United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
N. CHATIGNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jamal Sumler, is currently incarcerated at the Bridgeport
Correctional Center in Bridgeport, Connecticut. He initiated
this action by filing a civil rights complaint against Warden
Carol Chapdelaine, Deputy Warden Hines, Dr. David S.
Karimeddini, Nurse Barbara LaFrance and John Doe/Jane Doe of
University of Connecticut Correctional Managed Health Care.
Compl., ECF No. 1.
January 23, 2017, the Court dismissed all claims against
defendants Chapdelaine, Hines and LaFrance and concluded that
the allegations asserted against defendants Karimeddini and
John Doe/Jane Doe stated plausible claims of deliberate
indifference to medical needs. Initial Review Order, ECF No.
plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment and a
motion for appointment of counsel. For the reasons set forth
below, the motions are denied.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.
plaintiff's motion is one page in length and includes two
sentences. The plaintiff states that he is entitled to $500,
000.00 in damages for the defendants' deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need and is also entitled
to $500, 000.00 for pain and suffering. The motion, however,
is not signed by the plaintiff.
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
“[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the
attorney's name-or by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented.” Because the motion for summary judgment
is unsigned, it does not comply with Rule 11, Fed R. Civ. P.
and must be denied. Even if the motion were signed, it is
deficient in a number of other ways.
motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving
party to establish that there are no genuine issues of
material fact in dispute and that it is “entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.
The plaintiff offers no facts and has presented no legal
argument in support of his claims for monetary relief.
Rule 7(a) requires that “[a]ny motion involving
disputed issues of law shall be accompanied by a memorandum
of law.” Furthermore a “[f]ailure to submit a
required memorandum of law may be deemed sufficient cause to
deny the motion.” Id.
1 and 4 of Local Rule 56(a), require that a motion for
summary judgment be accompanied by memorandum and a Local
Rule 56(a)1 Statement. The “‘Local Rule 56(a)1
Statement, ' [must] set[s] forth in separately numbered
paragraphs meeting the requirements of Local Rule 56(a)3 a
concise statement of each material fact as to which the
moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be
tried.” See Id. at 1. Local Rule 56(a)3
requires that each statement in the Rule 56(a)1 Statement
“be followed by a specific citation to (1) the
affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts
at trial and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at
plaintiff has not filed a memorandum, Local Rule 56(a)1
Statement, or any evidence in support of his motion. Thus,
the motion for summary judgment does not comply with the
requirements of Local Rules 7(a) or 56(a)1, 3 or 4. In
addition, the plaintiff has failed to present evidence to
demonstrate that there are no issues of material fact in
dispute and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Because of deficiencies outlined above, the motion for
summary judgment is denied without prejudice.
Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 22]
plaintiff's one-page motion includes one sentence. The
plaintiff asks the court to appoint him counsel. The motion
is deficient because it is not signed by the plaintiff as
required by Rule 11(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The motion is denied for
failure to comply with Rule 11(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.
there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in
civil cases. Thus, the appointment of counsel in a civil
action is discretionary. See Hodge v. Police
Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (district
judges are afforded “broad discretion” in
determining whether to appoint pro bono counsel for
an indigent litigant in a civil case); 28 U.S.C. §