April 13, 2017
Emerick, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Kristan M. Maccini, for the appellee (defendant).
DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Bear, Js.
self-represented plaintiff landowner brought this action for,
inter alia, private nuisance against the defendant town,
alleging that development upstream from his property had
caused damage to wetlands on his property. The trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the action as a sanction for the
plaintiff's conduct during the five days of the jury
trial, in which the plaintiff, inter alia, refused to accept
the court's evidentiary rulings, interrupted and spoke
over the court, called the court's rulings
‘‘bizarre, '' remarked that the court was
‘‘incompetent'' and needed
‘‘to go back to law school, '' and
accused the trial judge of speaking in
‘‘gibberish'' and nodding her head as if
she were ‘‘drugged.'' During the trial,
the court employed a series of progressive steps to address
the plaintiff's behavior, which included, inter alia,
verbal warnings, and instructions to cease making comments
about the court's evidentiary rulings and to cease
interrupting the court and making insulting or disparaging
remarks about the court and the defendant's counsel. The
court also fined the plaintiff and advised him on multiple
occasions that dismissal of the case was an option it would
consider if he continued with his actions. On the
plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
plaintiff's action, as his continuing and deliberate
misconduct during the trial, for which he bore sole
responsibility, demonstrated such deliberate disregard for
the court's orders as to warrant dismissal: the plaintiff
did not demonstrate any mitigating factors for his actions
during the trial, the court's use of escalating
disciplinary steps to compel his observance of its orders
proved unsuccessful, which left dismissal of the case as a
last resort and the only reasonable remedy, the court's
repeated warnings, suggestions and fines had no impact on the
plaintiff, as he ignored the court's admonitions and
continued to delay the trial, and there was no merit to the
plaintiff's claims that the court did not adhere to
standards of stare decisis, that the court dismissed the case
on the basis of his claims of judicial bias or that the
dismissal followed from a finding of contempt, as the
dismissal was based on the court's inherent authority to
compel observance of its rules and to deal with continuing
misconduct; furthermore, the court did not fail to consider
the plaintiff's motions for a mistrial or his requests
that the court recuse itself, there were instances where the
plaintiff raised his voice or challenged the court's
evidentiary rulings in front of the jury, the absence of the
jury when certain acts of misconduct occurred did not deprive
the court of its authority to sanction the plaintiff for his
continuing misconduct during the trial and lack of
cooperation with the court, and the plaintiff's claim
that the dismissal of his case violated his constitutional
right to procedural due process was inadequately briefed and
essentially restated his previous arguments, which this court
to recover damages for, inter alia, private nuisance, and for
other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, where the court, Wiese, J.,
denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
granted in part the defendant's motion for summary
judgment; thereafter, the matter was tried to the jury before
Peck, J.; subsequently, the court, Peck,
J., denied the plaintiff's motions for a mistrial
and rendered judgment of dismissal; thereafter, the court,
Peck, J., denied the plaintiff's motion to
reargue, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.
DiPENTIMA, C. J.
trial court possesses the inherent power to impose sanctions
on litigants in cases before it, including dismissing the
case, both to compel observance of its rules and to bring an
end to continuing violations of those rules.
D'Ascanio v. Toyota Industries Corp.,
309 Conn. 663, 670-71, 72 A.3d 1019 (2013). This power
‘‘rests within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed on review unless there is an abuse
of discretion. . . . Generally, a sanction should not serve
as a punishment or penalty. . . . Such drastic action is not,
however, an abuse of discretion where a party shows a
deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the
court's authority.'' (Citations omitted.) Fox
v. First Bank, 198 Conn. 34, 39, 501 A.2d 747
(1985); see also D'Ascanio v. Toyota
Industries Corp., supra, 672; Millbrook
Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton
Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 16-17, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001). In
the present case, the self-represented plaintiff, Roger
Emerick, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
dismissing his case against the defendant, the town of
Glastonbury, as a sanction for his actions during trial. On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that the dismissal constituted
reversible error. We are not persuaded that the court abused
its discretion in dismissing the plaintiff's case after
his deliberate, continuing, and at times contumacious
disregard for the court's authority. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
following facts and procedural history are relevant to our
decision. The plaintiff commenced this action on February 15,
2011. In the operative complaint, he set forth claims against
the defendant of private nuisance, reckless and wanton
conduct, trespass, violation of General Statutes §
13a-138,  intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and
breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff alleged that he owned 580
Hopewell Road in South Glastonbury, a forty acre property
with wetlands along Roaring Brook. He claimed that
development upstream from his property caused damage to
Roaring Brook and his wetlands. The operative complaint was
filed on October 29, 2013, and the defendant filed its answer
and special defenses on November 13, 2013.
November 3, 2014, the defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment as to all counts. Two weeks later, the plaintiff
filed his own motion for summary judgment on all counts. The
parties filed various objections and replies to these
motions, and the court, Wiese, J., heard oral
argument on the motions on January 26, 2015. On May 14, 2015,
the court issued a memorandum of decision granting the
defendant's motion with respect to the plaintiff's
claims for damages for reckless and wanton conduct, violation
of § 13a-138, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
breach of fiduciary duty but denying it as to his claims for
damages for private nuisance and trespass, and his claim for
injunctive relief for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was
denied in its entirety.
trial commenced on October 27, 2015, before Judge A. Susan
Peck. At the beginning of the trial, the court
gave the jury preliminary instructions, including an
estimation that the evidentiary phase of the trial would take
three to four days. Following opening statements, the
plaintiff called himself as a witness. He testified
throughout the first and second days and the majority of the
third day of the trial. Near the end of the third day, the
plaintiff called Daniel A. Pennington, the defendant's
town engineer and manager of physical services, as a witness.
Pennington's testimony continued into the morning of the
fourth day of trial.
afternoon of the fourth day, the court excused the jury to
consider the defendant's objections to the
plaintiff's expert witness, Sigrun N. Gadwa. At the
outset of the fifth day of trial, the court permitted Gadwa
to testify before the jury. During her testimony, the jury
was excused so that the court could consider the objections
by the defendant's counsel and the plaintiff's
responses thereto. After an extended argument, the court
focused on the plaintiff's behavior during the trial,
finding that he had been insulting and abusive to the court
and the defendant's counsel, resulting in a disruption of
the administration of justice. After being interrupted by the
plaintiff, the court further found that the plaintiff had
exhibited a lack of respect for and refused to follow court
rules, procedure and decorum. As a result of his misconduct
during the course of the trial, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's case. The plaintiff subsequently filed a
motion to reargue, which the court denied. This appeal
followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
initial matter, we set forth the legal principles and our
standard of review. ‘‘It is well established that
a court may, either under its inherent power to impose
sanctions in order to compel observance of its rules and
orders, or under the provisions of [Practice Book] §
13-14, impose sanctions . . . .'' (Footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Evans v.
General Motors Corp., 277 Conn. 496, 522-23, 893
A.2d 371 (2006); see also DuBois v. William W.
Backus Hospital, 92 Conn.App. 743, 748, 887 A.2d 407
(2005) (trial court has inherent authority to impose
sanctions), cert. denied, 278 Conn. 907, 899 A.2d 35 (2006).
The sanction of ‘‘dismissal serves not only to
penalize those whose conduct warrants such a sanction but
also to deter those who might be tempted to[engagein] such
conduct in the absence of such deterrent. National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427
U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747
(1976).'' Pavlinko v. Yale-New
Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 145, 470 A.2d 246 (1984).
case involves the inherent authority of the court to impose
reasonable sanctions against a party during litigation.
‘‘The decision to enter sanctions . . . and, if
so, what sanction or sanctions to impose, is a matter within
the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . In reviewing a
claim that this discretion has been abused the unquestioned
rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial
court and every reasonable presumption should be given in
favor of its correctness. . . . [T]he ultimate issue is
whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . .
the same time, however, we also have stated: [D]iscretion
imports something more than leeway in decision-making. . . .
It means a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity
with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and
not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . .
. In addition, the court's discretion should be exercised
mindful of the policy preference to bring about a trial on
the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for
the litigant his day in court. . . . The design of the rules
of practice is both to facilitate business and to advance
justice; they will be interpreted liberally in any case where
it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will
work surprise or injustice. . . . Rules are a means to
justice, and not an end in themselves . . . . Our practice
does not favor the termination of proceedings without a
determination of the merits of the controversy where that can
be brought about with due regard to necessary rules of
procedure. . . . Therefore, although dismissal of an action
is not an abuse of discretion where a party shows a
deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the
court's authority . . . the court should be reluctant to
employ the sanction of dismissal except as a last resort. . .
. [T]he sanction of dismissal should be imposed only as a
last resort, and where it would be the only reasonable remedy
available to vindicate the legitimate interests of the other
party and the court.'' (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) D'Ascanio v.
Toyota Industries Corp., supra, 309 Conn.
671-72; see also Evans v. General Motors
Corp., supra, 277 Conn. 522-24; Mill-brook
Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton
Standard, supra, 257 Conn. 15-16; Pavlinko
v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 192
Conn. 145 (dismissal, when party fails to obey court's
order, is appropriate and serves as penalty and deterrent).
determine whether the court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's case constituted an abuse of discretion, we
must set forth a detailed account of the events that occurred
each day of the trial. This account reveals that the
plaintiff's confrontations with the court and his refusal
to comply with its orders began on the first day of the trial
and continued to its end on the fifth day of trial.
DAY OF TRIAL-OCTOBER 27, 2015
outset of the first day, the court instructed that there were
to be no ‘‘speaking objections'' and that
it would notify the parties regarding any further argument.
The plaintiff inquired if a copy of the
‘‘Practice Book'' could be made available
for his use during the trial, and the court replied in the
negative. The plaintiff then asked if he would be
permitted to testify from the counsel table, rather than the
witness stand. The court replied in the negative. It reasoned
that the jury would need an unobstructed view of the
plaintiff as he testified and that ‘‘to maintain
a proper decorum, each witness should testify from the
witness chair.'' The plaintiff countered that it
would be easier for the jury to see him at the counsel table
and that, in unrelated cases, he had been permitted to
testify from the counsel table to accommodate his status as a
self-represented party. The court iterated its ruling that
the plaintiff would testify from the witness stand.
further discussions regarding the plaintiff's testimony,
the court stated that he would not be permitted to read from
a ‘‘marked up'' copy of an exhibit. The
plaintiff voiced his displeasure with this
procedure.The court responded that its role was to
manage the case, and that if this method proved unwieldy,
then a modification could be made. It also noted that the
plaintiff could testify in a narrative, or use a question and
answer format. The court instructed that he could use marked
up copies of exhibits to present his case, but could read
only from full exhibits. The plaintiff then asked if the
court had any legal authority that required a witness to
testify from the witness stand, but the court declined
‘‘to articulate'' on that issue. The
plaintiff opined that the court had imposed a hardship on
recess, the court informed the jury that the trial likely
would last through the middle of the following week. The
plaintiff and the defendant's counsel made opening
statements and then the evidentiary phase of the trial
plaintiff was the first witness. During his testimony, the
defendant's counsel made a hearsay objection. The court
sustained the objection and explained to the plaintiff that
an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth
of the matter, even if made by the plaintiff, constituted
hearsay. The following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: This is the first I've
heard of that. Exception.
‘‘The Court: I'm sorry, Mr. Emerick.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I will take an exception.
‘‘The Court: The objection is sustained. Move on.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I've never heard of this.
‘‘The Court: Ask another question.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I've never heard of this.
‘‘The Court: Mr. Emerick, I'm going to ask
you not to comment-
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Yes, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: -on the rulings of the
further comment by the plaintiff, the court reminded him that
speaking objections were not permitted. The court then
excused the jury and stated: ‘‘I just want to
remind you that I specifically directed that there be no
speaking objections. And it's not proper for you to
challenge my rulings in a way; if it's based on the law,
it's one thing, but if it's not your understanding,
Mr. Emerick, you are not a lawyer; so I'm going to guess
that there are other things that may be not your
understanding. But just because it's not your
understanding, that doesn't mean that it's admissible
in evidence.'' A discussion on whether the
plaintiff's out-of-court statements constituted hearsay
ensued, with the plaintiff requesting that the court provide
a citation to support its ruling. The court declined to do
so, and instead suggested to the plaintiff what testimony
would be admissible.
court stated that it would not explain the rules of evidence
to the plaintiff at the cost of the time of the jury. The
plaintiff remarked that he was surprised by the ruling and
that his concept of what testimony would be permitted had
been ‘‘turned . . . on its head.'' The
plaintiff also questioned why his complaint had not been
stricken, and the court explained that the complaint
contained allegations, while the rules of evidence applied to
‘‘things that are being offered into evidence in
plaintiff's testimony continued, with the defendant's
counsel raising numerous objections, many of which the court
sustained. The plaintiff eventually turned his
testimony to conversations that he had had with an individual
named Peter Stern. The defendant's counsel asked and
received permission to raise an objection outside the
presence of the jury. The defendant's counsel stated that
this topic had been the subject of a motion in limine and
that the court previously had informed the plaintiff that he
was not permitted to discuss any conversations that he had
had with Stern. A dispute between the plaintiff and the
defendant's counsel ensued, at which point the plaintiff
stated that the defendant's counsel ‘‘lies
all the time.'' The court instructed the plaintiff and
the defendant's counsel to refrain from talking over each
other and that argument would be conducted in an orderly
fashion. After considering the matter, the court sustained
the objection and the plaintiff's testimony resumed.
plaintiff subsequently sought to have a document admitted
into evidence and the defendant's counsel raised numerous
objections, including a lack of authentication. After the
court sustained the objection, the plaintiff requested an
interruption of his testimony to
‘‘briefly'' call Pennington, the engineer
and manager of physical services for the defendant, to
authenticate the document. The court rejected this, stating
that it was ‘‘not appropriate'' and that
the plaintiff could not ‘‘have a witness testify
in the middle of another witness' testimony.''
The court then excused the jury.
court informed the plaintiff that he needed to
‘‘plan out'' his evidence and testimony.
The plaintiff responded that the court's interpretation
of the authentication requirement was
‘‘bizarre.'' After a recess, the
plaintiff again described the proceedings as
‘‘bizarre.'' Eventually, the jury
returned and the plaintiff's testimony continued for the
remainder of the day.
DAY OF TRIAL-OCTOBER 28, 2015
outset of the second day of trial, the defendant's
counsel noted that several of the photographs that the
plaintiff would be seeking to have admitted into evidence
contained ‘‘editorial comments.'' The
defendant's counsel wanted to raise her concerns about
these exhibits outside the presence of the jury because she
felt ‘‘like I'm being put in the position
where I look like I'm harassing [the plaintiff] by
objecting, because the jury doesn't understand what the
[Connecticut] Code of Evidence is. I'm repeatedly
objecting. It looks like I'm harassing him. It's
prejudicial to the [defendant].'' The court ruled
that the objections would need to be raised in due course as
the plaintiff attempted to introduce each of the photographs
into evidence. The discussion then turned to another exhibit,
and the court indicated to the plaintiff that this document
contained hearsay. The plaintiff responded: ‘‘It
is not hearsay. You're making this up.'' During
the court's response, the plaintiff interrupted,
prompting the following admonition: ‘‘Excuse me.
I am talking, Mr. Emerick. I am talking. You may not like it,
but my job here is to rule on the evidence that is offered in
this case, in accordance with the Code of Evidence, not what
you think it should be.''
further discussion, the court warned the plaintiff that
several of his exhibits were
‘‘problematic'' and subject to objections
from the defendant's counsel, and therefore he should
refrain from discussing the substance of these exhibits. The
plaintiff claimed that all of the objections by the
defendant's counsel had been sustained, and that
‘‘lawyers have a right to lie, and I'm
getting tired of it.'' The court stated that while
the plaintiff was entitled to his opinion, he was not to
repeat his derogatory comments about lawyers to the jury.
plaintiff resumed his testimony in front of the jury. At one
point, the court, after sustaining an objection, reminded the
plaintiff that his out-of-court statements, offered for the
truth of the matter asserted, constituted hearsay. Outside
the presence of the jury, the court inquired as to how long
the plaintiff's testimony would last; he replied,
‘‘[m]aybe all month. Excuse me. I tend to be
jocular on occasion.'' The court repeated its
inquiry, and a dispute ensued. At this point, the plaintiff
moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. The court
again cautioned the plaintiff about his conduct and raised
the possibility of sanctions. It then instructed the
plaintiff to prepare a written outline of the remainder of
his testimony during the lunch break. In response, the
plaintiff again complained about the court's evidentiary
ruling and included ad hominem remarks regarding Judge
court restated its order for the plaintiff to compose an
outline, and further argument ensued. During this argument,
the plaintiff accused the court of giving
‘‘preferential treatment to lawyers'' and
was told, on several occasions, to stop speaking. The
plaintiff characterized the court's statements as
‘‘ridiculous . . . .'' Before the jury
returned, the following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: This is not law.
‘‘The Court: That's it.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: This is not law. This is
an abuse of law at the highest level.
‘‘The Court: I want-you will not say one more
word. You will not say one more word. Get on that witness
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I move to recuse.
‘‘The Court: Mr. Emerick, take the witness stand.
Sit down. And you will not make any further comments or raise
your voice in front of this jury.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I have no respect for you
whatsoever.'' (Emphasis added.)
plaintiff resumed his testimony. Despite the court's
prior rulings, he continuously made reference to photographs
and documents that had been ruled inadmissible. At one point,
the court inquired if the plaintiff had planned to ask
another question, to which he responded, ‘‘Yes, I
am, unless you'd rather ask it for me.'' After a
few more questions, the court informed the plaintiff that his
testimony was not furthering the issues in this case and then
excused the jury for lunch. The court reminded the plaintiff
to complete his written outline for the remainder of his
testimony during the break.
his testimony resumed, the court again warned the plaintiff
about his conduct and cautioned him to not raise his
voice, even when the jury was not in the courtroom. After an
extended discussion regarding the admissibility of various
exhibits, the following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: May I be excused and call me
back when you and the lawyer here get done talking?
‘‘The Court: No, sir. Exhibit 13.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I again request a mistrial. A
gross, gross, gross incompetence regarding legal knowledge
and understanding what the complaint is about and literally
fabricating things that don't make any sense at all.
It's bizarre to me, what I'm listening to.
‘‘The Court: I just want to note for the record,
Mr. Emerick, that-well, first, it's appropriate to stand
when you address the court. You don't have to respect me.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I don't.
‘‘The Court: Which you've already indicated
on the record before, but you do have to respect the process.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: And you don't respect me
or my complaint, and you're just using your position of
power to formulate or promote the business of law, pursuant
to Practice Book § 1-8.
‘‘The Court: Your comments are totally
inappropriate, Mr. Emerick.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: No, it's not.
‘‘The Court: And I'm going to direct you to
confine your comments to the legal issues that we have to
address. These extraneous comments that you're making are
totally inappropriate. Okay. Exhibit 13-
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: And the comments that I'm
hearing are totally inappropriate. . . . It's a waste of
parties and the court continued to discuss the exhibits
outside of the presence of the jury, the plaintiff asked if
he would be permitted to voir dire the defendant's
counsel regarding her ‘‘math capability''
and stated that the court was ‘‘just nodding your
head like you're drugged or something. Yeah, let's
move on. This makes no sense.'' After a ruling on a
particular exhibit, the plaintiff sarcastically remarked,
‘‘[o]f course it's not coming in, ''
and moved for a mistrial because it was ‘‘a waste
of time presenting a case'' to the court, which, in
his view, was ‘‘incompetent.'' Shortly
thereafter, after the court asked him about a particular
exhibit, the plaintiff abruptly left the courtroom, without
asking permission to do so.
recess, the court made the following statement outside the
presence of the jury: ‘‘Mr. Emerick, you've
been extremely disrespectful of this process, the court,
opposing counsel. You've shouted at me. You have talked
over me. You've made snide and insulting comments to me,
demonstrating what you have stated to be your lack of respect
for me. Your behavior is intolerable, but I want to
put you on notice now that you will not comment. I am going
to rule on evidence. You will not comment on my rulings.
You will not be disrespectful to me or opposing counsel
or I will dismiss your case. I want you to understand
will not declare a mistrial. I will dismiss your
case. You do not have to like me. I'm not asking you
to. But you have to respect this process, or you have no
right to be here. You can disagree but you cannot be-you
cannot continue to be abusive. Your behavior has been
abusive. You must present your case in a proper and
respectful manner, in accordance with the rules of decorum
and the rules of practice and the rules of evidence of this
court, or it will be dismissed.
want you to understand that. This is the-I should have warned
you when we came back from lunch, and I deferred, because I
thought maybe we could make some headway. But it's
obvious to me after that scene that you just created by
rudely turning your back, rushing out of the courtroom,
slamming the swinging door against the wall, that you need to
know and understand that this is the way it's going to
what I'd like to do now, if you will agree with what I
just said, that you understand what I've just told you,
Mr. Emerick, we can proceed. . . . But if you have no
intention of behaving in a proper and civilized and
nonabusive manner, then I think the sanction of dismissal is
an appropriate one. Do you understand?''
(Emphasis added.) The plaintiff responded in the affirmative.
Despite the court's statement, the plaintiff again
challenged the honesty of the defendant's counsel
specifically, and attorneys generally. Later that day, and
outside the presence of the jury, the plaintiff raised his
voice to the court, and after an objection was sustained, he
remarked, ‘‘[n]o kidding.''
DAY OF TRIAL-OCTOBER 30, 2015
third day of trial, the court commented on the
plaintiff's conduct. ‘‘I just have a few
remarks I want to make before we begin. They're directed
against the- primarily concerning the disruptive behavior of
[the plaintiff] on [October 29, 2015], which needs to be
addressed by the court. And I just want to say to you, Mr.
Emerick, I know I may have said some of this previously, but
it bears repeating.
you've chosen to represent yourself, it does not mean
that you get to rewrite the rules of court to suit yourself.
You are not an inexperienced litigant. This is not the first
time that you have represented yourself in a civil
proceeding. Your behavior thus far has been extremely
disruptive and calculated in an effort to present your case
in the peculiar way that you believe you should be entitled
to present it, despite warnings that your tactics are
improper and unacceptable in a court of law.
court, the Superior Court, has existed-existed long before
you filed your first pleading in this case. It will continue
long after this lawsuit is history. Individual litigants do
not come here on a blank slate, and you know this, based on
your own courtroom experiences. There are rules of courtroom
decorum, rules of civil practice, and rules of evidence
established by our legislature and judges of the courts of
this state that must be followed in fairness and justice to
all parties to a litigation, the jury and the public.
can't ignore the rules based on your own vision of how
you should be able to present your case to a jury. Now, my
goal is to conclude this trial on the merits, and I make this
statement at this point to remark for the record that your
behavior has been an outrageous display, disrespectful of
opposing counsel, her client, and the jury, and the court, as
I have noted. It has delayed the progress of this trial,
caused the jury to be excluded from the courtroom for
extended periods of time to go over, while we ...