United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS
HON.
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
April Beutel (“plaintiff”), brings this appeal
under §205(g) of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §405(g),
seeking review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner” or “defendant”)
denying her application for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under the Act. Plaintiff has moved for an
order reversing the decision of the Commissioner or in the
alternative to remand for a rehearing. [Doc. #18]. Defendant
has filed a cross-motion seeking an order affirming the
decision of the Commissioner. [Doc. #20].
For the
reasons set forth below, plaintiff's Motion for Order
Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner or in the
Alterative Motion for Remand for a Rehearing [Doc.
#18] is GRANTED, in
part, to the extent plaintiff seeks a remand for a
rehearing, and defendant's Motion for an Order Affirming
the Decision of the Commissioner [Doc. #20]
is DENIED.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY[1]
Plaintiff
filed an application for SSI on December 10, 2013, alleging
disability beginning December 3, 2013. See Certified
Transcript of the Administrative Record, Doc. #16, compiled
on September 7, 2017, (hereinafter “Tr.”) at
209-17. Plaintiff's application was denied initially on
January 27, 2014, see Tr. 152-60, and upon reconsideration on
March 12, 2014. See Tr. 161-63.
On
September 23, 2015, plaintiff, represented by Attorney
Maurice Maitland, appeared and testified at a hearing before
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Deirdre R.
Horton. See Tr. 94-125. On March 1, 2016, the ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision. See Tr. 59-78. On May 23, 2017, the
Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review,
thereby making the ALJ's March 1, 2016, decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. See Tr. 1-7. The case is
now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
Plaintiff,
now represented by Attorney Olia Yelner, timely filed this
action for review and now moves to reverse the
Commissioner's decision, or alternatively, to remand for
a rehearing. [Doc. #18]. On appeal, plaintiff argues:
1. The ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinion evidence;
2. The ALJ failed to properly develop the record;
3. The ALJ failed to properly assess plaintiff's Residual
Functional Capacity (“RFC”); and
4. The ALJ's step five determination is not supported by
substantial evidence.
See generally Doc. #18-1 at 18-35.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
review of a Social Security disability determination involves
two levels of inquiry. First, the Court must decide whether
the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles in
making the determination. Second, the Court must decide
whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d
Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion; it is more than a “mere
scintilla.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The reviewing
court's responsibility is to ensure that a claim has been
fairly evaluated by the ALJ. See Grey v. Heckler,
721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
The
Court does not reach the second stage of review - evaluating
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
conclusion - if the Court determines that the ALJ failed to
apply the law correctly. See Norman v. Astrue, 912
F.Supp.2d 33, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The Court first
reviews the Commissioner's decision for compliance with
the correct legal standards; only then does it determine
whether the Commissioner's conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence.” (citing Tejada v.
Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999))).
“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether
the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the
substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no
disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will
be deprived of the right to have her disability determination
made according to the correct legal principles.”
Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987).
“[T]he
crucial factors in any determination must be set forth with
sufficient specificity to enable [a reviewing court] to
decide whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence.” Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582,
587 (2d Cir. 1984) (alterations added) (citing Treadwell
v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1983)). The ALJ
is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, but
a “finding that the witness is not credible must
nevertheless be set forth with sufficient specificity to
permit intelligible plenary review of the record.”
Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255,
260-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Carroll v. Sec. Health and
Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1983)).
“Moreover, when a finding is potentially dispositive on
the issue of disability, there must be enough discussion to
enable a reviewing court to determine whether substantial
evidence exists to support that finding.” Johnston
v. Colvin, No. 3:13CV00073(JCH), 2014 WL 1304715, at *6
(D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Peoples v. Shalala,
No. 92CV4113, 1994 WL 621922, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4,
1994)).
It is
important to note that in reviewing the ALJ's decision,
this Court's role is not to start from scratch. “In
reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited
to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence in the record and were
based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v.
Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Lamay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507
(2d Cir. 2009)).
III.
SSA LEGAL STANDARD
Under
the Social Security Act, every individual who is under a
disability is entitled to disability insurance benefits. 42
U.S.C. §423(a)(1).
To be
considered disabled under the Act and therefore entitled to
benefits, plaintiff must demonstrate that she is unable to
work after a date specified “by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Such impairment
or impairments must be “of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R.
§416.920(c) (requiring that the impairment
“significantly limit[] ... physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities” to be considered
“severe” (alterations added)).[2]
There
is a familiar five-step analysis used to determine if a
person is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §416.920. In the
Second Circuit, the test is described as follows:
First, the Secretary considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is
not, the Secretary next considers whether the claimant has a
“severe impairment” which significantly limits
his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry
is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant
has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the
Secretary will consider him disabled without considering
vocational factors such as age, education, and work
experience; the Secretary presumes that a claimant who is
afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to
perform substantial gainful activity.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). If and only if the claimant does not have a
listed impairment, the Commissioner engages in the fourth and
fifth steps:
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe
impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to
perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform his past work, the Secretary then determines whether
there is other work which the claimant could perform. Under
the cases previously discussed, the claimant ...