United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
R. UNDERHILL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Dalessio (“Dalessio”), currently confined at
Brooklyn Correctional Institution in Brooklyn, Connecticut,
filed this complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 asserting claims for false arrest and conspiracy to
effect his arrest. The only defendant is the City of Bristol.
Dalessio's complaint was received on August 17, 2017, and
his motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted
on August 22, 2017.
section 1915A of Title 28 of the United States Code, I must
review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any portion of
the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Although detailed allegations
are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts
to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims and the
grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a
plausible right to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory
allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. Nevertheless, it is well-established that
“[p]ro se complaints ‘must be
construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.'” Sykes v. Bank of
Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,
474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater,
623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules
of solicitude for pro se litigants).
October 29, 2015,  Dalessio was removed from his home in East
Hampton, Connecticut, and held on “warrants based out
of Bristol, CT.” Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 2. No police
officer from East Hampton or Bristol told Dalessio why he was
being arrested or informed him of his rights. He later was
forced to sign an electronic waiver of rights form.
believes that his ex-wife, Sarita Gordillo
(“Gordillo”) coached Dalessio's biological
daughter to say that Dalessio touched her in a sexual manner
and that she did not want to go with Dalessio on
court-ordered visits. Dalessio also believes that detective
John or Jane Doe conspired with Gordillo and Dalessio's
step-daughter to effect his arrest because the detective
prepared a secondary case with the step-daughter as the
victim. Dalessio contends that the offense date for the
secondary case was beyond the limitations period.
interview with Dalessio's daughter, conducted by the
detective and a child psychiatrist, was interrupted several
times. Dalessio believes that the interruptions were made to
plot against him. Dalessio's daughter was brought to the
hospital to have a rape kit processed. The tests were
has a history of making false allegations against Dalessio
that started after Dalessio's separation from her. The
detective would have discovered this pattern if he or she had
read the divorce hearing transcripts.
alleges that his Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights
were violated when he was falsely arrested and incarcerated.
False arrest claims are brought under the Fourth Amendment.
See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.
1996). The Eighth Amendment affords protection to persons
already convicted of crimes. Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 318 (1986). Although Dalessio is now incarcerated,
this claim arose in connection with his arrest. The Eighth
Amendment affords him no relief.
court assumes that Dalessio references the Fifth Amendment
because he alleges that he did not voluntarily waive his
rights. A claim for violation of rights guaranteed under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is not
cognizable under section 1983. See Lewis v. City of
Schenectady Police Dep't, 2014 WL 3548828, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014) (citing Neighbour v.
Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Miranda warnings are not, in and of themselves, a
constitutional right. Failure to issue the warnings before
questioning a suspect is enforced by suppression in the
criminal case of any statements and evidence gathered in
violation of the warning requirements, not by a separate
civil rights action. See O'Hagan v. Soto, 523
F.Supp. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Any Fifth Amendment claim
is dismissed with prejudice.
he describes police chief Doe, detective Doe, the City of
Bristol, psychiatrist Doe, Gordillo and his step-daughter as
defendants in the body of the complaint, Dalessio names only
the City of Bristol in the case caption. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that all parties be included
in the caption of the complaint. Thus, the City of Bristol is
the only defendant in this case.
asserts a claim against the City of Bristol pursuant to
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell, a
municipality may be liable in a section 1983 action for the
unconstitutional acts of municipal employees if the plaintiff
can show that an official policy or custom caused him to be
subjected to the denial of a constitutional right.
Id. at 691. Thus, before a municipality can be held
liable under Monell, there must be an underlying
constitutional violation. Bryant v. Ward, 2011 WL
2896015, at *10 (D. Conn. July 18, 2011) (citing Segal v.
City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Here, to state a cognizable claim against the City of
Bristol, Dalessio must allege facts supporting a claim for
false arrest or imprisonment.
1983 claims for false arrest are essentially the same as
false arrest claims made under state law. Jocks v.
Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003). Thus, when
reviewing a section 1983 claim for false arrest, the court
looks to state law. Davis v. Rodriguez, 364 F.3d
424, 433 (2d Cir. 2004). Dalessio must satisfy the state law
elements of the claim and show that the defendant's
actions resulted in an “unreasonable deprivation of