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Sousa v. Sousa

Court of Appeals of Connecticut

June 13, 2017

ERIC P. SOUSA
v.
DONNA M. SOUSA

          Argued December 5, 2016

         Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Hon. Lloyd Cutsumpas, judge trial referee.

          C. Michael Budlong, with whom was Brandon B. Fontaine, for the appellant (defendant).

          William J. Ward, for the appellee (plaintiff).

          DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Flynn, Js.

          OPINION

          FLYNN, J.

         A party seekingtoopen a judgment beyond the passage of the four month limitation period from its rendering provided by General Statutes § 52-212a under an exception for judgments procured by fraud, bears the burden of proving fraud in all of its elements by clear and convincing evidence. At the heart of this appeal is whether the defendant, Donna M. Sousa, proved by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff, Eric P. Sousa, knew that the $32, 698.82 he valued his pension at when the parties were divorced in 2001 was incorrect. The trial court found that the defendant failed to carry this burden. We affirm that judgment.

         We first turn to the procedural history of this case, which explains how it is again before us. This appeal, which stems from a judgment modifying a prior judgment dissolving the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant has returned to us on remand from our Supreme Court. In Sousa v. Sousa, 157 Conn.App. 587, 590, 116 A.3d 865 (2015), rev'd, 322 Conn. 757, 143 A.3d 578 (2016), this court held that the trial court, Hon. Lloyd Cutsumpas, judge trial referee, improperly denied the defendant's motion to vacate for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a judgment rendered by the trial court, Resha, J., in accordance with a stipulation by the parties, modifying the provision of the judgment of dissolution that divided the plaintiff's pension benefits equally between the parties. Our Supreme Court reversed that decision and remanded the case to us with direction to consider the defendant's remaining claims on appeal. Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 790, 143 A.3d 578 (2016).

         We next turn to the record, which discloses the following facts, which were either found by Judge Cutsumpas or are undisputed for purposes of this appeal, and procedural history. In November, 2000, after approximately fourteen years of marriage, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to dissolve his marriage to the defendant on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. Both parties were represented by counsel throughout the uncontested dissolution proceedings. The plaintiff, who had been employed for fourteen years as a police officer with the Naugatuck Police Department (department), filed a financial affidavit on December 18, 2000, setting forth his financial assets and expenses. Under the ‘‘deferred compensation plans'' category, the plaintiff wrote ‘‘borough pension-value undetermined.'' Soon thereafter, the plaintiff received a document from the department indicating that, as of April 21, 2001, he had contributed $32, 698.82 to the department's pension plan. Consistent with that document, the plaintiff filed a second financial affidavit on November 21, 2001, stating that his pension was valued as of April 21, 2001, at $32, 698.82.

         The parties were divorced on December 19, 2001. They executed a separation agreement that provided, inter alia, that the plaintiff's pension benefits would be divided equally between the parties pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). The separation agreement further required the plaintiff to pay periodic alimony of $130 per week for five years or until the defendant began cohabitating with another individual.

         On January 3, 2002, in the course of preparing the QDRO, the defendant's counsel, Kenneth Potash, obtained the document listing the plaintiff's contributions to the pension, fund as well as a four page document entitled ‘‘Appendix A-Pension Fund'' (appendix), which set forth, inter alia, the pension plan's vesting requirements and the various formulae for calculating department employees' benefits. Section 10 of the appendix provides that department employees such as the plaintiff who have been continuously employed by the department for ten years are entitled, upon reaching retirement age, to an annual pension benefit calculated based on their earnings and years of service.[1] Attorney Potash provided the defendant with a copy of the appendix prior to completing the QDRO, although she may not have read it. Nevertheless, the defendant was aware at the time of the divorce that the plaintiff's pension was based upon his years of service and earnings.

         The QDRO was executed and filed with the court on May 17, 2002. It provided that the defendant shall receive a 50 percent interest in the ‘‘marital portion'' of the plaintiff's pension, with the marital period running from the date of the marriage on December 20, 1985, to the date of dissolution on December 19, 2001.

         In 2003, approximately two years after the divorce, the plaintiff learned that the defendant had begun cohabitating with another individual. The plaintiff telephoned the defendant and informed her of his intention to seek a court order terminating the alimony payments. Sometime later, after referring to the separation agreement, the defendant acknowledged that her cohabitation provided grounds for termination of the alimony. She informed the plaintiff, however, that she needed the alimony payments to finish her education and obtain a teaching degree, higher income, and pension benefits of her own. Accordingly, the defendant offered to relinquish her 50 percent interest in the plaintiff's pension in exchange for three additional years of alimony. The plaintiff agreed and continued to make weekly alimony payments. Neither party reduced the agreement to writing at that time or sought a modification of the original judgment of dissolution.

         Three years later, the plaintiff completed the additional alimony payments pursuant to his oral agreement with the defendant. The plaintiff then filed a motion to modify the judgment of dissolution, seeking to have his full pension returned to him. As the parties agreed, the plaintiff's counsel prepared the motion and accompanying stipulation, which was executed by the parties and submitted to the court for approval. The parties appeared before Judge Resha on January 2, 2007. The plaintiff was represented by counsel, and the defendant was then a self-represented litigant. Judge Resha asked the defendant if she had reviewed the terms of the stipulation with a family relations officer, and the defendant answered in the affirmative. After reading the stipulation into the record, Judge Resha asked the defendant to explain why she was entering into an agreement waiving her interest in the plaintiff's pension. The defendant admitted that, three years earlier, it was her idea to enter into an oral agreement with the plaintiff whereby she would relinquish her rights in the pension in exchange for additional alimony payments. The defendant also indicated that she understood that she could not regain her interest in the pension once she waived it, and that she was comfortable entering into the agreement without the benefit of counsel. Judge Resha found that the stipulation was warranted, accepted it, and made it a final order of the court. No appeal was taken.

         The plaintiff ultimately retired in October, 2007, after undergoing spinal fusion surgery in late 2006 to remedy a work related injury that rendered him unable to perform his duties. Thereafter, the plaintiff began receiving an annual pension benefit of $43, 992.80.[2]

         On March 31, 2011-four years after the 2007 modification of the dissolution judgment and nearly a decade after the plaintiff filed his November 21, 2001 financial affidavit-the defendant filed a motion to open and vacate the modification, asserting that the plaintiff had secured the modification through fraud. Specifically, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had fraudulently undervalued his pension in the financial affidavit by listing only the value of his contribution-$32, 698.82. The defendant further argued that, had the plaintiff disclosed the full value of his pension, there was a substantial likelihood that Judge Resha would have rejected the proposed modification as inequitable. A few months later, the defendant filed a second motion to vacate the modification, this time asserting that Judge Resha lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the modification.

         Judge Cutsumpas held an evidentiary hearing on the motions on January 14, 2014. On February 25, 2014, Judge Cutsumpas issued a memorandum of decision denying both motions. In denying the defendant's first motion, Judge Cutsumpas found that the defendant failed to prove the prima facie elements of fraud with clear and convincing evidence. First, noting that the defendant failed to present actuarial evidence establish- ing the value of the plaintiff's pension at the time he filed his 2001 financial affidavit, Judge Cutsumpas found that the defendant failed to prove that the listed amount of $32, 698.82 was inaccurate. Second, Judge Cutsumpas found that, even if the plaintiff had misstated the value of his pension, the defendant failed to prove that he did so knowingly. Finally, Judge Cutsumpas found that the defendant adduced ‘‘no evidence whatsoever'' that, had she known the full value of the ...


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