United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A. BOLDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Eric Ramos (“Plaintiff”), is currently confined
at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in Suffield,
Connecticut (“MacDougall-Walker”). Mr. Ramos
initially filed this action in the Connecticut Superior Court
for the Judicial District of New London, asserting claims of
excessive force, lack of speedy arraignment, and violations
of the right to counsel and the right to remain silent
against Sergeant Corey Poore, Detectives James Curtis and H.
Reams, Supervisor John Doe on Shift 9-16-12 and the Norwich
Police Department (together “Defendants”). On
April 9, 2015, Defendants removed the action from state court
to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446. See
Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.
April 20, 2016, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Defs.
Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 13. On March 31, 2017, the Court
granted the motion for summary judgment as to the majority of
Mr. Ramos's claims and dismissed the claims against the
Norwich Police Department under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Summ. J. Ruling, ECF No. 27.
The Court, however, denied the motion as to the as to the
Fourth Amendment failure to intervene in the use of force
claim against Detective Poore. Id.
have now moved for reconsideration of the denial of their
motion for summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment
failure to intervene claim against Detective Poore. Def. Mot.
for Reconsid., ECF No. 30. Because Defendants filed the
motion for reconsideration past the deadline, the motion is
denied. However, for reasons explained below, the Court will
amend its judgment and dismiss the remaining claim in this
case under Rule 60(d)(1).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Ramos initially brought Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against several members of the Norwich
Police Department, alleging failure to intervene, lack of
speedy arraignment, and violations of the right to counsel
and the right to remain silent. See Not. of Removal,
ECF No. 1; Summ. J. Ruling, ECF No. 27. Mr. Ramos never
alleged any claims against officers or detectives with the
New York Police Department (“NYPD”), nor did he
identify anyone from the NYPD as a Defendant in this action.
On March 31, 2017, the Court dismissed all claims as to all
Defendants, with the exception of a Fourth Amendment failure
to intervene claim against Detective Poore. Summ. J. Ruling
at 16, ECF No. 27.
to Mr. Ramos, unnamed officers and an unnamed detective from
the New York Police Department used excessive force against
him in the context of his arrest and a subsequent criminal
interrogation. Id. at 14-15. Mr. Ramos alleged that
Detective Poore was present during his arrest, when officers
with the New York Police Department allegedly assaulted him.
Id. at 13. He also alleged that Detective Poore
asked Mr. Ramos questions while another detective twisted the
handcuffs on Mr. Ramos's wrists and pulled Mr.
Ramos's arms over his head. Id. Based on these
factual allegations, the Court found a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Detective Poore failed to
intervene in the use of excessive force against Mr. Ramos and
allowed Mr. Ramos's failure to intervene claim to go
forward as to Detective Poore only.
April 19, 2017, nineteen days after the Court's ruling on
the motion for summary judgment, Defendants filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Court's decision. Def. Mot.
for Reconsid., ECF No. 30. Defendants argue that the Court
failed to consider relevant case law, including the
Court's ruling in Anderson v. Waterbury Police
Dep't, No. 14-CV-829 (VAB), 2017 WL 1157843 (D.
Conn. Mar. 28, 2017), and Usavage v. Port Auth. of New
York & New Jersey, 932 F.Supp.2d 575 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), suggesting that a failure to intervene claim should
only proceed in connection with a valid underlying excessive
force claim. Def. Mot. for Reconsid., ECF No. 30. According
to Defendants, because Mr. Ramos never brought an excessive
force claim against the NYPD officials who allegedly used
excessive force against him during his arrest and
interrogation, his failure to intervene claim against
Detective Poore must fail as a matter of law.
explained in further detail below, the Court agrees with
Defendants. However, Defendants filed their motion for
reconsideration after the deadline had passed. Therefore,
their motion is denied, but the Court will issue a Rule 60(b)
order to amend the judgment; as a result, all claims are
STANDARD OF REVIEW
standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached
by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Virgin Atlantic
Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245,
1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The major grounds justifying
reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law,
the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a
clear error or prevent manifest injustice” (internal
motion for reconsideration should not be granted where the
moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already
decided.” Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257. Under Rule
7(c), D. Conn. L. Civ. R., a motion for reconsideration
“shall be filed and served within seven (7) days of the
filing of the decision or order from which relief is
sought.” Rule 60(d)(1) empowers the court to
“entertain an independent action to relieve a party
form a judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(d)(1). Under that Rule, setting aside a judgment is
appropriate where there is “no other available or
adequate remedy, ” where the party receiving relief did
not create situation “such as through [its own] fraud,
accident, or mistake, ” and where there is a
“recognized ground - such as fraud, accident, or
mistake - for equitable relief.” In re Hoti Enter.,
L. P., 549 Fed.Appx. 43, 44 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Campaniello Imports, Ltd. V. Saporiti Italia S.p.A.,
117 F.3d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1997)).
motion for reconsideration was filed on April 19, 2017,
nineteen days after the Court's ruling on the motion for
summary judgment and outside the permissible window provided
by Rule 7(c) of the District of Connecticut Local Rules of
Civil Procedure. See D. Conn. L. ...