Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

State v. Crenshaw

Court of Appeals of Connecticut

April 25, 2017

STATE OF CONNECTICUT
v.
DARRYL CRENSHAW

          Argued Date January 12

         Appeal from Superior Court, Judicial District Hartford, Dewey, J.

          David J. Reich, for the Appellant (Defendant).

          Rocco A. Chiarenza, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the Brief, were Gail P. Hardy, State's Attorney, Anthony Bochicchio, Senior Assistant State's Attorney, and Dennis O'Connor, Former Senior Assistant State's Attorney, for the Appellee (State).

          Lavine, Alvord and Pellegrino, Js.

          OPINION

          PELLEGRINO, J.

         The defendant, Darryl Crenshaw, appeals from the judgment of the trial court resentencing him to a total effective sentence of seventy-eight years imprisonment, on remand from the judgment of the Supreme Court, which had reversed, in part, his conviction of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly resentenced him under the aggregate package theory, violating his right to due process of law. Specifically, the defendant argues that because the trial court did not explicitly state on the record at the original sentencing that it was sentencing the defendant under the aggregate package theory, or words to that effect, it violated the defendant's right to due process for the court to adopt the aggregate package theory during resentencing. We disagree, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

         The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In connection with the death of the victim, Ashley Peoples, the defendant was charged in two separate informations. In Docket No. HHD-CR-09-0628765-T (Hartford case), the defendant was charged with one count of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A) and one count of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1) for events that took place in Hartford. In Docket No. HHD-CR-09-0150379-T (Enfield case), the defendant was charged with one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and one count of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a) for events transpiring in Enfield. The conduct giving rise to the charges occurred over a two day period in August, 2008. The two cases were consolidated for trial.

         On October 6, 2010, following a trial, the jury found the defendant not guilty of kidnapping in the first degree, but guilty of the lesser included offense of kidnapping in the second degree, and found him guilty on all remaining counts. The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of seventy-eight years of incarceration.

         The defendant appealed his convictions to our Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of two separate counts of kidnapping in the second degree because there was no evidence that the victim was ever free from the defendant's control after her initial abduction.[1]See State v. Crenshaw, 313 Conn. 69, 92, 95 A.3d 1113 (2014). The court reversed the count of kidnapping in the second degree in the Enfield case, holding that the state adduced sufficient evidence at trial to establish only one kidnapping on August 7 and 8, 2008, which inevitably resulted in the victim's death. Id., 98. Our Supreme Court then remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.[2] Id., 98-99.

         On remand, following a resentencing hearing, the trial court vacated the sentence for one of the two kidnapping charges and rendered a judgment of acquittal for that count. The trial court then imposed a total effective sentence of seventy-eight years imprisonment by restructuring the defendant's sentence on the remaining kidnapping count. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

         We first set forth the applicable standard of review and governing legal principles. Under the aggregate package theory, when a multicount conviction is remanded after one or more of the convictions has been vacated on appeal, the trial court may increase individual sentences on the surviving counts as long as the original total effective sentence is not exceeded. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 30, 106 S.Ct. 353, 88 L.Ed.2d 183 (1985) (per curiam); United States v. Dominguez, 951 F.2d 412, 416 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Maravilla v. United States, 504 U.S. 917, 112 S.Ct. 1960, 118 L.Ed.2d 562 (1992). On appeal, ‘‘[t]he determination of whether the defendant's new sentence exceeds his original sentence is a question of law over which . . . review is plenary.'' State v. Tabone, 292 Conn. 417, 428, 973 A.2d 74 (2009).

         ‘‘In State v. Raucci, 21 Conn.App. 557, 563, 575 A.2d 234, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 817, 576 A.2d 546 (1990), [this court] adopted the aggregate package theory, which authorizes trial courts, following either a remand from a direct appeal or after the correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to Practice Book . . . § 43-22, to fashion a new sentence to implement [their] original sentencing intent. In Raucci, the defendant had been convicted of larceny in the first degree, conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree, burglary in the third degree and conspiracy to commit burglary in the third degree, and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of not less than fifteen nor more than thirty years imprisonment. Id., 558. On appeal, [this court] vacated the conviction of conspiracy to commit burglary in the third degree on the ground that that conviction had stemmed from the same agreement underlying his conviction of conspiracy to commit larceny and, therefore, violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Id., 559. After remand, the trial court resentenced the defendant on the three remaining counts so as to reflect its original sentencing intent, and reimposed a total effective sentence of not less than fifteen nor more than thirty years. Id.

         ‘‘In accordance with the great weight of federal precedent, [this court] adopted the aggregate package theory and affirmed the defendant's new sentence, recognizing that, ‘[t]he general rationale for this is that the defen- dant, in appealing his conviction and punishment, has voluntarily called into play the validity of the entire sentencing package, and, thus, the proper remedy is to vacate it in its entirety. More significantly, the original sentencing court is viewed as having imposed individual sentences merely as component parts or building blocks of a larger total punishment for the aggregate convictions, and, thus, to invalidate any part of that package without allowing the court thereafter to review and revise the remaining valid convictions would frustrate the court's sentencing intent.' Id., 562. [This] court also noted that a trial court's power to restructure the aggregate package ‘is limited by its original sentencing intent as expressed by the original total effective sentence, ' and that ‘this power is permissive, not mandatory.' Id., 563. Thus, among its options, the trial court may ‘simply eliminate the sentence previously imposed for the vacated conviction, and leave the other sentences intact; or it may reconstruct the sentencing package so as to reach a total effective sentence that is less than the original sentence but more than that effected by the simple elimination of the sentence for the vacated ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.