United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER
Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Judge
25, 2017, Plaintiff, pro se, filed a Motion for an
Emergency Hearing on Getting Mental Health Treatment. [Dkt.
86]. In this motion, Plaintiff stated he took 12-15 aspirin
on May 13, 2017, because he was “feeling depressed and
emotional” in part because he was “in the cell
for 24 hours due to it being Saturday and on the
weekends.” Id. As a result of this intentional
overdose, he was taken to the infirmary where medical staff
then discontinued his medications. Id. Plaintiff
also notified the Court in this motion that he would be
released from Connecticut Department of Correction
(“DOC”) custody on June 16, 2017. Id. He
requested a hearing to receive proper medical treatment
before his release because he feared release without
medication. Id. The Court granted the motion and
held a hearing on June 6, 2017. The Court construes
Plaintiff's request to be one for a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction. For the following
reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's request.
is currently incarcerated at Northern Correctional
Institution (“Northern”). He claims to have been
diagnosed with multiple mental disorders and that he has
taken medication to treat the disorders since childhood.
According to Plaintiff, Northern does not have a mental
health unit, and he has been placed in the administrative
segregation unit for almost the entirety of his stay there.
Plaintiff believes that the Defendants have acted with
deliberate indifference in failing to provide him with
adequate mental health treatment during his custody at
Northern and previously at Cheshire Correctional Institution
(“Cheshire”). Plaintiff claims that the
conditions at Northern and Cheshire have “caused him to
suffer from criminal charges; racing thoughts, fear for
safety, loss of sleep, extreme anxiety attacks; to engage in
acts of being beaten by custody as a form of self-harm . . .
extreme distrust of authority figures, to isolate himself out
of fear of being attacked; to have depression; [and] to have
anger/rages.” [Dkt. 1 ¶ 57].
addition, Plaintiff contends Defendant Dr. Gagne sexually
harassed him when they spoke one-on-one. The Plaintiff
reported the incident, but no action was taken in response to
the report. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Dr. Frayne on
many occasions placed the Plaintiff on behavior observation
status in retaliation for the Plaintiff's complaints to
Dr. Frayne's supervisor regarding improper treatment of
the Plaintiff's mental health conditions.
filed a complaint with this Court on September 27, 2016,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary
damages for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, unlawful
disciplinary sanctions, the Eighth Amendment for an alleged
sexual harassment, the First Amendment for retaliation, and
42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. The Court dismissed
certain allegations in its Initial Review Order, [Dkt. 20],
and presently the following claims remain:
• the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of
deliberate indifference to mental health needs and safety and
unconstitutional conditions of confinement against Defendants
Semple, Rinaldi, Erfe, Cournoyer, Mulligan, Laffargue, Burns,
Gallagher, Liebel, Cruz, Frayne, Gagne and Johnson in their
individual and official capacities;
• the Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim against
Defendant Gagne in his individual and official capacity;
• the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against
Defendants Semple, Rinaldi and Burns in their individual and
official capacities in connection with the Plaintiffs
improper transfer to Northern and Cheshire and placement in
the administrative segregation programs at those facilities;
• the First Amendment retaliation claim against
Defendant Frayne in his individual and official capacity; and
• the ADA claim against Defendants Department of
Correction, Semple, Rinaldi, Erfe, Cournoyer, Mulligan,
Laffargue, Burns, Gallagher, Liebel, Cruz, Frayne, Gagne and
Johnson in their official capacities.
Id. at 13. Due to Plaintiff's recently filed
Motion for Emergency Hearing, the Court learned that
Plaintiff will be released on June 16, 2017. The Court held a
hearing to address his current medical treatment as well as
DOC's procedure prior to and subsequent to release.
temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary and
drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the
movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Reidy, 477 F.Supp.2d 472, 474
(D. Conn. 2007) (quoting Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y.,Inc.,409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005)).
“The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to
preserve an existing situation in status quo until the court
has an opportunity to pass upon the merits of the demand for
a preliminary injunction.” Garcia v. Yonkers Sch.
Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2009). The factors
considered in assessing whether to grant a request for a
temporary restraining order are similar to those used to
determine the merits of a motion for a preliminary
injunction. See Control Sys., Inc. v. Realized ...