United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Christopher Komondy brings this action on behalf of his
deceased wife, Marguerite Komondy, against the Town of
Chester and its zoning officials to redress alleged
infringement of her constitutional rights with respect to
residential property she owned at 29 Liberty Street in
Chester, Connecticut (the "Liberty Street
property"). Defendants now bring a summary judgment
motion, seeking judgment as a matter of law on
Plaintiff's § 1983 "class of one" equal
background facts of the case are as follows. Margaret Komondy
commenced this action on February 20, 2012. Doc. 1
("Complaint"). Upon her death in June of 2013,
Christopher Komondy successfully moved the Court to become
the substituted plaintiff as executor of her estate. Doc. 41
& 42. Plaintiff Christopher Komondy then filed an Amended
Complaint, reflecting his plaintiff status. See Doc.
50 ("Second Amended Complaint" or "SAC").
That complaint is now the operative complaint in this action.
include Mario Gioco, who at all relevant times held the
position of Chairman of the Town of Chester Zoning Board of
Appeals ("ZBA"); Judith Brown, a Zoning Enforcement
Officer employed by the Town of Chester; and the Town of
Chester, a municipality within the State of Connecticut
(herein collectively "Defendants"). Id.
(SAC) , ¶¶ 4-6. Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants unlawfully enforced Chester's Zoning
Regulations, § 113B.5, by directing removal of a mobile
home that the Komondys placed on the Liberty Street property
as a temporary residence during the anticipated construction
of their new home.
Komondys' former historic home had been destroyed by fire
on March 5, 2005. Id., ¶ 9. Because the
structural damage from the fire was so extensive, the
"remainder of [the] dwelling was demolished in the
interest of safety." Id. Mrs. Komondy
thereafter sought permission from the Town of Chester,
pursuant to § 113B.5 of the Chester Zoning Regulations,
to remain on her property in the temporary mobile home while
her permanent home was reconstructed. Id., ¶
10. On March 14, 2005, she received a permit to install the
mobile home on the premises, a "temporary dwelling"
in which she could live for a maximum period of six months.
Id., ¶¶ 10-11. Upon expiration of the
six-month period, Mrs. Komondy applied for an extension of
the permit from the Town of Chester. The extension, however,
was denied by Chester Zoning Enforcement Officer Brown on
August 25, 2006. Id., ¶ 13.
Komondy thereafter filed an appeal of the permit denial and
an application for a variance from § 113B.5, but the
Chester ZBA denied both applications on December 18, 2006.
Id., ¶ 14. She subsequently filed appeals of
the Chester ZBA decision in the Connecticut Superior Court,
Judicial District of Middletown, and then in the Connecticut
Appellate Court. Id., ¶ 15. See Komondy v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Chester, Case No.
MMX-CV07-4006628-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2007);
Komondy v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Chester,
127 Conn.App. 669 (2011). The appeals were ultimately
dismissed on April 5, 2011. See Komondy, 127
Conn.App. at 690 ("[I]t remains that the court
determined that no unusual hardship existed to warrant a
variance from § 113B.5 of the regulations" and
"[p]roof of exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship
is absolutely necessary as a condition precedent to the
granting of a zoning variance.") (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
February 2, 2012, Mrs. Komondy received a letter from
Chester's legal counsel, informing her that the Town
would "remov[e] the trailer on [her] property . . . if
it [was] not removed by [her]" and "the costs and
expenses of that removal would be charged against [her],
resulting in a lien on the subject real property." Doc.
50, ¶ 23. Two weeks later, Town representatives and
contractors entered the property at 29 Liberty Street to
inspect the trailer and evaluate disconnection of utilities
in preparation to remove the trailer. Id., ¶
24. Mrs. Komondy, then residing in the trailer with her
spouse Christopher Komondy, was seventy-nine years old,
suffering from "stage 4 cancer, " and undergoing
"weekly chemotherapy sessions." See Doc. 1
(original Complaint), ¶ 23.
Komondy commenced this action in the District of Connecticut
on February 20, 2012. Doc. 1. In her original Complaint, she
maintained that Chester's Zoning Regulations, §
113B.5, barring her from remaining in a temporary mobile home
on her property during re-construction of her home, was
"unconstitutional, " "unreasonable, " and
"confiscatory" as applied to her. Doc. 1,
¶¶ 17-18. She also specifically alleged that
"defendant Judith Brown and [the] Town of Chester have
attempted to deprive [her] of all 'economically viable
use' of [her] property and therefore effected a
'taking' under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments" of the United States Constitution.
Id., ¶ 25. Two days after filing her Complaint,
she sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Town from
removing her mobile home from the premises of 29 Liberty
Street. Doc. 3. She subsequently withdrew the motion after
Chester's counsel represented that the Town agreed not to
take any action to remove her mobile home during the pendency
of this action. Doc. 14. On June 4, 2013, Marguerite Komondy
died. Doc. 35 ("Suggestion of Death").
described supra, on January 29, 2014, the Court
granted an "Amended Motion to Substitute Plaintiff,
" filed on behalf of Christopher Komondy as the
surviving spouse of the deceased Marguerite Komondy. Doc. 48.
On February 6, 2014, Christopher Komondy filed the Second
Amended Complaint [Doc. 50], once again seeking recovery from
the prior named Defendants for violation of his wife's
constitutional rights with respect to the property at 29
Liberty Street in Chester. In that SAC, he also alleged that
Chester's zoning regulation, § 113B.5, as applied to
29 Liberty Street, was an attempt "to deprive plaintiff
of all 'economically viable use' of said property and
therefore effected a 'taking' [without just
compensation] under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Doc. 50 (SAC), ¶ 28.
to Federal Rule 12(c) of Civil Procedure, the Defendants
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that
"Plaintiff's federal taking[s] claim in his
operative complaint should be dismissed" because it
"is not ripe for adjudication and, as a result, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim."
Doc. 51, at 1. The Court granted that motion in a Ruling
dated November 18, 2014, holding that the takings claims was
dismissed, but "to the extent that [Plaintiff's]
Complaint contains other causes of action [i.e., a
"class of one" equal protection claim, a §
1983 claim against the Town of Chester], those claims may
remain pending for the present." Komondy v.
Gioco, 59 F.Supp.3d 469, 481 (D. Conn. 2014).
Defendants have now filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
74], asserting that "there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, and Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on the remaining claim[ ]" - "class of
one" equal protection under § 1983 - as a matter of
law. In that motion, they argue:
1. Plaintiff cannot identify any similarly situated property
that was treated differently;
2. The Defendants had a rational basis for treating the
comparator[s] identified by Plaintiff differently;
3. The Individual Defendants lack the required "personal
involvement" necessary to impose any liability against
[them] on any of the Plaintiff's claims which are brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and,
4. The Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified
Doc. 74, at 1-2.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party is entitled
to summary judgment if he or she "shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986). Accordingly, the Second Circuit will
affirm a ruling on summary judgment "only if the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
party against whom it was entered, demonstrates that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that judgment
was warranted as a matter of law." Saleem v. Corp.
Transportation Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir.
2017) (citing Barfield v. New York City Health and
Hospitals Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2008)).
outlining the standard for this "provisional remedy,
" the Second Circuit has previously summarized:
[First, ] summary judgment may not be granted unless
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Second, the burden
is upon the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue
respecting any material fact exists. In considering that,
third, all ambiguities must be resolved and all inferences
drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is
sought. Fourth, the moving party may obtain summary judgment
by showing that little or no evidence may be found in support
of the nonmoving party's case. When no rational jury
could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the
evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no
genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary
judgment is proper.
Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd.
P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir. 1994)
(internal citations omitted).
the summary judgment standard, a genuine dispute exists where
"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party;" and a fact is
deemed "material" if it "might affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law." Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
respect to burden of proof, although the movant must
establish that it is entitled to summary judgment, "[a]
defendant need not prove a negative when it moves for summary
judgment on an issue that the plaintiff must prove at
trial." Parker v. Sony Pictures Entertainment,
Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2001)(citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Rather, the defendant "need only point to an
absence of proof on the plaintiff's part, and, at that
point, plaintiff must designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial." Parker,
260 F.3d at 111. In other words, the party opposing summary
judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must
"resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336
F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Moreover,
the court "must draw all permissible inferences from the
submitted affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and
depositions in favor of that party." Harris v.
Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 78 (2d
Cir. 2002). In drawing such inferences, the only evidence the
court must consider is "admissible evidence."
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 264 (2d Cir. 2009).
summary judgment, the court's duty is not to "weigh
the evidence or resolve issues of fact; it is confined to
deciding whether a rational juror could find in favor of the
non-moving party." Lucente v. Int'l Bus.
Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). "Summary judgment
is improper if there is any evidence in the record that could
reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving
party." Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310
F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Pinto v. Allstate
Ins. Co. 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 2000)).
"[t]he district court's judgment may be affirmed
'on any ground fairly supported by the record.'"
Trikona Advisers Ltd. v. Chugh, 846 F.3d 22, 29 (2d
Cir. 2017) (quoting Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 465 (2d Cir. 2001)). Therefore, the
Court of Appeals "may affirm on any grounds for which
there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law,
including grounds no[t] relied upon by the district
court." Mitchell v. City of N.Y., 841 F.3d 72,
77 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Summary of Undisputed Facts
the Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statements of the Parties [Doc. 74-1,
Doc. 75-1], the Court discerns the following undisputed
Christopher Komondy is the trustee of the Liberty Street
Trust. Doc. 74-1 & 75-1, ¶ 1. According to the
Chester deeds on file, the property at 29 Liberty Street,
Chester, Connecticut, is now owned by that trust.
Id., ¶ 2. Prior to the formation of the trust,
the property was owned by Marguerite Komondy. Id.,
early 1969, the Town of Chester adopted Zoning Regulations.
Id., ¶ 4. Section 113 of those regulations
related to mobile homes; and Section 113B.5, was and remains
entitled, "Temporary Use During Construction of
Home." Id., ¶¶ 5-6. Pursuant to
Section 113B.5, after notifying a Zoning Compliance Officer,
"a temporary dwelling [may be placed] on premises of the
owner [of the property] during construction of such
owner's permanent dwelling upon the same premises,
provided that such mobile home shall not remain upon said
premises for more than six months from the time that it is
first placed thereon . . . ." Id., ¶ 6;
see also Ex. 1 to Affidavit of Zoning Officer Judith
Brown (herein "Brown Aff.") (Doc. 74-4), at 9.
property at 29 Liberty Street was damaged by fire in March
2005. Doc. 74-1 & 75-1, ¶ 7. On March 15, 2005,
Marguerite Komondy applied for a zoning permit to allow a
mobile home on the property. Id., ¶ 8. The
permit was granted and a mobile home was placed on site.
Id., ¶ 9. The mobile home was permitted to
remain on the property for six months pursuant to Section
113B.5. Id., ¶ 10. The Zoning Enforcement
Officer for the Town of Chester generally allows the mobile
home to remain on the property (during reconstruction of the
permanent home) up to one year prior to taking legal action
for the mobile home's removal. Id., ¶ 11.
Since February 2006, when she became Zoning Enforcement
Officer, Defendant Judith Brown has followed the procedure of
allowing the mobile home to remain for "an additional
six month period." Id., ¶ 12.
mobile home at 29 Liberty Street remained on the property
beyond the six-month period allowed under the permit and
longer than the one-year "grace period, " which was
normally given to all properties in town. Id.,
¶ 13. On July 28, 2006, after the mobile home had been
at 29 Liberty Street for more than sixteen months, Brown
issued a "Cease & Desist" Order. Id.,
¶ 14; see also Ex. 4 to Brown Aff. (Doc. 74-4),
at 16. Thereafter, on August 25, 2006, Brown wrote a letter
to the Komondys and informed them that no further extensions
of their mobile home permit would be granted, as a Cease
& Desist Order had been issued. Doc. 74-1 & 75-1,
¶ 15. In that letter, she also informed the Komondys
that Section 113B.5 does not allow for extensions or
successive applications for a mobile home permit.
Id., ¶ 16.
several years of non-compliance with the Cease & Desist
Order, a lawsuit was filed in the Connecticut Superior Court,
bearing docket number MMX-CV11-6005284-S and captioned
"Judith Brown Zoning Enforcement Officer v. Marguerite
Komondy." Id., at ¶ 17. On August 24,
2011, a judgment was entered against Ms. Komondy in favor of
Zoning Enforcement Officer Brown. Id., ¶ 18. As
a result of this judgment, John S. Bennet, counsel for the
Town of Chester, wrote to Mrs. Komondy regarding removal of
the mobile home on the 29 Liberty Street property.
Id., ¶ 19. Soon thereafter, this lawsuit was
filed. Id., ¶ 25.
date, there has been no construction on the property at 29
Liberty Street to rebuild the home that burned down.
Id., ¶ 23. The mobile home remains on the
property. Id., ¶ 21.
of One" Equal Protection Claim Pursuant to §
Christopher Komondy's Second Amended Complaint contains
no headings or delineated claims. Therefore, the Court must
attempt to interpret the language of his complaint to
determine what claims may be supported by the alleged facts.
See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36-37
(2d Cir. 2000) ("[G]enerally a complaint that gives full
notice of the circumstances giving rise to the
plaintiff's claim for relief need not also correctly
plead the legal theory or theories and statutory basis
supporting the claim.") (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Northrop v. Hoffman of Simsbury,
Inc., 134 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1997) ("Under the
liberal pleading principles established by Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in ruling on a 12(b)(6)
motion the failure in a complaint to cite a statute, or to
cite the correct one, in no way affects the merits of a
claim. Factual allegations alone are what matters.")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Sabilia v. Richmond, No. 11-739, 2011 WL 7091353, at *26
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011) (Even though "plaintiffs did
not label these allegations as a breach-of-contract claim
[this] is not fatal to their pleading, since we must look to
the factual allegations of the complaint as defining the
nature of the claim rather [than] depend upon the legal
labels affixed to those factual allegations.") (citation
Equal Protection Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
requires that the government treat all similarly situated
people alike." Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. Of
Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985)). See also Latrieste Rest. v. Village of
Port Chester, 188 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) (The Equal
Protection Clause is "essentially a direction that all
persons similarly situated be treated alike.") (quoting
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439). A plaintiff who does not
claim to be a member of a constitutionally protected class
may bring an Equal Protection claim on one of two theories:
selective enforcement or "class of one." See
Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 109-10 (2d Cir.2004).
See also Musco Propane, LLP v. Town of Wolcott, 891
F.Supp.2d 261, 271 (D. Conn. 2012) ("There are two types
of equal protection claims available under 42 U.S.C. §
1983: selective enforcement and class of one."),
aff'd sub nom. Musco Propane, LLP v. Town of
Wolcott Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 536
F.App'x 35 (2d Cir. 2013).
the text of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, the
Court finds language suggesting a "class of one"
equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
all Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in
depriving Plaintiff of "equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, " Defendants have
violated Section 1983 of the United States
Code. Doc. 50, ¶ 22.
1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state
law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
"The traditional definition of acting under color of
state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action
have exercised power `possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law.' " Id. at 49
(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
[are] liable under § 1983 to be sued as
'persons' within the meaning of that statute, when
the alleged unlawful action [was] implemented or was executed
pursuant to a governmental policy or custom."
Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 190 (2d
Cir.2007) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978)). See also
Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365
F.3d 107, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Municipalities and other
local government bodies . . . are considered
'persons' within the meaning of §
"a single incident of unconstitutional conduct by a
non-policymaking employee" of the City will generally
not suffice to establish liability." Fisk v.
Letterman, 501 F.Supp.2d 505, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(citations omitted). "Instead, municipalities may only
be liable under § 1983 if their violation of the
plaintiff's federal rights resulted from an official
policy, custom, or practice of the municipal body."
Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694;
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
"[i]n order to prevail on a claim against a municipality
under section 1983 based on acts of a public official, such
as a zoning officer, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1)
actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a
constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4)
damages; and (5) that an official policy [or custom] of the
municipality caused the constitutional injury."
Zainc v. City of Waterbury, 603 F.Supp.2d 368, 380
(D. Conn. 2009) (quoting Roe v. City of Waterbury,
542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 690-91)). Absent a policy or custom of inflicting
such injury, a § 1983 claim may not proceed against a
respect to individual liability, "[p]ublic officials
sued in their individual capacity are entitled to qualified
immunity from suit unless [t]he contours of the right [are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right[;] [a]nd
even assuming a state official violates a plaintiff's
constitutional rights, the official is protected nonetheless
if he objectively and reasonably believed that he was acting
lawfully." Back, 365 F.3d at 129 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
if an individual does not have qualified immunity, "[a]
finding of 'personal involvement . . . in an alleged
constitutional deprivation is a prerequisite to an award of
damages under Section 1983." Feingold v. N.Y.,
366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Provost v. City
of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 154 (2d Cir.2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
of One Equal Protection
case at bar, as stated supra, the constitutional
right Plaintiff claims was violated is his right to
"equal protection" as a "class on one."
Specifically, in paragraph 21 of his Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff states, "Other similarly situated
property owners, including but not limited to, property
owners of residential land within the Town of Chester,
specifically located at 80 Wig Hill Road and 5 Wig Hill Road
were permitted to maintain mobile homes on the land for many
years." Doc. 50, ¶ 21. Moreover, the
"defendants have treated the plaintiff differently from
at least two other identically situated property owners in
the Town of Chester and have thereby deprived [him] of equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution as enforced
through Sections 1983 and 1988 of Title 42 of the United
States Code." Id., ¶ 22. Thereafter,
Plaintiff summarizes, at ¶ 28 that "[i]n the manner
described above, the defendant Judith Brown and Town of
Chester have attempted to deprive the plaintiff of all
'economically viable use' of said property and
therefore effected a 'taking' under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id., ¶ 29.
stated supra, the Court has previously dismissed
Plaintiff's "takings" claim. Doc. 64.
Defendants move for summary judgment on the remaining §
1983 "class of one" equal protection claim,
asserting that the "Plaintiff cannot identify any
similarly situated property and the defendants had a rational
basis for dissimilar treatment." Doc. 74-2, at 3.
Prima Facie Elements of "Class-Of-One" Equal
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)
(per curiam), the United States Supreme Court
recognized the existence of a "class of one" equal
protection cause of action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, against a municipality for arbitrary or irrational
application of property laws. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that a property owner stated a valid "class of
one" equal protection claim by pleading that the
defendant village required the plaintiff property owner to
grant a 33-foot easement as a condition to connect to the
municipal water supply, whereas similarly situated owners had
only been required to provide a 15-foot easement; and there
was "no rational basis for the difference in
treatment." 528 U.S. at 564. As the Supreme Court
summarized, "successful equal protection claims [may be]
brought by a 'class of one, ' where the plaintiff
alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational
basis for the difference in treatment." Id.
establish a "class-of-one" equal protection claim,
"plaintiffs must show an extremely high degree of
similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they
compare themselves." Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of
Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d
Cir. 2006)). "Accordingly, to succeed on a class-of-one
claim, a plaintiff must establish that (i) no rational person
could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ
from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the
differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate
government policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances
and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the
possibility that the defendants ...