Date: February 16, 2017
from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, C.
Deborah G. Stevenson, assigned counsel, for the appellant
R. Lockwood, senior assistant state's attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney,
and Anthony Bochicchio, senior assistant state's
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Lavine, Prescott and Bishop, Js.
defendant, Ricky Ellis, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court, claiming that the court improperly dismissed his
motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
17, 2007, the defendant and an accomplice participated in a
drive-by shooting that resulted in the death of Mark Morgan.
The defendant was sixteen years old at the time he was
arrested and charged with murder and conspiracy to commit
murder. The defendant was on probation for a conviction of
larceny in the third degree at the time he committed the
underlying crimes.On December 18, 2008, when he was eighteen
years old, the defendant, with the assistance of counsel,
entered into a plea agreement with the state. The defendant
agreed to plead guilty under the Alford
doctrineto the crime of accessory to manslaughter
in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General
Statutes §§ 53a-55a and 53a-8 in exchange for a
sentence of eighteen years incarceration. On March 11, 2009,
the court sentenced the defendant in accordance with the plea
15, 2015, the defendant filed an amended motion to correct an
illegal sentence, wherein he claimed that the sentencing
court did not take into consideration his age at the time he
committed the offense and therefore violated his eighth
amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. He also
claimed that, pursuant to No. 15-84, § 2, of the 2015
Public Acts (P.A. 15-84),  the court retroactively must review the
sentence to determine his parole eligibility. The defendant
argued that P.A. 15-84, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012),  and Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825
(2010),  permit him to have a new sentencing
hearing. The trial court concluded that the sentencing court
was not required to consider the Miller factors when
sentencing the defendant because the sentence he received was
not the equivalent of life in prison without the possibility
of parole, and the sentencing court had no authority to
resentence the defendant's future parole under P.A.
15-84. The court therefore dismissed the motion to correct an
illegal sentence. The defendant appealed.
appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly
dismissed his motion to correct an illegal sentence by
failing to apply Miller and Graham
retroactively and by failing to apply P.A. 15-84 so as to
grant him a new sentencing hearing. The defendant's
claims are controlled by our Supreme Court's decision in
State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 151 A.3d 345
(2016). ‘‘Following the enactment of P.A. 15-84 .
. . the defendant is now eligible for parole and can no
longer claim that he is serving a sentence of life
imprisonment, or its equivalent, without parole. The eighth
amendment, as interpreted by Miller, does not
prohibit a court from imposing a sentence of life
imprisonment with the opportunity for parole for a
juvenile homicide offender, nor does it require the court to
consider the mitigating factors of youth before imposing such
a sentence. See Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S.
.'' (Emphasis in original.) State v.
Delgado, supra, 810-11. We therefore conclude that the
court properly dismissed the defendant's motion to
correct an illegal sentence.
judgment is affirmed.
opinion the other judges concurred.