United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER AND RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Dorlette (“Mr. Dorlette” or
“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the
Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut, and
proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Correctional Officer Tyburski,
Disciplinary Investigator Melendez, Disciplinary Hearing
Officer Richardson, District Administrator Angel Quiros and
Commissioner Scott Semple.
October 17, 2016, the Court dismissed all claims against
Tyburski and Semple under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process claims would proceed against Melendez, Richardson and
Quiros in their individual and official capacities.
See Initial Review Order, ECF No. 13. Defendants
have now filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint under Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is
GRANTED in part and DENIED
Dorlette claims that, on October 24, 2014, Officer Tyburski
issued him a disciplinary report charging him with attempting
to mail an envelope that contained a soup seasoning packet.
The plaintiff complains that both the report and the process
afforded him in connection with the disciplinary hearing were
deficient in multiple ways and alleges that there was no
evidence to support the charge. On November 20, 2014,
Lieutenant Richardson allegedly found Mr. Dorlette guilty of
the charge and sanctioned him to 20 days in punitive
segregation and 60 days loss of mail privileges. District
Administrator Quiros allegedly failed to respond to Mr.
Dorlette's appeal of the disciplinary finding and
Dorlette claims that Officer Melendez, Lieutenant Richardson
and District Administrator Quiros violated his procedural due
process rights. Specifically, he alleges that the
disciplinary report was vague and unsigned, that Officer
Melendez did not specify the evidence which formed the basis
of the disciplinary report, that there was no evidence to
support a guilty finding by Lieutenant Richardson, and that
District Administrator Quiros failed to remedy the situation
when he became or should have become aware of the allegedly
unsupported guilty finding.
result of the disciplinary proceedings, Mr. Dorlette
allegedly remained in punitive segregation for twenty days,
and he alleges that the conditions in the restrictive housing
unit were significantly more onerous than the conditions in
general population. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19, ECF No. In
particular, Mr. Dorlette alleges that the “extreme
conditions” that he suffered in punitive segregation
included the “use of restraints . . . upon exiting his
cell, recreation, showers, etc.” that allegedly caused
“shoulder pain and pain in the back” from his
getting into position “for restraint application and
removal.” Id. ¶ 19. Mr. Dorlette also
alleges that, while in punitive segregation, he was deprived
of “adequate showers, phone calls, recreation,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring that a plaintiff
plead only “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). A
claim is facially plausible if “the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. In other words, to state a
plausible claim, a plaintiff's complaint must have
“enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the claim.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007). Although “detailed factual allegations”
are not required, a complaint must offer more than
“labels and conclusions, ” “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action, ” or
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further
factual enhancement.” Id. at 555, 557.
determining whether the plaintiff has met this standard, the
Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's
favor. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d
89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007); Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh
Tree Expert Co., Inc., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss,
“a district court must [also] limit itself to facts
stated in the complaint or in documents attached to the
complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by
reference.” Newman & Schwartz, 102 F.3d at
662 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court notes that the operative Complaint makes a number of
references to attached exhibits, yet, Ms. Moorer did not
attach exhibits to the Amended Complaint, See ECF
No. 56, so the Court relies solely upon the alleged facts in
her Amended Complaint.
pro se complaints “must be construed liberally
and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399,
403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470
F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v.
Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010)
(discussing the “special solicitude” courts
afford pro se litigants).
defendants move to dismiss all claims in the complaint. In
compliance with Local Rule 12(a), the defendants have filed
an Order of Notice to Pro Se Litigant informing Mr.
Dorlette of his obligation to file a response to the motion
to dismiss. See Notice, ECF No. 32-4. Despite this
notice, Mr. Dorlette has ...