United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
MICHAEL P. SHEA, U.S.D.J.
On
March 14, 2015, Edward Jordan and two officers of the Windsor
Police Department had an altercation. Jordan alleges that the
officers detained him without probable cause, physically
restrained him, and injured him. He alleges that this
misconduct violated his rights under the federal and
Connecticut constitutions. He also alleges that this incident
resulted from the Town of Windsor's failure to train its
officers. He has sued the two officers, the Chief and a
captain of the Windsor Police Department, and the Town of
Windsor. The defendants have moved to dismiss several counts
of the Amended Complaint. For the reasons that follow, their
motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.
Factual Allegations
In
Jordan's amended complaint (ECF No. 17), he makes the
following allegations. Defendant Kearse was the chief of the
Windsor Police Department, and defendant Lappore was
“the captain” of the Windsor Police Department.
(Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.) They were responsible for
the supervision and training of the members of the Windsor
Police Department. (Id.) Jordan alleges that
“at all times relevant hereto[, ] there was a policy
within the Windsor Police of having [p]atrol officers on duty
at all times and having such officers armed at all times with
weapons including firearms and/or tasers.”
(Id. at ¶ 4.) He further alleges that
“there was an obvious need to train officers in the
proper use and handling of firearms” and that there was
also “an obvious need to train officers in proper use
of force, including de-escalation of force, confronting
members of the public, including suspects[, ] and keeping the
firearms and weapons of the officer secure.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.)
Jordan
also alleges that defendants Sanchez and Taylor were patrol
officers of the Windsor Police Department. (ECF No. 17 at
¶¶ 7-8.) On March 14, 2015, Jordan was
“lawfully in the area of Deerfield Package Store, 264
Deerfield Road, Windsor, Connecticut.” (Id. at
¶ 9.) He alleges that, at that time, he was
“verbally confronted by” Sanchez and Taylor.
(Id.) “During the aforementioned
confrontation, the Plaintiff discontinued his conversation
with [Sanchez and Taylor] and began calmly and slowly walking
away from defendants.” (Id. at ¶ 10.)
Jordan alleges that Sanchez “began . . . shouting at
plaintiff, despite plaintiff's clear expressed intention
to leave the presence of defendant, and no probable cause
[sic] to arrest or detain Plaintiff.” (Id. at
11.) Jordan states that at no time during this conversation
did the officers tell him that he was under arrest.
(Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) He alleges that the
“shouting and verbal demands were upsetting,
threatening[, ] and constituted verbally provoking [sic] to
Plaintiff.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) He alleges
that a physical altercation ensued: Sanchez “pushed
[him] to the ground and punched [him] in the face” and
“twist[ed] [his] limbs, press[ed] on [him] forcefully
with [Sanchez's] knees and other extremities”; and
Taylor “aimed and pointed her taser weapon at”
Jordan when “it was unsafe to do so and in an unsafe
manner, ” which “created a risk that others might
be harmed by the taser weapon.” (Id. at
¶¶ 17-20.)
Jordan
alleges that he suffered the following injuries: (1)
“injuries [sic] head, face, jaw[, ] and neck”;
(2) “swelling, bruising[, ] and visual impairment in
both eyes”; (3) “swollen and bruised lips”;
(4) “swollen and bruised right hand”; (5)
“numbness and nerve damage to the upper torso and head
area”; (6) “related surgeries and treatments to
the head”; (7) “traumatic brain injury”;
(8) “depression”; (9) “anxiety and panic
attacks”; and (10) “injuries to the contiguous
muscles, ligaments, nerves, soft tissues, glands, bones[, ]
and joints of the injured parts [sic].” (ECF No. 17 at
6-8.) He also alleges that he incurred medical expenses,
suffered diminished ability to participate in the activities
of everyday life, and lost earning capacity. (Id.)
The
defendants have moved to dismiss several of Jordan's
claims under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 20.) They have moved to
dismiss Jordan's Monell claims, his claims under
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the
Connecticut Constitution, his claims for negligence against
Kearse and Lappore, and his false imprisonment claim.
(Id.)
II.
Legal Standard
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must
determine whether the plaintiff has alleged “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Under Twombly,
the Court accepts as true all of the complaint's factual
allegations-but not conclusory allegations-when evaluating a
motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 572. The
Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party.” Vietnam Ass'n for
Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104,
115 (2d Cir. 2008). “When a complaint is based solely
on wholly conclusory allegations and provides no factual
support for such claims, it is appropriate to grant
defendants['] motion to dismiss.” Scott v. Town
of Monroe, 306 F.Supp.2d 191, 198 (D. Conn. 2004). For a
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, “[a]fter the
court strips away conclusory allegations, there must remain
sufficient well-pleaded factual allegations to nudge
plaintiff's claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” In re Fosamax Products Liab.
Litig., No. 09-cv-1412 (JFK), 2010 WL 1654156, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2010). In its review of a motion to
dismiss, the court may consider “only the facts alleged
in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or
incorporated by reference in the pleadings and matters of
which judicial notice may be taken.” Samuels v. Air
Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1993).
III.
Analysis
A.
Monell and Supervisory Liability Claims
The
defendants have moved to dismiss Count One of Jordan's
Amended Complaint, which is brought against the Town of
Windsor, because he has not sufficiently alleged that an
unconstitutional policy or custom caused his injuries. They
have moved to dismiss Count Two, which names Chief Kearse and
Captain Lappore, because there are insufficient allegations
that those two defendants were personally involved in the
March 14, 2015 incident. (ECF No. 20-1 at 8-12.)
A
municipality is liable under Section 1983 only if it had a
“policy or custom” that caused the
plaintiff's injury. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Wray
v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“To hold a city liable under Section 1983 for the
unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is
required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official
policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be
subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Courts
have recognized that “[a] plaintiff may satisfy the
policy or custom prong in one of four ways: by alleging the
existence of (1) a formal policy; (2) actions taken or
decisions made by final municipal policymakers that caused
the violation of plaintiff's rights; (3) a practice so
persistent and widespread that it constitutes a custom or
usage and implies the constructive knowledge of policymakers;
or (4) a failure to properly train or supervise municipal
employees that amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of those with whom municipal employees will come into
contact.” Aquino v. City of N.Y., No.
1:16-cv-1577, 2017 WL 384354, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2017)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Albert v. City of Hartford, 529 F.Supp.2d 311, 329 (D.
Conn. 2007).
“A
municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is
at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to
train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61
(2011). For municipal liability to attach on a failure to
train theory, “a municipality's failure to train
its employees in a relevant respect must amount to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
[untrained employees] come into contact.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A
pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate
indifference for purposes of failure to train.”
Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “While it may be true that Section 1983
plaintiffs cannot be expected to know the details of a
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