Date January 12
from Superior Court, Judicial District Hartford, Dewey, J.
J. Reich, for the Appellant (Defendant).
A. Chiarenza, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on
the Brief, were Gail P. Hardy, State's Attorney, Anthony
Bochicchio, Senior Assistant State's Attorney, and Dennis
O'Connor, Former Senior Assistant State's Attorney,
for the Appellee (State).
Lavine, Alvord and Pellegrino, Js.
defendant, Darryl Crenshaw, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court resentencing him to a total effective sentence of
seventy-eight years imprisonment, on remand from the judgment
of the Supreme Court, which had reversed, in part, his
conviction of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-94 (a). On appeal, the defendant
claims that the court improperly resentenced him under the
aggregate package theory, violating his right to due process
of law. Specifically, the defendant argues that because the
trial court did not explicitly state on the record at the
original sentencing that it was sentencing the defendant
under the aggregate package theory, or words to that effect,
it violated the defendant's right to due process for the
court to adopt the aggregate package theory during
resentencing. We disagree, and, therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. In connection with the death of the victim, Ashley
Peoples, the defendant was charged in two separate
informations. In Docket No. HHD-CR-09-0628765-T (Hartford
case), the defendant was charged with one count of kidnapping
in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §
53a-92 (a) (2) (A) and one count of assault in the third
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1)
for events that took place in Hartford. In Docket No.
HHD-CR-09-0150379-T (Enfield case), the defendant was charged
with one count of murder in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-54a (a) and one count of kidnapping in the second
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a) for
events transpiring in Enfield. The conduct giving rise to the
charges occurred over a two day period in August, 2008. The
two cases were consolidated for trial.
October 6, 2010, following a trial, the jury found the
defendant not guilty of kidnapping in the first degree, but
guilty of the lesser included offense of kidnapping in the
second degree, and found him guilty on all remaining counts.
The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective
sentence of seventy-eight years of incarceration.
defendant appealed his convictions to our Supreme Court,
arguing, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction of two separate counts of kidnapping
in the second degree because there was no evidence that the
victim was ever free from the defendant's control after
her initial abduction.See State v. Crenshaw, 313 Conn.
69, 92, 95 A.3d 1113 (2014). The court reversed the count of
kidnapping in the second degree in the Enfield case, holding
that the state adduced sufficient evidence at trial to
establish only one kidnapping on August 7 and 8, 2008, which
inevitably resulted in the victim's death. Id.,
98. Our Supreme Court then remanded the case to the trial
court for resentencing. Id., 98-99.
remand, following a resentencing hearing, the trial court
vacated the sentence for one of the two kidnapping charges
and rendered a judgment of acquittal for that count. The
trial court then imposed a total effective sentence of
seventy-eight years imprisonment by restructuring the
defendant's sentence on the remaining kidnapping count.
This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as
first set forth the applicable standard of review and
governing legal principles. Under the aggregate package
theory, when a multicount conviction is remanded after one or
more of the convictions has been vacated on appeal, the trial
court may increase individual sentences on the surviving
counts as long as the original total effective sentence is
not exceeded. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer,
474 U.S. 28, 30, 106 S.Ct. 353, 88 L.Ed.2d 183 (1985) (per
curiam); United States v. Dominguez, 951 F.2d 412,
416 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Maravilla v.
United States, 504 U.S. 917, 112 S.Ct. 1960, 118 L.Ed.2d
562 (1992). On appeal, ‘‘[t]he determination of
whether the defendant's new sentence exceeds his original
sentence is a question of law over which . . . review is
plenary.'' State v. Tabone, 292 Conn. 417,
428, 973 A.2d 74 (2009).
State v. Raucci, 21 Conn.App. 557, 563, 575 A.2d
234, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 817, 576 A.2d 546 (1990), [this
court] adopted the aggregate package theory, which authorizes
trial courts, following either a remand from a direct appeal
or after the correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to
Practice Book . . . § 43-22, to fashion a new sentence
to implement [their] original sentencing intent. In
Raucci, the defendant had been convicted of larceny
in the first degree, conspiracy to commit larceny in the
first degree, burglary in the third degree and conspiracy to
commit burglary in the third degree, and was sentenced to a
total effective sentence of not less than fifteen nor more
than thirty years imprisonment. Id., 558. On appeal,
[this court] vacated the conviction of conspiracy to commit
burglary in the third degree on the ground that that
conviction had stemmed from the same agreement underlying his
conviction of conspiracy to commit larceny and, therefore,
violated the prohibition against double jeopardy.
Id., 559. After remand, the trial court resentenced
the defendant on the three remaining counts so as to reflect
its original sentencing intent, and reimposed a total
effective sentence of not less than fifteen nor more than
thirty years. Id.
accordance with the great weight of federal precedent, [this
court] adopted the aggregate package theory and affirmed the
defendant's new sentence, recognizing that, ‘[t]he
general rationale for this is that the defen- dant, in
appealing his conviction and punishment, has voluntarily
called into play the validity of the entire sentencing
package, and, thus, the proper remedy is to vacate it in its
entirety. More significantly, the original sentencing court
is viewed as having imposed individual sentences merely as
component parts or building blocks of a larger total
punishment for the aggregate convictions, and, thus, to
invalidate any part of that package without allowing the
court thereafter to review and revise the remaining valid
convictions would frustrate the court's sentencing
intent.' Id., 562. [This] court also noted that
a trial court's power to restructure the aggregate
package ‘is limited by its original sentencing intent
as expressed by the original total effective sentence, '
and that ‘this power is permissive, not mandatory.'
Id., 563. Thus, among its options, the trial court
may ‘simply eliminate the sentence previously imposed
for the vacated conviction, and leave the other sentences
intact; or it may reconstruct the sentencing package so as to
reach a total effective sentence that is less than the
original sentence but more than that effected by the simple
elimination of the sentence for the vacated ...