United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc.
W. Thompson United States District Judge
Petitioner Paul Stinson commenced this habeas corpus action
pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the
computation of his sentence. The respondent moves to dismiss
the petition on the ground that the petitioner's sentence
was properly calculated. For the reasons that follow, the
respondent's motion is being granted.
2241 affords relief only if the petitioner is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A
petition filed pursuant to section 2241 may be used to
challenge the execution of a prison sentence. Section 2241
petitions are appropriately used to challenge conditions of
confinement or sentence calculations. See Poindexter v.
Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 2003). Before filing a
habeas petition pursuant to section 2241, prisoners are
required to exhaust internal grievance procedures. See
Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d
629, 634 (2d Cir. 2001).
reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all
allegations in the petition as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the petitioner. Cruz v.
Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir. 2000). The court need
not, however, accept conclusory allegations. The case should
proceed only if the complaint alleges “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55). Determining
whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief is
“‘a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.'” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72
(2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Even under this standard, however, the court liberally
construes a pro se complaint. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Boykin v.
KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2008).
October 20, 2011, the petitioner was arrested by local law
enforcement in New York and charged with criminal possession
of narcotics. On December 23, 2011, a detainer was lodged
against the petitioner for a parole violation, based on the
local arrest. On February 9, 2012, the petitioner was
sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment in the narcotics
March 7, 2012, a parole revocation hearing was held. The
petitioner was declared a parole delinquent and ordered to
serve a one-year time assessment. The state court did not
order the one-year term of imprisonment on the narcotics
charge to run concurrently with any parole violation time
assessment. Thus, the parole violation term did not commence
until June 20, 2012, the date on which the petitioner
completed serving the one-year sentence on the narcotics
petitioner was serving his parole violation sentence at the
Westchester County Jail. On June 26, 2012, the U.S. Marshals
Service took the petitioner into custody on a federal writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
petitioner had remained in state custody, he could have been
released to parole supervision on December 23, 2012, to serve
the remainder of his state parole violation sentence. But he
was not released because he was in federal custody on the
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
petitioner's state sentence expired on February 26, 2014.
The petitioner received credit for the periods from October
11, 2011 until December 23, 2011 toward the parole violation
sentence, from December 23, 2011, until June 20, 2012 toward
the narcotics sentence, and from June 20, 2012 until February
26, 2014, toward the parole violation sentence.
December 5, 2014, the petitioner was sentenced in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
to a 60-month term of imprisonment for conspiracy to
distribute crack cocaine and marijuana. Upon admission, the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) prepared a sentence
computation report. Because the petitioner had received
credit toward his state sentences for all time prior to
February 26, 2014, none of this time was credited toward his
federal sentence. The BOP did credit toward the
petitioner's federal sentence the time from February 27,
2014, through December 4, 2014.
petitioner argues that the BOP failed to credit him for the
time after the conclusion of the time assessment until
conclusion of the maximum time on his state sentence, ...