the state's motion and the relief requested therein,
stating: Upon careful review of the record, it is apparent
that the [petitioner] failed to raise a disparate treatment
claim in the trial court and, therefore, is not entitled to
rectification of the record to augment [it] with evidence to
support such a claim. See, e.g., State v. Hodge, 248
Conn. 207, 227 [726 A.2d 531] (when the defendant [fails] to
raise a disparate treatment claim with respect to [specific]
venirepersons, the record is inadequate for appellate review
of his claims with respect to those venirepersons), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 969');">528 U.S. 969 [120 S.Ct. 409, 145 L.Ed.2d 319] (1999);
State v. Haughley, 124 Conn.App. 58, 61 n.3 [3 A.3d
980] (same) [cert. denied, 299 Conn. 912, 10 A.3d 529
(2010)]. Thereafter, pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1,
the Supreme Court transferred the [petitioner's] appeal
to this court.'' (Footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ship-man, 142
Conn.App. 161, 163-65, 64 A.3d 338, cert. denied, 309 Conn.
918, 70 A.3d 41 (2013). This court affirmed the
petitioner's conviction. Id., 177.
27, 2014, the petitioner filed his amended petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleged, inter alia,
that his federal and state constitutional rights to due
process, conflict-free representation, and the effective
assistance of counsel were violated. Specifically, the
petitioner claimed that the state failed to disclose material
evidence favorable to his defense, pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963), and that the state knowingly presented false
testimony at his trial. Additionally, the petitioner claimed
that his trial counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of
interest that adversely affected counsel's performance,
his trial counsel's performance was deficient during jury
selection and the criminal trial, and that the petitioner was
December 14, 2015, the habeas court denied the
petitioner's habeas petition. On December 23, 2015, the
court granted his petition for certification to appeal. This
appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as
begin our analysis with the law governing the
petitioner's claim as well as our standard of review.
‘‘A criminal defendant is constitutionally
entitled to adequate and effective assistance of counsel at
all critical stages of criminal proceedings. . . . This right
arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States constitution and article first, § 8, of
the Connecticut constitution. . . . As enunciated in
Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668');">466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], [our Supreme Court] has
stated: It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. . . . A claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel consists of two
components: a performance prong and a prejudice prong. . . .
The claim will succeed only if both prongs are
satisfied.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Spearman v. Commissioner of Correction, 164
Conn.App. 530, 538, 138 A.3d 378, cert. denied, 321 Conn.
923, 138 A.2d 284 (2016).
to] Strickland, [an ineffective assistance of
counsel] claim must be supported by evidence establishing
that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there
was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different had it not been for the
deficient performance.'' (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks ...