United States District Court, D. Connecticut
SUSAN SKIPP, ET. AL. Ms. Skipp,
MARY BRIGHAM ET. AL. Defendants.
RULING AND WARNING OF POTENTIAL LEAVE-TO-FILE
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
ruling addresses three cases filed in this court by pro
se plaintiff Susan Skipp (“Ms. Skipp”), all
of which arise from Ms. Skipp's ongoing
attempts to regain custody of her children from her
ex-husband: Skipp v. Brigham (17-cv-01224),
Skipp v. Tittle (17-cv-01569), and Skipp v.
Brigham (17-cv-01761). The cases were consolidated
because they raise similar claims against different subsets
of the same group of defendants. In Skipp v. Brigham
(17-cv-01224), Ms. Skipp sets out sixteen counts against
eighty different defendants. She alleges defendants violated:
(i) Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) (counts one through twelve, fourteen);
(ii) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(“Rehabilitation Act”) (count thirteen); (iii)
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(“FERPA”) (count fifteen); and (iv) the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Civil Rights Act”) (count
sixteen). In Skipp v. Brigham
(17-cv-01569), Ms. Skipp brings a claim under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against United
States District Court Judge Jeffrey Meyer. Finally, in
Skipp v. Tittle (17-cv-01569), Ms. Skipp petitions
the court for a writ of habeas corpus enjoining defendants,
Ms. Skipp's ex-husband and another, to return custody of
Ms. Skipp's children to her.
the defendants in Skipp et al v. Brigham et al
(17-cv-01224) have filed a motion to dismiss. Defendants Mary
Brigham and Mary Brigham Law LLC move to dismiss Ms.
Skipp's second amended complaint in that case under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(4), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5). They also move to
dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the
reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion to
dismiss in that case is GRANTED. Ms. Skipp's other cases,
which bring similarly deficient claims, are also DISMISSED.
Finally, Ms. Skipp is hereby placed on notice that a further
attempt to make any filing in this court (except a notice of
appeal) related to the factual allegations raised in the
complaints filed in any of these cases (i.e. Skipp v.
Brigham (17-cv-01224), Skipp v. Brigham
(17-cv-01761), and Skipp v. Tittle (17-cv-01569))
could result in the imposition of a leave-to-file injunction,
which would prevent her from making further filings related
to the allegations in these cases in this court without
Skipp et al v. Brigham et al
(17-cv-01224) (Second Amended
ADA (counts 1-12, 14)
Skipp sets out thirteen counts alleging violations of the ADA
and 42 U.S.C. § 12203, which prohibits retaliation,
intimidation, or coercion targeted at parties that raise
claims under the ADA. (ECF No. 22 at 58-106, 108-109). Each
count save for one ends with the same allegation that
“[a]ll defendants knew or should have known that the
court had no jurisdiction to open and modify the contract
that two parents signed regarding the care, custody,
financial consideration (sic) of the two plaintiff minor
children (sic) and such (sic) was an interference of the
plaintiff mothers (sic) right to contract, such interference
is prohibited by 42 USC 12203 (sic).” (Id. at
¶ 172, 184, 193, 217, 243, 269, 282, 283, 300). The
reference to “the court” appears to refer to a
2012 Connecticut Superior Court decision that modified Ms.
Skipp's custody of her children, granting sole legal
custody of the children to their father. See Tittle v.
Skipp-Tittle, No. UWYFA104022992S, 2012 WL 5476915, at
*11-12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2012), aff'd, 150
Conn.App. 64 (2014). Nearly all of the defendants listed in
Ms. Skipp's counts either denied her subsequent legal
challenges,  or had some connection to Ms. Skipp's
attempts to challenge the Superior Court's decision over
the past five years.
twelfth count is the only one that does not end with the
sentence noting that the defendants listed “knew or
should have known” that the state court lacked the
jurisdiction necessary to modify Ms. Skipp's custody of
her children. (Id. at ¶ 302). That count, which
identifies as defendants the Connecticut Chapter of the
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (CCAFCC), along
with several related actors, alleges that the listed
defendants “used plaintiff's family to obtain
federal ‘access' grants via [funding from a
congressional initiative] to further discriminate against
Rehabilitation Act (count 13)
Skipp also alleges a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 701 et seq., against two judges, two states,
and various actors associated with these entities. She
contends that each defendant receives federal funding either
“directly or indirectly, ” and that all of them
refused to provide her with the reasonable accommodations
necessary for her to take part in their judicial forums.
(Id. at ¶ 303, 314). The complaint also avers
that defendants' refusal to provide Ms. Skipp with the
necessary reasonable accommodations constituted part of a
pattern of discrimination against single mothers perpetrated
in order to receive federal funding via the “Healthy
Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood (HRMF) initiative.”
(Id. at ¶ 310).
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (count
Skipp contends that one Pimm Moses, an administrator at her
children's elementary school, violated the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. §
1232g, by refusing to provide Ms. Skipp with her
children's educational records. (Id. at ¶
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (count 16)
Skipp alleges that defendants “gave plaintiff's
former husband [greater] access to the children”
without cause in order to obtain federal funding via the HRMF
initiative. (Id. at ¶ 319-321).
Skipp v. Brigham (17-cv-01569) (amended
Skipp sets out a complaint against United States District
Judge Jeffrey Meyer under the onus of Bivens v. Six
Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 1-2). In her complaint,
Ms. Skipp contends that Judge Meyer “endeavored to
obstruct justice, engaged in selective prosecution and
colluded with several of the Defendants.” (Id.
at ¶ 7). She also alleges that Judge Meyer discriminated
against her based on her disabilities throughout her judicial
proceedings before him, thereby violating the ADA.
(Id. at ¶ 13-15). Finally, Ms. Skipp contends
that Judge Meyer's rulings against her constituted
discrimination based upon her disability. (Id. at
Skipp v. Tittle (17-cv-01761)
Skipp also filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 seeking the return of her children into her
custody. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3.). She alleges that the
children are currently residing in Houston, Texas, in the
custody of defendants Shawn Tittle and Laura
Choi.(Id. at ¶ 9-10). Ms. Skipp
advances a number of allegations in her petition, all of
which center around the contention that the divestiture of
the children from Ms. Skipp's custody violated her
constitutional rights. (Id. at ¶ 6-19).