United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S OUTSTANDING
MOTIONS
MICHAEL P. SHEA, U.S.D. JUDGE
Defendant
Raymond McLaughlin was indicted on two counts: (1) corruptly
endeavoring to obstruct and impede the due administration of
the internal revenue laws in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
7212(a); and (2) willfully and knowingly making and using a
false writing and document, knowing the same to contain a
materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and
entry in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive
branch of the United States government in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001. (ECF No. 7 at 1-3.) In particular, the
indictment alleges that the defendant mailed “similar
packages of materials to the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) in Austin, Texas and to the United States
Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) in
Washington, D.C.” containing “a No. of
documents” that “falsely claimed that [the
defendant] had paid approximately $332, 204” to a
Connecticut state judge and to the “Judiciary Courts of
the State of Connecticut.” (ECF No. 7 at 2.) The
indictment also alleges that the defendant knew that the
information in these forms was false and that he
“stated and declared under the penalties of perjury
that he had examined the submissions [on these forms] and
that they were true, correct, and complete . . . .”
(ECF No. 7 at 3.) I dismissed Count One of the indictment
upon the Government's and the defendant's motions in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Marinello v.
United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018). (ECF No. 129.) Now
before me are the defendant's seven pending motions to
dismiss the indictment (ECF Nos. 115, 120, 124, 132, 135,
136, 145) and one pending motion to have a default entered
against the Government (ECF No. 117). For the following
reasons, the defendant's motions are hereby DENIED.
I.
Discussion
a.
Motions Predicated Upon Lack of Jurisdiction
The
defendant has filed four motions challenging the indictment
on the basis that the Court lacks jurisdiction over him.
(See ECF Nos. 115, 117, 132, 135.[1]) Two of the
defendant's motions in this vein aver that various
defects in his birth certificate deprive the Court of subject
matter and personal jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 132
(averring that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the defendant because he “was born without
Registration and has no legal existence”); ECF No. 135
(oral motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction due
to an error on the defendant's birth certificate)).
Another such motion avers that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the defendant's case because the United
States Attorney for the District of Connecticut
(“United States Attorney”), the Assistant United
States Attorney (“AUSA”) prosecuting this case,
and the foreperson of the grand jury lacked the capacity to
sign the indictment on behalf of the United States of
America. (See ECF No. 115 (averring that the Court
“lacks authority” over the indictment because the
United States Attorney, AUSA prosecuting the case, and the
“other signer” of the indictment “are not
agents for [the] United States of America in this
matter”).) A fourth motion contends that the
“United States of America lacks standing and cannot
rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court.”
(See ECF No. 120.)
The
defendant's contention that the court lacks jurisdiction
is a nonstarter. Federal law provides the “district
courts of the United States” with “original
jurisdiction . . . of all offenses against the laws of the
United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231. “[I]f an
indictment or information alleges the violation of a crime
set out in Title 18 or in one of the other statutes defining
federal crimes, that is the end of the jurisdictional
inquiry.” United States v. Fahnbulleh, 752
F.3d 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
George, 676 F.3d 249, 259 (1st Cir. 2012)).
Thus, the fact that the defendant was charged with a federal
crime under Title 18-specifically under 18 U.S.C. §
1001-confers subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court. The
defendant's motion averring that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over him is similarly meritless. “It is
well settled that a district court has personal jurisdiction
over any party who appears before it, ” United
States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1991), as
the defendant has done repeatedly in this case. Thus, the
Court possesses personal jurisdiction over the defendant by
virtue of his presence before it in response to the
indictment. See United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d
799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding “district court
had personal jurisdiction over [defendant] by virtue of
[defendant's] having been brought before it on a federal
indictment charging a violation of federal law”).
As
such, the defendant's motions are denied.
b.
Motion for Default Predicated Upon Lack of Agency
The
defendant has also moved for a default to be entered against
the United States on the basis that the United States
Attorney and the AUSA prosecuting this case lack the
authority to represent it. (See ECF No. 117 (moving
for a “default” to be entered against the United
States of America due to the fact that the United States
Attorney and the AUSA prosecuting this case “are not
[its] agents”).) This argument is meritless. The United
States Attorney is empowered by statute to prosecute all
offenses against the United States and may proceed against
any person upon presentation of charges to a grand jury. See
28 U.S.C. § 547 (“Except as otherwise provided by
law, each United States attorney, within his district, shall
. . . prosecute for all offenses against the United States .
. . .”); U.S. Const. amend. V (“No personal shall
be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury . . .
.”). Thus, this motion is also denied.
c.
Motions to Dismiss in Light of Dismissal of Count
One
The
defendant moves to dismiss the remaining count of the
indictment on the basis that it fails to charge him with a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. (See ECF No. 136
at 1.)[2] In particular, the defendant contends that
the Court's dismissal of count one precludes the
Government from establishing that he made a materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry to the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”). (Id.). Under 18
U.S.C. § 1001(a), a person commits a federal crime if he
or she, “in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government
of the United States knowingly and willfully”
“makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or entry.” In order to establish
“materiality, ” the Government must prove that a
“statement [has] a natural tendency to influence, or
[be] capable of influencing, the decision of the
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.”
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant contends
that, in dismissing Count One of the indictment in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Marinello (see ECF No.
129), the Court effectively concluded that the
defendant's statements to the IRS at issue in this case
were not material for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
(ECF No. 136 at 2.)
Marinello
concerned the scope of a portion of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)
otherwise known as the “Omnibus Clause.”
Marinello, 198 S.Ct. at 1104. The Omnibus Clause prohibits
“corruptly or by force or threats of force (including
any threatening letter or communication) obstruct[ing] or
imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due
administration of [the Internal Revenue Code].” 26
U.S.C. § 7212(a). The Marinello Court held that
“to secure a conviction under the Omnibus Clause, the
government must show (among other things) that there is a
‘nexus' between the defendant's conduct and a
particular administrative proceeding, such as an
investigation, an audit, or other targeted administrative
action. That nexus requires a relationship in time,
causation, or logic with the [administrative]
proceeding.” Id. at 1109 (internal citations
omitted). The Marinello Court noted that
“administrative proceeding[s]” did not include
“routine, day-to-day work carried out in the ordinary
course by the IRS, such as the review of tax returns.”
Id. at 1109-10. Count One of the indictment failed
to allege such a nexus because it did not contend that the
defendant mailed his material to obstruct an ongoing IRS
administrative proceeding or that he was aware of any such
proceeding. (See ECF No. 7 at 2 (alleging that the
defendant violated the Omnibus Clause by “mailing and
causing to be mailed, similar packages of materials to the
Internal Revenue Service in Austin, Texas and to the United
States Department of the Treasury in Washington, D.C”
enclosing a No. of documents containing information that the
defendant “knew to be false.”).)
This
reasoning does not apply to Count Two of the indictment. The
fact that the defendant's submissions to the IRS did not
have a nexus to an ongoing administrative proceeding does not
reflect upon the capability of those statements to influence
the IRS and the Treasury. Further, the Supreme Court noted in
Gaudin that the question of materiality under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, a “mixed question of law and fact, has
typically been resolved by juries . . ., involving as it does
delicate assessments of the inferences a reasonable
[decisionmaker] would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him . . . .”
Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). For these reasons, the question of
whether the defendant's submissions were capable of
influencing the IRS and the Treasury must be left to the
jury. Indeed, an indictment survives a motion to dismiss as
long as it alleges the elements of the charged offense and
contains enough detail to enable the defendant to plead
double jeopardy in a future prosecution based on the same
elements. United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772,
776 (2d Cir. 1998). This indictment expressly alleges
materiality, as well as the other elements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, and contains adequate factual detail. That is
sufficient to place the government's allegations before a
jury. The defendant remains free, of course, to challenge the
Government's proof of materiality before the jury. I
therefore deny the defendant's motion.
d.
Motions to Dismiss Count Two Based Upon ...