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Jones v. Waldron

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

June 27, 2018

DASHANTE SCOTT JONES, Plaintiff,
v.
WALDRON et al., Defendants.

          RULING AND ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

          VICTOR A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Dashante Scott Jones (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Garner Correction Institution in Newtown, Connecticut, has sued several correction officers and officials (collectively “Defendants”) alleging use of excessive force, failure to protect Mr. Jones from harm, deliberate indifference to his safety, supervisory liability, and conspiracy, while Mr. Jones was incarcerated at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center.

         Mr. Jones has moved to amend the First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 148, and seeks a temporary restraining order, ECF Nos. 149, 153, 160; a trial date, ECF No. 150; modification of liens, ECF No. 151; and a federal investigation, ECF No. 152. Mr. Jones has also moved to compel discovery, ECF No. 160, and for the appointment of pro bono counsel, ECF No. 175.

         For the reasons that follow, the motions to amend the First Amended Complaint, for a temporary restraining order, a trial date, modification of liens, a federal investigation, and to compel discovery are all DENIED. Mr. Jones's motion for the appointment counsel is DENIED as moot.

         I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         Mr. Jones alleges that, while incarcerated at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center, Defendant John Doe sexually assaulted him on May 22, 2014, and Defendants Snyder and Colby used excessive force against him. He further alleges that defendants Murphy, Quigley, Sweet, Jusseame, Glover, Witkowski, Burnham, and Waldron also were involved, but cannot identify specific actions taken by them because his vision was obscured by the use of pepper spray. None of the defendants allegedly interceded on his behalf.

         Mr. Jones also asserts claims for supervisory liability against defendants Waldron, Williams and Erfe and conspiracy claims against all of these defendants. Immediately following the incident, defendants Waldron, Barnes and Bogue allegedly failed to ensure that his eyes were properly flushed and defendants Barrett, Barnes and Bogue allegedly failed to follow proper procedures for incidents of sexual assault. Mr. Jones also asserts claims for supervisory liability against defendants Waldron, Williams and Erfe for failure to train their subordinates, ensure they followed proper procedures and take corrective action, despite having seen the video recordings of the incident.

         In 2015, Mr. Jones, proceeding pro se, commenced this civil action and, in June 2015, amended the Complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 11. On its initial review, the Court dismissed the Amended Complaint in part and allowed Mr. Jones's excessive force, failure to protect, deliberate indifference to safety, supervisory liability and conspiracy claims to proceed.

         Mr. Jones has moved to amend the First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 148, and seeks a temporary restraining order, ECF Nos. 149, 153, 160; a trial date, ECF No. 150; modification of liens, ECF No. 151; and a federal investigation, ECF No. 152. Mr. Jones has also moved to compel discovery. ECF No. 160.

         On June 14, 2018, the Court appointed pro bono counsel to represent Mr. Jones in the prosecution of his claims.[1] ECF No. 174.

         The Court now addresses Mr. Jones's pending motions.

         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         A. Amendment of Pleadings

         Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend its pleading as of right within twenty-one days after serving it or “if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, [within] 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion” to dismiss, a motion for a more definite statement, or a motion to strike, whichever is earlier. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. The district court has broad discretion to decide a motion to amend. Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater New York v. Parker Meridien Hotel, 145 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1998).

         B. Motion for Injunctive Relief

         Injunctive relief, in the form of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, is available only to redress injuries that are related to the conduct giving rise to the complaint. See DeBeers Consol. Mines Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (noting that a preliminary injunction is appropriate to grant intermediate relief of “the same character as that which relief may be granted finally, ” but inappropriate where the injunction “deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit”); Trowell v. Upstate Corr. Facility, No. 9:16-CV-0639 (MAD/TWD), 2016 WL 7156559, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2016) (“To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunctive ...


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